The Pre-war Situation of the First Changsha Battle

Since the twenty-seventh year of the Republic of China (1938), China and War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression entered a stalemate, and the Japanese invaders had to adjust their policy of aggression against China and implement the strategy of political inducement and surrender, supplemented by military strikes; At the same time, we should abandon the military strategy of quick victory and replace it with a protracted war, save your strength and wait for an opportunity to solve the China incident in one fell swoop.

At that time, there were nearly 100 divisions of China defenders in the periphery of Wuhan, and they formed a situation of encircling Wuhan. South of the Yangtze River is the ninth war zone commanded by Chen Cheng and Xue Yue, with 52 infantry divisions. North of the Yangtze River is Li Zongren's 5th war zone, with 35 infantry divisions. The Japanese army/KOLOC-0//KOLOC-0/Commander Okamura Ningji/KOLOC-0//KOLOC-0/Troops launched the Nanchang Campaign and the Xiangdong Campaign (that is, the battle with Ziziphus jujuba) in the spring and summer of/KOLOC-0/939. After these two operations, the Japanese army captured Nanchang, repelled the counterattack of the troops in the ninth theater, gained the southeast barrier of Wuhan security circle, and opened the passage to Changsha; At the same time, it hit the troops in the fifth war zone, saved the position east of Hanshui, and temporarily eased the worries of Jiangbei. At the end of August, the Japanese army pointed its attack at Hunan.

Operational concept

In the 28th year of the Republic of China (1939) and in September 1, Okamura Ningji formulated the operational guidelines. According to the judgment, China's army in Xiushui River is divided into 25 divisions. In order to defeat the will of China's army to continue the war of resistance, the Japanese army decided to start a surprise attack after mid-September, so as to capture the main force of the ninth theater in the shortest time and annihilate the surrounding areas of Pingjiang and Xiushui in northern Hunan and southern Jiangxi. Therefore, the Japanese army's 1 1 army concentrated about 654.38+10,000 troops in three divisions (including navy and aviation). Under the command of Commander Okamura Ningji, it adopted the policy of attack and attack.

13 September, the Japanese secret deployment was completed, and the JapaneseNo. 1 1 operational command post was stationed in Xianning, and Okamura personally commanded the operation. Officially issue operational orders. The main contents are as follows: In order to conceal the main attack direction, confuse and contain the China army, 106 Division began to attack first on September 15, and broke through the garrison positions of 1 and 19 Army from the west of Fengxin, and annihilated the northwest defenders of Gao 'an after entering and leaving its side; Thirty-three divisions rushed from Tongcheng to Maishi and Zhajin. Strike the 27th and 30th armies of the local China army. The army's main force launched an attack at dawn on September 23, in which the 6 th Division made rapid progress from the west of Wangxin Town to the southern highland of Lishui; Its left-wing Nara detachment suddenly advanced from the west of Yanglin Street to Qikou and the north bank of Lishui. Its right-wing Shangcun detachment landed in Yingtian at dawn on September 23; Attacking the Pingjiang area in the upper reaches of the Miluo River, these three forces cooperated to annihilate the China garrison 15 army in this area. The whole campaign is expected to return to the original station in 20-30 days, June10-June 15. Pre-war preparation

The ninth war zone in China mainly covers Hunan, southern Hubei and Jiangxi provinces. The war zone spans the border areas of Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi provinces, with Ganjiang and Xiangjiang rivers as natural borders in the east and west, lakes in the two wings, Poyang Lake in the east and Dongting Lake in the west, which just happens to be a neat and symmetrical battlefield. The Japanese circuitous tactics can't be put into use, so they can only fight head-on. Moreover, the areas where Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi provinces intersect are criss-crossed with mountains and complex terrain. Most of the northern Hunan area north of Changsha is mountainous: northern Hunan is not only mountainous, but also watery. With the Guangdong-Han Railway as the boundary, draw a straight line from north to south, with Dongting Lake, Lishui, Yuanshui and Xiangjiang River on the left and Wangxin, Miluo River, Laodao River and Liuyang River on the right, forming a natural defense line. This mountainous and watery terrain will have a great influence on the actions of the troops, especially the mechanized actions against the Japanese army.

Xue Yue (1939, 10, 1, officially appointed as the commander-in-chief), the acting commander of the ninth theater, thinks that the Japanese attack can be completely repelled by using these favorable geographical conditions and correct strategies and tactics. The battle plan of the theater is as follows: It seems that the enemy began to invade the south in mid-September, pushing the main force from northern Hunan to southern Changsha, and implementing coordinated operations between northern Jiangxi and southern Hubei. The war zone plan dealt a heavy blow to the enemy and set a precedent for the victory of the second anti-Japanese war. It will lure the enemy deep into the area north of Changsha and surround and annihilate the enemy's main force. In northern Jiangxi and southern Hubei, the enemy's attempt to coordinate the war should be broken to ensure the success of the main force. Xue Yue summed up the core point of this strategic deployment in eight words: retreat and seek external wings.

Specific deployment

With the approaching of the war, Xue Yue also began to deploy troops. At that time, the ninth theater had 2 1 troops, 3 forward columns and 52 divisions. The Military Commission of the National Government is subordinate to four armies (the 4th, 5th, 99th and the newly compiled 6th Army) and 1 division (namely 1 1 division). There are 500,000 people in 63 divisions of 25 armies, and 2 1 army has 49 divisions and 3 forward columns (the actual combat effectiveness is 30,000) By mid-September, the specific deployment of its troops was as follows:

1 Army's 58th and 60th armies are guarding the frontline positions of Jing 'an, Zhangjiashan, Ma Xia and Huibu west of Fengxin;

19 Army's 32nd and 49th Army are guarding the positions on the right bank of Lianhua Mountain, Maxingshan and Jinjiang;

15 army is dominated by 52 troops guarding the new wall river position, 79 troops guarding the position between Nanjiang Bridge and Maishi, and 37 troops guarding the position north of Xiangyin on the right bank of Xiangjiang River.

Twenty armies of the 27th Army left Xianning and Chongyang areas, and seventy armies assembled in Zhajin area.

30 army * * * 72nd and 78th divisions, guarding the positions around Pu Tianqiao and Pipashan, west of Wuning;

Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border region is located in Tongshan, Daye and Yangxin areas;

The 4th, 70th, 74th, 5th, 99th, newly-made 6th Army and 1 1 division * *15th Division are the general reserves of the war zone, which are assembled in Xiangtan, Zhuzhou, Hengshan, Hengyang, Liuyang, Gaobei, Yifeng and Wanzai in the south and east of Changsha respectively.

In addition, the 20th Army (under the jurisdiction of the 53rd, 54th, 87th Army, etc. ) Defending Dongting Lake and Xiangxi in the 6th Theater. In order to facilitate coordinated operations, the army is subordinate to the ninth theater command. The ninth theater commander's office is located in Changsha.