Why did Hua Ye and Nakano clash in Huaihai Campaign?

Why did Chen Yi, the governor on the eve of Huaihai Campaign, go to Nakano to serve as commander of Hua Ye?

This question has been debated endlessly. In my opinion, to understand this problem, we have to go back to the military to understand it and understand the mystery.

On the eve of the Huai Hai Campaign, what was the situation between the enemy and ourselves?

First of all, on the enemy's side, the Xuzhou suppression general and the Central China suppression general were established. In the Huaihai area of the Central Plains, with Xuzhou as the center, we are ready to engage in decisive battle and strategic decisive battle with China.

At this time, the enemy has completed or is ready to complete the reform of the command system, forming a military command system with Xuzhou suppression headquarters as the general command. It can be said that the enemy's military command mechanism has been formed. In terms of military command, the enemy has clearly defined the power and responsibility of military command, that is, the Xuzhou suppression headquarters is responsible for the campaign command of the Central Plains and Huaihai. Of course, what happens in the actual process is another matter. But as far as preparations are concerned, the enemy still has rules and laws.

Mainly our situation. Facing the enemy's military situation, the Central Committee, at the suggestion of Su Yu, is prepared to launch a strategic decisive battle with the enemy in the Huaihai area of the Central Plains. Competing for the Central Plains, from now on!

Before the battle, of course, the most important work is to select generals and establish a campaign command system. The General Front Committee is a virtual organization established during the campaign and is not responsible for actual command. Due to the strategic situation formed in the Huaihai area of the Central Plains in the history of our army, it is impossible for our army to establish a command system with clear powers and responsibilities like the enemy. The reason is:

First, during the strategic counter-offensive, it leapt thousands of miles into the Dabie Mountains, and the Central Plains formed a zigzag military layout.

Second, Hua Ye and Nakano undertook different combat missions, even very related. Ye Ye should not only cooperate with Hua Ye in Huaihai, but also consider the task of containing the enemy in Central China and Nanking.

Third, our army does not have advanced communication equipment, can not command such a large-scale campaign, and does not have the corresponding military equipment to carry out large-depth, high-mobility operations in such a vast area.

Fourth, when the Central Plains leaps a thousand miles into the Dabie Mountains, its task is to contain and disperse the operational pressure in East China and Northwest China. From the stage of strategic counter-offensive, the role of the Central Plains in the War of Liberation was destined to be a containment operation.

Fifth, Hua Ye and Nakano are two completely different systems of field troops. It is impossible for Hua Ye and Nakano to reconcile and conduct unified command under one command system. This is probably the so-called faction. The combat effectiveness of mixing old brothers was greatly reduced, but our army found another way and achieved the effect of 1+ 1.

Therefore, at this time, the central government first considers how to coordinate the operations of the two field armies, which will be the key to winning the battle.

In the Huai Hai Campaign, Hua Ye was the absolute main force to fight against the enemy of Xuzhou, while Nakano wanted to contain the enemy of Central China and Nanjing and distract the enemy of Xuzhou. Therefore, in the campaign, Nakano's operational task will be to monitor the enemies in Central China and Nanking, and resolutely prevent them from reinforcing if there are reinforcements, so as to cooperate with Hua Ye. At the same time, it will contain the enemy of Xuzhou so that it cannot return to the south or flee to the west.

In such an enemy-enemy situation, in terms of strength, Nakano jumped thousands of miles into the Dabie Mountains, and his strength was greatly reduced, making him unable to undertake the main battle task. However, after recuperation, Hua Ye was well-equipped and greatly increased in strength, which played an important role in destroying the enemy. Nakano is weak and Hua Ye is strong, so it is difficult for the two armies to cooperate tacitly. Assuming the Nakano crisis, is Hua Ye willing to go all out to save the crisis? This is a problem.

Therefore, in this situation, it is necessary to have a suitable person as the coordinator of the coordinated operations of the two field armies. Who is suitable? Liu Bocheng? Deng Xiaoping? Rola Chen? Su Yu? Or airborne? Or something else? Then let's comment one by one!

Liu Bocheng. In nakano, Liu is the core of military command. Without him, Nakano would not exist. So Liu was the first to be excluded.

