Who is Mao?

Mao, a native of Zhennan, Han nationality, was born in Qiantang County (now Shangcheng District, Hangzhou City, Zhejiang Province) in the Ming Dynasty. China is a famous military strategist, a national hero, and a famous fighter against the late Jin Dynasty. Mao was the largest military commander after the annihilation of the Jin (Qing) army in the late Ming Dynasty, and was known as the "Great Wall at Sea". He devoted his whole life to defending the Ming Dynasty, and finally died with bitterness.

In May of the first year of the Apocalypse (162 1), Mao led his troops to take a boat from Sanchahe to Zhudao, Kashima, Bird Island, Shicheng, Changshan, Shirley, Zhangzi and other places to collect Liao people in exile. At the beginning of July, it was reported that Tong Yangzhen, the commander of Zhenjiang in the late Jin Dynasty, sent troops, so Chen Zhongdu, the emperor, sneaked into Zhenjiang to meet Chen Liangce. Late at night on the 20th of that month, Mao himself led 3,000 people into Zhenjiang and captured Tong Yangzhen and his son Tong Songnian alive. After the triumph of Zhenjiang, the whole Liao Dynasty shook, and castles such as Kuandian, Tangzhan and Yishan surrendered to Mao Longwen one after another. At that time, "Fiona Fang is hundreds of miles away, jittery" (Volume 4 of Mao Shuai Dongjiang Supplement in Ming Dynasty), and "People who surrender seek and seek" (Volume 5 of Dongjiang Tangbao Festival Copy), so Mao was awarded the qualification.

In September of the first year of the Apocalypse (162 1), the Maoists stationed troops on Mayang Island, and led troops to Jinzhou coastal area at night to recover Jinzhou and Lushun in one fell swoop. At this time, Nurhachi was preparing to occupy Beining and Xingcheng in the south. However, after Jinzhou, Lushun and Zhenjiang successively fell, Nurhachi had to mobilize the main force of Houjin to attack Zhenjiang City in September of the same year. Under heavy siege, Zhenjiang City fell, and most troops died heroically. Mao led some officers and men to break through.

In response to Mao's threat, Nurhachi ordered Belle A Min, Huang Taiji and others to lead troops to suppress Mao's threat, and Mao retreated to North Korea to escape. Later, Ambassador Kim sent a letter to North Korea, saying, "If our two countries really want to live in harmony, then arrest Mao and Chen Liangce." ("Old Files of Manchu Dynasty", Volume 28 of Taizu Dynasty, November 12, 2006), but North Korea did not expel Mao.

In August of the second year of the Apocalypse (1622), Mao sent Chen Zhong and his troops to conquer the cherry vortex and vortex station occupied by the late Jin Dynasty.

In September of the second year of the Apocalypse (1622), Mao's army conquered Manpu and the Great Wall.

In October of the second year of the Apocalypse (1622), the troops stationed in Mao Lushun went north and made a surprise attack on the 8 Jin Army. "The troops in Jianzhou fled, and the castles in Yongning were all under it." Soon, the late Jin attacked the south on a large scale, and returned to Lushun because he fought alone and was defeated. In the spring of the following year, "Jianzhou led another 10,000 troops to attack Lushun Fort" and sent envoys to make a plan. After the siege of the 8 Jin Army, Zhang Pan led his troops to attack the 8 Jin Army in the north and south mountains of Lushun, and the "Jianzhou soldiers were defeated."

In October of the second year of the Apocalypse (1622), Mao personally led the troops in the store to fight with the post-Jin Army, and both sides suffered heavy casualties. The latter Jin was limited to the main force assembled in the southwest front, unable to suppress Mao, while Mao was unable to attack because of the lack of generals and supplies. The two sides confronted or fought, and the war was in a stalemate. Although the war has not been won, it is of considerable strategic significance. The post-Jin regime deeply felt the existence of Mao Zedong and had to consider the security of the rear area and invade the south without scruple.

