Why did Shanxi merchants decline?

Guangdong merchants, Huizhou merchants, Shanxi merchants, Zhejiang merchants and Jiangsu merchants are collectively called "five big business gangs" in history. Among them, Chaozhou merchants, Huizhou merchants and Shanxi merchants are the "three big business gangs" in the history of China.

Shanxi merchants can be traced back to the warrior jackal, the father of Wu Zetian, during the Sui and Tang Dynasties. When Li Yuan and his son set out from Taiyuan, the timber merchant Wu gave great financial support. It was with the financial resources of the most elite Taiyuan Army and Wu Shi that Li Yuan and his son began to seize the national political power. After the founding of People's Republic of China (PRC), the Wu family was named lord protector, which was equal to that of Cheng. You can imagine how much property Li Yuan and his son got from Wu Shi at that time, and Wu Shi also got huge returns from his original ingenious political investment. Later, an unprecedented Empress Wu Zetian was born in the history of China. Of course, this is another story.

The root of the success of Shanxi merchants lies in the business gang policy of "honesty" and "unity".

The brilliant figure of Shanxi merchants is Qiao Zhiyong.

Shanxi merchants declined in the late Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China for various reasons, and Shanxi began to become relatively dull on the economic stage in China. It can almost be said that Shanxi businessmen can only talk about Kong Xiangxi, Li Yanhong, Chen Nian and Guo Taiming. The culture of Shanxi merchants has not been well preserved, so that Shanxi is still in a backward state in the whole country.

As early as the end of the Ming Dynasty, some Shanxi businessmen took Zhangjiakou as their base, traveled to and from Shanhaiguan, engaged in trade activities, delivered materials for the Manchu regime, and even delivered documents and information. According to the records of the Qing Dynasty, the mandate of heaven lasted for three years (16 18), and there were 16 businessmen from Shandong, Shanxi, Hedong, Hexi, Suzhou and Hangzhou in Fushun. Nurhachi "generously paid and repatriated". Shanxi merchants' trade activities inside and outside Shanhaiguan gave great support to the post-Jin regime in terms of materials, and the post-Jin regime also gave courtesy and attention to Shanxi merchants. Shanxi merchants played a cooperative role in strengthening the rule of Qing rulers over Mongolia.

In the third year of Jin Chongde (1637), Huang Taiji ordered the Manchu nobles to lead 100 mainland Han businessmen to carry goods to Guihua City for trade. The Qing army entered the customs, the military expenditure soared, and the finance was very difficult. In this regard, Zu Kefa and Zhang Cunren, political councilors of Duchayuan, once said: "Shandong is the way of grain transportation, and Shanxi is the way of merchants, so it is urgent to please. If the soldiers and civilians of the two provinces belong to our territory, then the money will come out and the country will not need it. " Therefore, the post-Jin regime mostly adopted the policy of wooing Shanxi businessmen.

In the early years of Shunzhi, the Qing government made Fan, a wealthy businessman in Shaanxi, an imperial envoy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He was in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and gave birth to Zhangjiakou. Entrusted by the imperial court, he traveled inside and outside Shanhaiguan, and lost his match at the age of 20. In the process of unifying the large-scale military operations of the whole country and past dynasties, in the middle of Kangxi, the Qing government organized some Han businessmen to trade with the army during the period of quelling the feudal riots in Junggar. They followed the Qing army, went deep into Mongolian grasslands, trafficked military supplies such as rations and horses, and did business with Mongols. Most of these "traveling Mongolians" were Shanxi merchants named as "imperial merchants" by the Qing court, and some of them were Han businessmen from Zhili (Hebei) and other places. They ensured the logistics needs of the military operations of the Qing army. Of course, the Qing government also gave these businessmen the privilege of monopolizing profits, which made them gain huge benefits. This unusual relationship between the Qing government and businessmen naturally had a considerable impact on the formulation of political and economic policies of the Qing government.

Fading process

First, the decline of the country frustrated Shanxi merchants in the Russian tea war.

In the fifth year of Yongzheng in Qing Dynasty (1727), the Qing government and the Russian government decided to use Chaktu near Kulun (Ulaanbaatar) as a trading point for their own businessmen. Since then, the trade of Chaktu has become increasingly prosperous. Since Jiaqing and Daoguang (1796— 1850), China's commodities exported from Chaktu to Russia are mainly tea, and its business is monopolized by Shanxi merchants. According to statistics, from 17 to 19 years of Daoguang (1837-1839), China exported 807 1880 Russian pounds of tea from Chaktu to Russia every year, with a value of 8 million rubles. After the Second Opium War, Russia coerced the Qing government to sign the unequal Sino-Russian Tianjin Treaty and the Sino-Russian Beijing Treaty by "meritorious mediation". The Russian government opened the passage of invading China and Mongolia without a single soldier, and obtained the trading rights of seven coastal ports (Shanghai, Ningbo, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Guangzhou, Taiwan Province Province and Qiongzhou). In the first year of Tongzhi (1862), the Russian government also obtained the privilege of trading Tianjin at a tax rate one-third lower than that of other countries according to the Sino-Russian Land Trade Charter. Since then, Russian businessmen have been lucky enough to go deep into China to grab products and promote their own products. In the fifth year of Tongzhi (1866), the Russian government forced the Qing government to cancel the re-import tax of Tianjin Customs, that is, to exempt the half tax on tea, which greatly reduced the trafficking cost of Russian businessmen.