Deng Xiaoping. If political commissar Deng goes to Hua Ye, it always gives people a feeling of not voting. Besides, political commissar Deng's prestige in the Party and the army at this time, especially in Hua Ye, seems a little insufficient. Moreover, Hua Ye has no political commissar, and Liu has been serving in the army and has never done political work. Do you want to fight in Hua Ye?

Su Yu As we all know, Hua Ye left Su Yu in military planning, and Hua Ye's military strength was greatly reduced. In the face of enemy forces with superior numbers and weapons, a field army with the largest establishment is likely to fight without a chief of staff. Ass knows what the result is.

Therefore, this coordinator has only two options: one is Chen Yi, and the other is airborne. At this time, skydiving is tantamount to changing sides at the cold feet, which is a taboo for military strategists! In addition, can airborne people command Hua Ye's Iliad Wolf soldiers? So, only Chen Yi. Then why Chen Yi? What advantages does Chen Yi have to undertake this important task?

First, Chen Yi has prestige. This prestige is hard to say, it contains very subtle things. But generally speaking, Chen Yi's prestige has the following aspects: First, he is old in seniority. Although there were no Nanchang Uprising, Jinggangshan Meeting, and Long March, the three-year guerrilla war in the south was enough to rival the East Detachment of the New Fourth Army during the Long March and the Anti-Japanese War, and it was fully qualified. Second, the party occupies a high position in the mainland. At this time, it is already a member of the Central Committee. In the long-term movement, it basically "follows Mao Zedong Thought".

Second, strong political ability. Chen Yi has always stood firm in all previous political movements of the Party, which is inseparable from his high political literacy. And what is politics is to coordinate the relationship between people. What the Central Committee wants is to coordinate the relationship between the two field armies.

Third, Chen Yi is generous. Chen Yi this person, crude and refined. Why is he free and easy, poetic and charming? This kind of person is easier to deal with, and others are willing to deal with this kind of person, at least they don't have to bother to please and guess him all day. This communication is efficient.

Fourthly, the relationship between Chen Yi and Liu Deng is endless. Chen and he met earlier, and there is no "generation gap", that is, there is no question of who is older and who is younger in history, especially the relationship with Liu. At the same time, from the relevant historical data, there is no evidence that Chen and Chen had sharp opposition in the inner-party movement. This creates personal emotional conditions for the good cooperation of the three of them. Trust and support each other, and negotiations and battles on the battlefield will be handy.

Then why did Su Yu insist that Chen Yi be the commander and political commissar, while he was willing to take care of himself behind the scenes?

First, Chen Yi's ability. Chen Yi is inferior to Su Yu in military planning, but inferior to Chen in commanding the three armed forces. The same is true of the relationship between Chen Su and Li Bai in Guidi. The relationship between Li Bai and Tang Degang, an oral historian at Columbia University, has been elaborated subtly, and if measured by Chen Su, the same is true.

Second, Chen Yi's prestige. As mentioned above, this prestige is unmatched by Su Yu.

Third, Su Yu's ability. General Su is recognized as the second general and word marshal. This kind of moral integrity is admirable. However, when it is used to run the army internally, there is always suspicion of being a good person. Therefore, whenever I read the Biography of General Su, I always think of the story of Sun Wu beheading the concubines of the prince of Wu. This kind of hegemony and cruelty is necessary for the commander in chief. General Su Can can be said to be an eternal model of "strategizing and winning thousands of miles". The position of chief of staff must belong to General Su. But the award rate of the three armed forces, Shi Keping, Chen Ren.

Fourth, the benefits of Chen Yi as commander of Hua Ye. When necessary, you can order Hua Ye to rescue Nakano as a commander, which is not only justified, but also necessary and efficient. Furthermore, when those generals with horns on their heads, Hua Ye, refused to accept General Su, Chen Yi stood up and showed his strong voice and prestige, which could effectively stabilize Hua Ye and play a role in maintaining harmony.

Therefore, Chen Yi's appointment embodies the superb art of employing people in the Central Committee. Chen Yi is in a position where it is easy to defend but difficult to attack: attack can command Hua Ye to support Nakano, and retreat can coordinate Nakano and Hua Ye.

Endless words have taught Fang Jia.