Due to the unsuccessful attack on Mao by Jin Jinbing several times, North Korea sent Mao to Pidao to prevent the situation from deteriorating, "fearing future troubles, saying that it was intentional to Mao Jiang and make it involved in the island" ("A Record of the Korean Li Dynasty"). In the second year of the Apocalypse (1622), the troops led by Mao came to Pidao, Korea. In order to prevent the late payment, North Korea strongly supported Mao Zedong, zoned idle fields, exempted taxes, helped pay military salaries, gave food, and supplemented a large number of firearms. Mao's support in North Korea has greatly increased. In addition to its tens of thousands of troops, it also accepted more than 10 million refugees.

Because of Mao's rest and supplement in Korea, he harassed the post-Jin dynasty more actively. In addition to constantly carrying out military strikes on the frontal battlefield, Mao also sent people to sneak into the late Jin Dynasty and encouraged the Liao people to rise up against the late Jin regime.

1623, the Maoists "incited" in the late Jin Dynasty, causing a large number of Liao people to "rebel", and at the same time leading some Liao people to rise up and gather people to "rebel". Although Mao Zai's actions were small in scale, they had a great influence on the people in the hinterland of the late Jin Dynasty. 1623 became the year of severe disaster in Houjin area. Because of Mao's existence, the movement against the brutal rule in the Houjin area surged. Officials in the Houjin area were often cheated and killed in various names, and even the food bought by Manchu people was often poisoned, so that Manchu women had to write down the name of the store after buying food. That year, eleven thousand people went from Fuzhou (Fuxian County, Liaoning Province) to Ming Dynasty Ding ("Manchu Old File Mao", Volume 56). Many Baylor ministers in the latter Jin Dynasty thought: "Mao's suffering should end as soon as possible! As long as Long Wen does not die, there will be a day of treachery and rebellion, and the kind people will not have peace. "

After Mao started Dongjiang Town, he made a series of brilliant achievements, but it became a "long-standing problem" in the later Jin Dynasty. Sadly, when Yuan Chonghuan killed Mao Shuai, the last charge actually mentioned "watch and help each other": "After eight years of opening the town, you can't recover an inch of land, and watch and help each other, and all twelve will be beheaded!" It seems that Lord Yuan has the demeanor of a grand marshal. Later, it turned out that they were really "connected" ...

In the second year of the Apocalypse (1622), Sun Chengzong left Shanhaiguan Town in August. When Mao harassed the late Jin Dynasty, captured the city and turned against the border people, Sun Chengzong stabilized the defense of Shanhaiguan Guancheng. Although Nuerhachi captured Guangning at the beginning of 1622, under the strategy of resolutely clearing the field, Wang Zaijin, Sun Chengzong sticking to Shanhaiguan and Mao constantly harassing the rear, its offensive advantage was successfully contained. Although Mao retreated to Pidao in November of the second year of the Apocalypse (1622), the hinterland of Jin was turned upside down by Mao in the following year (1623). At this time, Sun Chengzong seized the opportunity and began to build Ningyuan City, and enabled Juehua Island to cooperate with Dongjiang Town to fight against Houjin. In September of the third year of the Apocalypse (1623), Sun Chengzong ordered Yuan Chonghuan to lead an army into Ningyuan. At this time, it has been more than a year since he left the important town of Shanhaiguan ... Everyone knows this history very well, so I won't go into details here. It is not difficult to see that the construction of Ningyuan City is so smooth, which has a considerable relationship with Mao's containment of Dongjiang Town behind enemy lines.

It should also be noted that Yuan Chonghuan's most well-known achievements are related to Ningyuan. Ningyuan was one of the steps for the Ming army to show its military presence in Liaoning after the fall of Guangning in the Ming Dynasty, and it was also an important measure to coordinate Dongjiang Town, Mongolia, North Korea and other parties in this way to contain the late Jin Dynasty. This strategy was determined with Sun Chengzong's full efforts and implemented with his support, without Sun Chengzong's personal field trip. After returning to Beijing, he went to Beijing more than ten times and served in the cabinet. Later, he became an imperial envoy and raised Liao, so there was no support for Ningyuan construction from the imperial court to the local government. Without Mao's encouragement in the hinterland of the late Jin Dynasty, Wang Zaijin and Sun Chengzong insisted on closing the door for a long time to contain the edge of the late Jin Dynasty. It was impossible to build Ningyuan City by Yuan Chonghuan alone, and later facts also proved that Ningyuan would not turn without him. To sum up, the construction of Ningyuan was not completed by Yuan alone.

