The "fenglingdu" of the new forces: Wei Lai "downward", ideal upward, Tucki confused

"When fenglingdu first met Yang Guo, she missed her life." Fenglingdu was a turning point in Guo Xiang's life. After that, she waited for a lifetime and became a master of Emei.

Mr. Gao Hua once had an anthology "In the fenglingdu Mouth of History", trying to find the key moments and turning points in the great historical changes.

Geographically, fenglingdu is a big bend under the Yellow River with nine twists and turns, and it is the throat where the canyon enters the Central Plains. "A moisture flows from north to south, and the Central Plains is self-sufficient. Yunshan Lian Jin native tobacco trees enter Qinchuan. " Here, the Jiuqu Yellow River is intercepted by the Qinling Mountains, and the mighty tide flows into the sea after a sharp turn.

There are too many thrilling historical events in fenglingdu, which means a big turning point. After the past, it is a completely strange atmosphere.

For the automobile industry in 2023, these three months can be said to be "thrilling every day":

65438+1On October 6, Tesla suddenly announced the official price reduction of 15%, which brought a thunder to this market.

On February 10, BYD launched the 99800 Qin Yuan Champion Edition, which started a game of "knocking on the table" with the attitude of "the same price of oil and electricity".

These two new energy car companies seem to be launching a general attack on fuel vehicles, trying to grab the market quickly.

The new forces represented by Wei Lai, Ideal and Tucki are facing their own "fenglingdu". Today, combining the data of three 2022 financial reports, let's talk about their "key turning points" respectively.

0 1

Wei Lai "squats": Can "squats" take off again?

In the "Internal Reflection Letter" on the first day of 2023, Li Bin said frankly: "In 2022, we worked hard and made contributions, but we should be soberly aware that many colleagues performed better than us in the same period", and directly listed the key issues in Articles 8-9.

The problem is very acute: mainly for the supply chain in the pre-delivery of ET7 and the delivery of ET5. This not only affects the overall delivery rhythm in 2022, but also seriously affects the reputation of ET7 as the flagship model of NT2.0, making ET5 surpass BMW 3 Series from "holding hands" to "a little hard".

According to the data, in 2022, Weilai completed the switching of three new models of ET7, ES7 and ET5 based on NT2.0, and delivered122,500 vehicles throughout the year, up 34% year-on-year, far below the year-on-year growth rate of more than 90% in the industry. This figure is also lower than the ideal 654.38+033.2 million vehicles, and higher than the 654.38+020.8 million vehicles in Tucki, which makes the sales list of new forces change again-from small, strong and rational in 2026, rational, strong and small in 2022.

If only from the delivery data, the three companies are all concentrated in12-140,000 vehicles, but reflected in the revenue side, interesting changes have begun.

In terms of revenue, in 2022, the revenue of Weilai automobile business was 45.5 billion yuan, which was the highest among the three. Ideal and Tucki are 4.41100 million yuan and 24.8 billion yuan respectively. The ideal is rapidly approaching Weilai, and the gap between them is only 654.38+0.4 billion yuan (about 3.5%).

If we only look at the automobile business income in the fourth quarter, the ideal is 65.438+072 billion yuan, and Weilai only has 65.438+047 billion yuan-which means that the ideal of 22Q4 not only exceeds Weilai in delivery, but also exceeds Weilai in revenue. Most importantly, the average bicycle price of the ideal Q4 is 372,800 yuan, while the average bicycle price of Weilai is reduced to 368,500 yuan due to the delivery of ET5.

Data comes from: financial reports of various companies, compiled by the author.

Weilai down, ideal up-as if the script has been written in Q4, 2022.

Weilai faces more difficulties than that: the decline of gross profit will be Weilai's biggest challenge in 2023.

Data comes from: financial reports of various companies, compiled by the author.

In 2022, the gross profit margin of Weilai automobile business was 13.70%, and in 2026, 5438+0 was 20.06%, down 6.36 pcts year-on-year; In contrast, the ideal annual gross profit of automobile business decreased slightly from 20.57% to 65,438+09.09% (down 0.48 pcts); Tucki decreased from 1 1.52% to 9.44% (down 2.08 percentage points);

Even in the face of "loss of purchase commitment" in the process of switching between old and new models, Ideal will depreciate about 800 million yuan in advance in Q3, and the gross profit will remain at 12.65%, while Weilai Q4 depreciates nearly1000 million, resulting in a gross profit of only 6.84% in Q4.