Yuan Chonghuan entered Ningyuan in September of the third year of the Apocalypse (1623). After the completion of Ningyuan City, Ningyuan and Juehua Island became the important contact points between Dongjiang Town and the rear. From the first month of the fourth year of the Apocalypse (1624), Mao's exploits were sent to Juehua Island for inspection before being sent to the Ministry of War in Beijing. The so-called number of exploits is mainly the head captured by Mao, which means Sun Chengzong. Lord Yuan is the natural person who counts people on Juehua Island. The Records of Letters of the Two Dynasties records that "Yuan Chonghuan, the deputy envoy of the Westernization Road, inspected one by one, three times, which was actually 371." In other words, Mao's contribution to all was counted by Yuan's adult. When he was able to cut off Mao Shuai, Lord Yuan actually listed one: "If you report it, you will bully, if you kill it, you will be defeated, if you drop it, you will be a refugee, and if you make meritorious deeds, you will be punished." If Mao always puts the credit for "bullying" on his head, it is estimated that Yuan's adult can't get away with it. It is worth mentioning that Yuan's "Victory in Ningyuan" has only more than 200 beheadings.

In the fourth year of the Apocalypse (1624), Jin strengthened his rule over southern Liaoning and sent heavy troops to guard it. As usual, copying southern Liaoning lost its suddenness, so Mao sent a special submarine force in April of the fourth year of the Apocalypse (1624), secretly went north along the Yalu River, entered Changbai Mountain, and began to harass in the rear area of Houjin, caught off guard. In order to cooperate with this army and relieve its pressure, Mao personally organized and commanded Baguzhai, Gupihong and Fenshui in July of the fourth year of the Apocalypse (1624), and won three out of three. Later, the late Jin Dynasty mobilized heavy reinforcements, and Mao He retreated to North Korea.

After the third year of the Apocalypse (1623), Jin was fiercely resisted by the people in the occupied area, so a series of repressive measures were taken in the following year. During the fourth year of the Apocalypse (1624), the local harassment of Mao was repelled, and the hinterland of Jin was temporarily calm. At this time, it was Yuan's Journey to Guangning. As mentioned earlier, in September of the fourth year of the Apocalypse (1624), Yuan applied for the restoration of Jinzhou after "visiting Guangning in the East". Judging from the situation at that time, it was a lack of strategic vision, so Sun Chengzong immediately rejected his request. "Ming History" records: "Yuan Chonghuan travels eastward, please return to Jinzhou immediately and visit Zhucheng. Chengzong thought it was too late." Thus, Sun Chengzong is really resourceful. Yuan's adult just unconsciously built Ningyuan and didn't know how much he weighed.

Mao, as a partial teacher in the frontal battlefield, was not as good as the latter Jin Dynasty, but he played an important role in instigating the border people to resist the tyranny of the latter Jin Dynasty. Liao people's resistance to the late Jin Dynasty experienced a low tide in the four years of the Apocalypse (1624), but under the cruel suppression of the late Jin Dynasty, the anger of Liaodong people also accumulated and finally broke out in the following year. In the fifth year of the Apocalypse (1625), the Han people in Zhangtun, which belongs to Haizhou (Haicheng, Liaoning), secretly contacted the Manchu who sent troops to attack this tun (Records of the Emperor's Father, Vol.4 and Vol.8). Meanwhile, this year, Zhenjiang, Fengcheng, Xiuyan, Long Island, Shuang Shan, Pingdingshan, Haizhou and Anshan.

Faced with this situation, Sun Chengzong actively supports the shipping of Dongjiang Town. In the fifth year of the Apocalypse (1625), Sun Chengzong sent more troops to Lushun, which was controlled by Mao, to further cope with the resistance of Liao people in the late Jin Dynasty. This will consolidate this Liao stronghold, and deploy troops from Deng and Lai to guard it, which will reduce Mao's pressure and enable Mao to penetrate behind enemy lines. In the fifth year of the Apocalypse (1625), Nurhachi found out that the Ming Dynasty sent 10,000 troops to "station troops in the city from the sea to Lushunkou". Feeling that it posed a military threat, he ordered Sanbaylor to lead 6000 troops and attack Lushunkou directly in the first month. After that, 8 jin j fiercely raided Lushun. After fierce fighting, and his department Zhu was defeated twice in a row. However, after the Jin army captured Lushun, it was afraid that Mao might attack its flank at any time, and did not dare to stay long. It only plundered property, destroyed the city wall and led the troops back to the defense. In March of the fifth year of the Apocalypse (1625), Governor Wu came to the Ming Dynasty to "guard Lushun".

Sun Chengzong received Lushun defense, ordered the Ming army to enter Jinzhou. "History of the Ming Dynasty" records: "In the summer of five years, Chengzong and Chonghuan planned to send troops to Jinzhou, Songshan, Xingshan, Youtun, and the Linghe River, and the city was built in it." Sun Chengzong's move was a further demonstration of the military presence of the Ming Dynasty in Liaodong, but it didn't mean to fight for the future or advance the front. Sun Chengzong always coincides with Yan Mingtai. Jinzhou, a "non-simple place", can only be "suspended as a virtual work, cautious as a practical one" and has a thorough understanding of "stopping as a live game and being cautious as a dead game". In fact, this truth is not complicated. Jinzhou lies between Xiaoling River and Daling River. From Ningyuan to Jinzhou, you must pass Tashan, Songshan and Xingshan to reach Xiaoling River. If any place is restricted, Jinzhou will be cut off from the rear. Yuan Chonghuan failed to effectively reinforce Zhao Lvjiao in the Ningjin War, and Hong Chengchou failed to rescue Zu Dashou in the Jin Song War because of this geographical defect. The reasons for the failure of Daling River City are similar.

It is worth mentioning that after Yuan Chonghuan was beheaded, Sun Chengzong defended Liao for the second time. At that time, the Ming army had completed the construction of Jinzhou, but when the defense line was pushed forward to Daling River City, it was opposed by Sun Chengzong. At this time, his caution is completely different from the deployment and courage of "sending troops to Jinzhou, Songshan, Xingshan, Youtun and Linghe". The difference is that it "hangs in the air" and he can advance and retreat freely. There is no need to "scrape off half of Gankun with a few tiny bullets". If the post-Jin army really attacks, it should give up, just as assistant minister Huo of the Ministry of War summed up the generals' opposition to Jinzhou after the "Ningjin War": "When thieves arrive, they must stay in the wild." This is the right choice, instead of spending huge sums of money to build Jinzhou, which is easy to be surrounded. The failure of "Jin Song War" proved this point. It can be seen that Sun Chengzong occupied so many cities at once at 1625, but it was just "hanging in the air".

However, when Sun Chengzong defended Liao for the second time, Jinzhou City was built by Yuan Daren, which was already an "original". According to the top-down thinking set at that time, it is bound to be a "real job" to take another step towards Daling River. It is unlikely that Sun Chengzong will change this wrong strategy in a short time, so he can only act cautiously, but it was conservative to build the Daling River at that time. Another opinion is to restore Quang Ninh, but that would be more risky. 1624, Sun Chengzong sent Yuan Daren with 12000 troops to "travel east to Guangning" and didn't recover. Now that Huang Taiji is in Mongolia, is it possible to recover? Faced with this choice, Sun Chengzong reluctantly compromised and reluctantly allowed the construction of Daling River City. As expected, the Daling River was attacked by the late Jin before it was completed, and the defenders in Jinzhou and Ningyuan could not reinforce the Daling River. As a result, the Ming army suffered heavy losses and became a reality again. After that, Sun Chengzong took the initiative to assume the responsibility for the fall of Daling River City, and ended the second defense of Liao.