Although Li Bin expressed confidence in bringing the gross profit of the whole vehicle back to the level of 65,438+08-20% in the earnings conference call, for any automobile enterprise with direct operation system, the gross profit of direct operation of 20% is not enough (Ideal once said in Weibo that the gross profit of direct operation of 20% is the lowest gross profit margin for normal transshipment).

The biggest challenge that Weilai will face in 2023 is the downward product structure and brand.

Regarding the downward trend of brands, whether it is "mountain" or "firefly", the pace of Weilai's expansion is the sinking of brands and services. Especially for services, according to the current loss of services (-28.84% gross profit, loss of 65.438+85 billion yuan in 2022), once the sales in Alps increase, the loss of services may be more serious.

The product structure is downward. With the increasing proportion of ET5 in the sales structure, the bicycle price of Weilai has also dropped for three consecutive quarters, from RMB3,865,438+0.9 million in Q2 2022 to RMB368 in Q4 2022, with a decrease of 3.5% from the previous month in 500 yuan.

This trend will reach a peak in 2023 Q 1. On the one hand, the old "866" product of NT 1.0 is on sale, and on the other hand, the competition of 300,000+level is intensified. The price of the same-size wisdom pole LS7 is less than 400,000, and the price of the new single-motor version of Aoweita is as low as 3 1.99 million. This will be a great test for the pricing of the new ES6. Coupled with the increasing proportion of ET5 sales, for Wei in 2023, whether it can hold the average sales price of 400,000 yuan will face greater challenges.

Data source: insured amount, compiled by the author.

The screenshot of a recent email shows that Weilai is selling vehicles at a "more favorable price (about 20% discount)" through the supplier channel, which is enough to illustrate the tremendous pressure Weilai is facing.

The brand goes down, the sales structure goes down, the average price of bicycles goes down and the gross profit goes down. If it can't reduce the sales growth, it is a very serious problem for any brand.

02

Ideal: Pure electricity is the real challenge.

Since the ideal entered the ranks of the new forces, it has been ranked "third" because of "extended range". Many people say that the extended journey is backward. But the ideal is to rely on "accurate positioning" and "deep understanding of customers" to find a way of their own. Today, sales not only surpass Weilai and Tucki, but also beat Weilai and Tucki in revenue and gross profit in the fourth quarter of 2022.

As for the stock price, not to mention that as of March 24th, the ideal market value is about 193 1 100 million, which exceeds the sum of the market values of Weilai and Tucki (Weilai's market value is about123.7 billion, and Tucki's market value is about 67.4 billion yuan).

In 2022, the ideal was changed from 1 to L9L8L7, and the selling price rose from 328,000 to 450,000+,and decreased slightly to 309,900. Even with such a product structure, the monthly sales volume of 20,000 in Q4 has achieved the highest sales volume of the new head unit. The average bicycle price rose from 297,500 yuan in Q 1 in 2022 to 372,800 yuan in Q4, an increase of 27%.

Most importantly, Ideal achieved quarterly profit again. In 2022, Q4 earned 265 million yuan, which is completely different from the symbolic profit of 24 million yuan in 20021year.

Source of data: financial report of the company, compiled and drawn by the author.

Therefore, Li Xiang said in Weibo, "The ideal is that the monthly income will exceed 10 billion in 2022. At the moment when L9 and L8 products are delivered at the same time, it is also time to bid farewell to the loss-making operation for seven consecutive years. "

Although, this profit data is particularly prominent because the year-end bonus is halved. But this does not affect the significance of achieving quarterly profit.

Even so, Ideal is expected to become the first company among the new forces to achieve annual profit.

Pure electricity is the ideal "fenglingdu" in 2023.

In 2022, the ideal has proved itself in the medium and large SUV market. According to the insurance data of1-February, the ideal market share in the new energy market of more than 350,000 yuan exceeds 45%.

Combined with the ideal rhythm of product development and production base, it is expected that the first pure electric SUV product equipped with high-voltage platform-W 01will be listed in Q3 of 2023. In Li Xiang's original words, the follow-up plan of pure electric products is that "a whale (aircraft carrier) and five sharks (ships) will form Li's high-voltage pure electric fleet battle group".

The clarity of pure electric MPV products and the layout of overcharge network will be the biggest challenge to the ideal.