To sum up, we can see that Sun Chengzong's step-by-step approach is very sophisticated and accurate, which not only continues the strategy of "clearing the field and fighting the battle behind closed doors" by Wang in Jin, but also promotes Jinzhou and Lushun from time to time to "make a feint", in fact, writing articles in Dongjiang Town, in order to achieve the goal of containing Nurhachi, harassing the late Jin Dynasty, disrupting the opponent's rear by rebellion and successfully defending Liao for four years.

In October of the fifth year of the Apocalypse (1625), Sun Chengzong was dismissed for sending Ming troops to harass the Daling River. The general Ma Shilong was slightly depressed and was replaced by Gao Di. In fact, Sun Chengzong's attack on the Daling River was also a continuation of the harassment of the late Jin Dynasty, indicating that the military presence of the Ming Dynasty cooperated with Dongjiang Town's actions in the rear of the late Jin Dynasty.

After Gaudi took over, he ordered the general withdrawal, Jinzhou withdrawal, Ningyuan withdrawal, military withdrawal, civilian withdrawal, material withdrawal, ordnance withdrawal, and grain and grass withdrawal. Anyway, everything that can be withdrawn has been withdrawn. This is in stark contrast to Sun Chengzong's step-by-step approach. Many people accused Yuan of "retreating", "fleeing" and "crushing defeat", and praised Yuan's "great achievements" infinitely. This method has been characterized for a long time, but is it really like this? Let's sort out the views of Xiong Tingbi, Wang Zaijin and Sun Chengzong just now.

When Gaudi took over, it was already after October. The autumn harvest season has passed, and the grain has been put into storage, which is near winter. Once the severe winter comes, the seas and rivers in Liaoning will freeze. Haihe River can no longer be used as a geographical barrier to block the post-Jin Dynasty, and even Juehua Island, which is far from home, is not spared. Therefore, once the late Jin attacks, even a sudden attack is very dangerous. Every time Liaodong changes slightly, Jindu takes the opportunity to harass and often succeeds. At this time, when will Nurhachi attack? According to Nurhachi's habit of fighting for many years, it should be after the winter comes. Mao, who has dealt with Nurhachi for many years, will withdraw his main force to Pidao every winter to prevent the late Jin Dynasty from attacking in winter. Therefore, as soon as Gaudi left Shanhaiguan Town, he had to guard against the sneak attack of Houjin.

It is understandable that Emperor Gaudi removed Sun Chengzong's "empty work" in Jinzhou before winter, and as just discussed, Jinzhou is not a place suitable for persistence, so it should be handled as summarized by assistant minister Huo of the Ministry of War: "If thieves come, they will be fortified and cleared." Therefore, Gaudi's order to evacuate Jinzhou is well-founded, not a blind rout.

Jinzhou is going to withdraw, so whether to withdraw Ningyuan's political achievements is the key point. Adult Yuan's impassioned words are still in my ears. Should Ningyuan go? Ningyuan is 200 miles away from Shanhaiguan Guancheng, and its defense capability is far less than that of Shanhaiguan Guancheng operated by Wang Zaijin and Sun Chengzong for more than four years. If we want to fight a decisive battle, we should put it in Shanhaiguan Guancheng, where the reasonable deployment of the supply line is extended, not the other way around. If the Ming army fights the post-Jin Army in Ningyuan, it will automatically give up the natural barrier of Shanhaiguan and put the army in the wild and kill it in the post-Jin. Winter is not suitable for firearms to give full play. The defeat of Sal Water is a lesson, so Ningyuan is not suitable as a battlefield for decisive battle. According to this train of thought, it is completely reasonable for Gaudi to leave Ningjin. If Houjin only comes to harass and plunder, it will definitely come back in vain after the Gaudi wall is cleared. It's a long way from Shenyang to Shanhaiguan Guancheng, and it's snowing heavily, so there won't be any gains in the latter gold, and Mao is still eyeing Pidao. If the latter Jin put his main force into Shanhaiguan to close the door and rob and harass, its rear will be hit, and it will not be worth the candle. If the late Jin Dynasty really fought a decisive battle, the natural barrier of Shanhaiguan Xiongguan and the heavy troops mobilized from all over the country would not have been broken at that time, and then Jin failed to attack Ningyuan and Jinzhou with all his strength. Obviously, the defense of these two cities could not be compared with Shanhaiguan Guancheng, so Gao Di's move was a perfect solution. The History of the Ming Dynasty recorded the difference between Sun Chengzong and Emperor Gaudi on this issue: "At the beginning, I tried my best to inherit the Sect, so please retreat from the customs and keep it. I am deeply sorry for Chengzong's refutation. " According to Sun Chengzong's idea, Ningyuan's defense should be "... when Ningyuan rushed, he was in a corner with Juehua. When the enemy detected the city, he made a fork beside the soldiers on the island, broke the pontoon and went around to fight. " However, the climatic conditions at that time were that even the sea around Juehua Island was frozen, and the military forces of Houjin killed all the way from Ningyuan to Juehua Island, so Sun Chengzong's tactics were useless here. Facts have proved that Gaudi's retreat is reasonable.

In the case of retreating to Shanhaiguan in an all-round way, if the latter Jin really attacked Shanhaiguan, he would come all the way and the main force would go all out. If the two armies are at loggerheads, the ice and snow will melt after a long time, and then "closing the door" will already appear. Even if the latter Jin did not close the door and occupy Ningyuan, the same was true. After the ice and snow melt, the Ming army can go hand in hand with the land according to Sun Chengzong's "Hundred Buckle Car Camp", first blocking the Daling River and the Xiaoling River to cut off their grain routes, and then copying the rear along the Liaohe River with Mao. As long as the latter gold has half a month to support the grain, its main force outside the door will be defeated without a fight, and the rear will not be guaranteed. ...

Nurhachi once said: "If you want to be bright, you can't stop!" Words of wisdom, this is the second year of the apocalypse (1622). What Nurhachi said to Baylor and his ministers after the fall of Guangning expressed his determination to attack Shanhaiguan, which is recorded in the second page of Volume IV of A Record of Zhao Kuangyin. But in the following years, Sun Chengzong's correct strategy and Mao's increasing resistance curbed his offensive momentum. In recent years, Nurhachi was too busy with internal contradictions in the late Jin Dynasty to go to war. Sun Chengzong's sudden stepping down gave him a chance. Sun Chengzong was deposed in October of the fifth year of tomorrow (1625). Three months later, Nurhachi immediately rushed to their lair, Shanhaiguan. Gaudi's defense proved to be reasonable.

Tomorrow, on the 14th day of the first month of the sixth year (1626), Nurhachi led Baylor and his ministers, with a rate of130,000 and an army of 200,000 to the Ming Dynasty, and arrived at Shanhaiguan. The late Jin army arrived at Dongchangbao on 0/6, crossed the Liaohe River on 0/7, and arrived at Ningyuanmen on 23. Without resistance, Houjin's army walked from Shenyang to Ningyuan for nine days, and I'm afraid it will take ten days to reach Shanhaiguan. If Daling River, Xiaoling River and Liaohe River are blocked by the Ming army after the spring, I'm afraid it won't take 19 days to transport grain. As long as there is a slight mistake, the army in front will be lost. What a dangerous layout! Nurhachi is really crazy, but fortunately, his mistake was saved by Lord Yuan.

Yuan's rhetoric refused to obey the military orders, and he kept Ningyuan alone during the whole line of retreat. Yuan's action once touched many people, but it was actually extremely irresponsible. In doing so, Yuan Shikai put the battlefield of Ming army and Houjin in Ningyuan, but at this time, due to climatic conditions, it was impossible to start the hidden "trap". If Gaudi comes to the rescue, it will definitely fight with Houjin in the ice and snow. If something goes wrong, I'm afraid the safety of Shanhaiguan can't be guaranteed, and Ningyuan will inevitably become an isolated city if it is besieged and can't be rescued. Whether it is breached by the late Jin Dynasty is one thing, whether the grain and grass in the city are well prepared, and whether the safety of tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians in the city is worth considering? In addition, the content of Gaudi's order is very clear, that is, to evacuate Jinzhou and Ningyuan, the army, the people, materials, ordnance and hay. Anyway, everything that can be withdrawn is withdrawn, just like entering with Wang Zaijin, except Yuan Daren. Are you going to evacuate the soldiers, civilians and materials on Juehua Island? Juehua Island was opened together with Ningyuan City in Sun Chengzong to reinforce Dongjiang Town. It is an important contact point between Dongjiang Town and the rear. The gold head that Mao He got was first transported to Juehua Island for inspection, and then sent to Beijing Ministry of Military Affairs. It can be seen that Juehua Island and Ningyuan merged into one, and then 8 gold J threatened. Why not consider the safety of the soldiers and civilians on Juehua Island? Even if Gaudi can't come to the rescue, you Yuan's adult also has the ability to evacuate them to Ningyuan, not to mention whether the soldiers and civilians on Juehua Island didn't withdraw because you Yuan's adult didn't or didn't let them withdraw, even if Gaudi wouldn't let them withdraw (is this possible? ) Lord Yuan didn't transfer them to Ningyuan Town, so it's hard to blame.