Pure electric MPV products. At present, there are only 250,000+pure electric MPV products on the market, such as Krypton 009, Tengshi D9 EV, Lan Tu Dreamer EV, Roewe iMAX 8 EV and Datong MIFA 9. Among these products, except Jing 009, which will be delivered to the Asian Games in batches this year, the monthly sales of other models have not exceeded 1 1,000. In terms of sales volume, it is far less optimistic than that of plug-in MPV: Take Tengshi D9 as an example. Since March, the insurance coverage of pure electric version only accounts for 65,438+00.85% of all D9 models.

Data source: The author compiled and listed the insurance amount.

Generally speaking, pure electric MPV products are typical scene-limited products, which are more suitable for fixed route and point-to-point business reception. The most typical is one-way or round trip from the airport to the hotel. Once it comes to family travel scenes, it will directly face the challenge of cruising range. Even the CLTC of the most expensive krypton 009 has a cruising range of 702-822 kilometers. According to the energy consumption level of MPV, the actual mileage can reach 500 kilometers, which is already very good. Not to mention other products with a battery life of less than 600 kilometers.

In order to solve the endurance anxiety of MPV in open scene, 800V high-voltage fast charging has become an ideal problem that has to be solved quickly. At present, due to the high investment, there are few public charging piles suitable for 800V fast charging. No matter Tucki G9 or W0 1, it is necessary to realize rapid layout in the form of self-built piles.

Missed the opportunity window of self-operated charging piles, laying high-speed has become an ideal and realistic choice at this stage. However, it is not only the choice of high-speed layout sites that stand in front of the ideal, but also the problem of power expansion. In short, there is no ideal of catching up with the best time, and more efforts and resources are needed to realize the construction and layout of 800V charging piles.

Pure electricity is the core growth curve of "from 1 to 10". On this curve, there are not only difficulties in product definition, but also challenges in the layout of 800V charging piles. Being able to stride forward smoothly and meet the ideal will be a broader world; Otherwise, it will inevitably hinder the further implementation of the pure electricity strategy.

03

Tucki is confused: in the dark, the road ahead is long.

Tucki was the most seriously injured among the three new forces in 2022, and none of them suffered.

In 202 1 year, the sales volume of P7 was the champion among the three China companies in Tucki. At the beginning of 2023, the sales volume of P7 was close to 10000 vehicles. However, by the end of the year, the situation had "plummeted". Not only did G9 not go on the market, but its sales volume was also surpassed by Ideal and Weilai. By Q4, the gross profit of automobile business was only 5.66%, even lower than that after Weilai's replacement. Not to mention that the average price of bicycles is only 209,900, but the loss of bicycles is as high as 1.2 million yuan.

Data source: compiled by the author of the company's financial report.

Tucki's 2022 financial report shows that the gross profit margin of Xpeng's automobile business has dropped from 202 11.25% to 9.44% last year, less than 10%. In the same period, the gross profit margins of Weilai and LI were 65,438+03.70% and 65,438+09.09% respectively. In Tucki, in 2022, the overall expense rate was as high as 44.33%, the loss of bicycles reached 79,200 yuan, and the overall loss was 965,438+400 million yuan. Among them, the operating loss was 8.706 billion yuan, an increase of 32.5438+0% over the previous year.

In terms of cash flow, Tucki's cash and cash equivalents at the end of 2022 were 30.063 billion yuan, a net decrease of 7.43 billion yuan compared with 37.493 billion yuan in 202 1; Current liabilities are 2.41.10.50 billion yuan, a net increase of 610.20 billion yuan compared with 200210.80/kloc-0.30 billion yuan. The decrease of cash equivalents and the increase of current liabilities are 654.38+03.532 billion yuan, which has exceeded 65% of 30 billion cash equivalents. If this performance continues until 2023, Tucki's cash and cash equivalents will fall below the safety line of 20 billion yuan.

Although, Tucki has used the last 3-4 months to introduce fresh blood, straighten out the channel relationship and adjust the organizational structure. However, two basic laws of the automobile industry are equally inevitable in Tucki.

First, all products launched now were defined and developed three years ago. If the ultimate cause of a product failure is the failure of positioning and definition three years ago. Then, for Tucki, the G6 and H93 launched this year are also the products of that period of bursting internal confidence. G6 was originally aimed at Model Y, but at least several competing products of Model Y, such as Deep Blue S7 and BYD Sea Lion, will be put on the market this year. If G6 can't form enough differentiation and competitiveness, it can't bear the pressure of Model Y change and price reduction in Q4 in 2023 (

This article is from the author of Icano. Electric car observer, and the copyright belongs to the author. Please contact the author in any form. The content only represents the author's point of view and has nothing to do with the car reform.