However, Nurhachi's luck ran out. Although Yuan's actions covered up his strategic mistakes, Yuan's shells did not spare Nurhachi, who was shot and injured in the battle. A few days after the siege of Ningyuan, 8 Jin Army retreated hastily. Before the retreat, tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians on Juehua Island were slaughtered. After the Ming Dynasty, there were only a few dozen people left on the island. Many people think that the hasty retreat of the late Jin army was because Nurhachi was injured and had no intention of fighting. Not really. If it is really because the coach was injured that he didn't have the will to fight, then how did the battle against Juehua Island come to retreat? Nurhachi died eight months after the battle of Ningyuan, which proved that he was not seriously injured at that time, and it was more likely that he died of wound infection later. So it was entirely possible to appoint a Baylor to take over the command and continue to attack the city, and Ningyuan City also showed a state of gradual fatigue, and the confidence of the military and civilians in Liancheng was shaken. Why did the last ten thousand troops suddenly retreat? There must be other reasons, and it should be this reason and Nurhachi's injury, which can lead to the late Jin army's inevitable abandonment of the attack on Ningyuan and hasty retreat. Gaudi was sticking to Shanhaiguan and didn't come to help, which had nothing to do with him. While Nurhachi's army attacked Shanhaiguan, Mao also attacked Yongning in the rear. Nurhachi was injured in the front line of Ningyuan, the backyard caught fire again, and the main force of the late Jin army was outside. How can you sit still?

If Mao Longwen's containment appears at the same time as Nurhachi's injury, you won't see how big it is. Then Nurhachi returned to Mongolia, and Mao copied its rear area, forcing Nurhachi to come back, which proved two things. One is that Nurhachi's injury is not serious, and the other is that he will come back because Mao Chao's rear is not injured. It can be seen that Mao's containment of the late Jin Dynasty completely inhibited his expedition ability.

Since then, the containment of the post-Jin dynasty has also been reflected in the "Battle of Ningjin". In the seventh year of the Apocalypse (1627), when Huang Taiji attacked Ningyuan and Jinzhou, Mao led his troops to attack the Great Wall and Liaoyang, forcing Huang Taiji to give up the attack. It is precisely because of this that after the "Battle of Ningjin", the commander Yuan also specifically appealed for Mao Shuai: "Who knows that Mao attacked Liaoyang and rotated his troops accordingly, so that it was not Mao Shuai who attacked the enemy, and Jinning was attacked again! Although Mao Shuai was defeated by a soldier, he restrained himself for several years. This is the strongest! " ("Three Dynasties Liao Facts Record" Volume 18, in August of the seventh year of the Apocalypse, Liaodong Governor Yuan Chonghuan spoke; From the Letters of the Two Dynasties (Volume 31), in August of the seventh year of the Apocalypse, Yuan Chonghuan, the governor of Liaodong, spoke. )

Mao's long-term harassment and attack on the rear area of Houjin made Houjin often restless. Just three months before Nurhachi's death, Mao also sent troops to attack Anshan Post (the old fort in the southwest of Anshan), which made Nurhachi very nervous and rushed back to Shenyang overnight. The kings are busy leading their troops to Anshan. A few days later, the Maoist army attacked Salhu City, which is only a hundred miles away from Shenyang. Shenyang, the capital of the late Jin Dynasty, was threatened by Mao, and even Nurhachi had to flee overnight. What kind of deterrent is this? If the latter were deployed on a large scale, wouldn't the rear be turned upside down by Mao? Do opponents like Nurhachi and Huang Taiji have the heart to go out?

Nurhachi attacked Ningyuan and Mao Longwen attacked Yongning; After the war in Ningyuan, Nurhachi led an army to levy Mongolian Gurkha in April of the sixth year of the Apocalypse, and Mao immediately attacked Anshan. The tight rear forced Nurhachi to return to Shenyang. When Huang Taiji attacked Ning and Jin, Mao attacked the Great Wall and Liaoyang. Every time the main force of the latter Jin dispatched Mao, it would take advantage of the situation and attack its rear, which greatly restricted the large-scale action of the latter Jin. Mao Longwen's containment of the late Jin Dynasty and his threat to its hinterland were so great that both Xiong Tingbi and Sun Chengzong spoke highly of Dongjiang Town and Mao Shuai:

Mao abandoned Confucianism to join the army and destroyed Lu in the hegemony. The fortifications are wide and the shapes of mountains and rivers are difficult to understand; Military strategists are all good at attacking and defending strange tricks in the right way. Those who are practical, knowledgeable, courageous and successful will not get much! "

-Xiong Yanbi, right assistant minister and right consultant of Liaodong Ministry of War.

"Winlong is a lone sword in the nest of the jackal, drifting in the stormy waves, having the ability to belong to the country, always leaving the people, and fighting in the chariot has repeatedly lost the owl Emirates. And his ambition is to follow the minister's request and pound his nest by the tail. The world's soft wait-and-see attitude towards those who can't defend themselves and think they can get down alone is really enough to inspire the courage of heroes all over the world and make those who shrink their feet ashamed to die. "

—— Sun Chengzong, a military college student in Liaodong.

It is worth mentioning that the victory of the "Ningjin War" and the failure of the "Jin Song War" are in sharp contrast. The most obvious difference is that in the later Battle of Jinsong, the Ming army not only lost Mao's coordination, but also the main force of Dongjiang Army defected to Huang Taiji, resulting in more commanders, generals, troops and fortifications in the Battle of Jinsong than in the Battle of Ningjin. And all this is thanks to Yuan's adult, because it is Yuan's legacy to make Jinzhou "cautious", and it is also Yuan's masterpiece to kill Mao Shuai and destroy Dongjiang.

Yuan's failure was committed in April of the first year of Chongzhen, when he was the minister of war and the right deputy capital, and when he was the governor of Hebei, Liaoning, Denglai and Tianjin military affairs. At that time, in order to support Lord Yuan, Chongzhen took back Man Guihe's Shangfang sword and gave it to Lord Yuan, but did not take back Mao's. This shows that Chongzhen doesn't want Yuan Chonghuan to intervene in the affairs of Dongjiang Town, and Dongjiang Town is not mentioned in Yuan Chonghuan's official title. On the contrary, there is a big problem in Jiyumen.

After Yuan came to power, he made three important mistakes. First, refocus Jinzhou, build the so-called "Ningjin defense line", weaken the thistle gate and strengthen Jinzhou's troops; Second, it repeatedly asked the court to open the horse market for Mongolian tribes who had joined or taken refuge in the late Jin Dynasty; The third is to kill Mao Shuai and destroy Dongjiang Town. These three consecutive mistakes directly led to Huang Taiji's safe entry through Jiyumen, while Yuan Da made a low-level mistake in command in the process of intercepting Jiyumen, which directly led to the vibration of Gyeonggi, which was an important direct reason for his imprisonment.

After giving up Jinzhou, Yuan regarded Jinzhou as a key construction. His so-called "Ningjin Defence Line" was undoubtedly a "Zheng Guoqu" compared with the financial situation at that time in the Ming Dynasty. More unfortunately, Yuan not only used huge sums of money to build a "Zheng Guoqu" that brought economic burden to the Ming Dynasty, but also used a series of personal mistakes to realize the transformation of this "Zheng Guoqu" into "maginot line".