According to the records of Tianjin Customs, before the eleventh year of Xianfeng (186 1), Shanxi merchants monopolized the tea trafficking in Hubei and Hunan. They transported the tea from the two lakes to Chaktu by land and sold it to Russia. However, from the first year of Tongzhi (1862), Russian businessmen set up tea warehouses in the above areas to buy and traffic tea. Because Russian businessmen enjoy the privilege of being exempt from half tax on tea, and it is combined transportation by land and water, the trafficking route of Russian businessmen is from Hankou to Shanghai along the river, then to Tianjin along the coast, and then to Europe by land via Chaktu, which greatly saves costs. Therefore, the tea business of Russian businessmen soared from 1 647888 Jin (1 865) in Tongzhi for four years. However, due to the restrictions of the Qing government, Shanxi businessmen could not enjoy the convenience of water transportation, and they had to pay several times the lijin tax of Russian businessmen. For example, selling tea from Hankou, Hubei Province to Zhangjiakou requires 63 lijinzi cards, and the tax paid is 10 times more than that paid by Russian businessmen, so the trade between Shanxi merchants in Chaktu and Russia is declining.

In the seventh year of Tongzhi (1868), the number of gold gangs in Chaktu decreased from 120 to 4. Shanxi merchants decided to "deal with a man as he deals with you" and put forward the general plan of "doing business in Russia through Chaktu", that is, "Russia came to China to grab my commercial interests, and China businessmen went to Russia to find another way out." (See "Shaanxi Foreign Trade Record" by Qu Shaomiao and Pang)

At the right time, Russia sent a message to the Qing government, claiming that the trade of Chaktu was declining and demanding that Zhangjiakou be turned into a commercial port and a consulate be established there. Zhangjiakou is adjacent to Kyoto, and the Qing government worried that it would endanger the security of Kyoto and Mongolia's rule after being turned into a commercial port and consul by Russia, so it agreed to let Shanxi businessmen go north to Russia to do business, so as to prevent the Russians from turning Zhangjiakou into a commercial port and setting up consuls to go south. The Qing government also reduced the amount of money for Shanxi businessmen going north and cancelled the floating tax to show sympathy. With this convenience, Shanxi merchants made great efforts to develop into the Russian mainland. They have successively set up business offices in Moscow, Dohms, Chita, Krasnoyarsk, Novosibirsk and other Russian cities, and launched fierce competition with Russian businessmen. In the first year (1869) when Shanxi merchants marched into the Russian mainland, they exported 1 10000 tons of tea to Russia, and Russian businessmen directly sold 1 10000 tons of tea. In the first round, Shanxi merchants tied with Russian merchants. In the third year (Tongzhi decade, 187 1), Shanxi merchants exported 200,000 tons of tea to Russia every year, twice as much as Russian merchants directly sold tea. Shanxi businessmen trade with Russia by land, using camels, oxen and wagons with higher freight rates as transportation tools, while Russian businessmen transport tea with lower freight rates by land and water with the privilege. The competition conditions between Shanxi merchants and Russian merchants are very obvious, but Shanxi merchants can still get the upper hand in trade with Russia. If it were not for the corruption of the Qing government, Shanxi merchants would not necessarily fail in their trade with Russia.

In the eleventh year of Tongzhi (1873), Shanxi merchants planned to transport Hubei tea to Tianjin by water and then sell it to Russia by land, but the Qing government interfered with this plan and still levied lijin tax on Shanxi merchants who sold tea by water. Worldwide, how can domestic businessmen who traffic their own goods in their own countries not enjoy the same treatment as foreign businessmen, but have to pay extra taxes? However, under the rule of the Qing government, China did so. The rulers of the Qing Dynasty acted perversely and suppressed Chinese businessmen, which made Shanxi merchants in a very unfavorable position in the tea merchant war with Russian businessmen from the beginning. In addition, Russian businessmen have successively set up brick tea factories in Hankou, Jiujiang and Fuzhou, using steam engines instead of hand pressing. The brick tea produced has low cost, high quality and large output, but Shanxi merchants still rely on manual workshops to make brick tea, and their products obviously cannot be compared with machine products. Shanxi merchants were squeezed out by Russian businessmen in brick production. Then, the negotiations between China, Japan and South Korea began, and the Qing government pursued the policy of "inducing Russia to control Japan", which made Russian businessmen more and more rampant in China and successively controlled some tea-producing areas in China. In this case, the amount of China tea directly trafficked by Russian businessmen has soared, reaching 600,000 to 700,000 tons per year, while Shanxi merchants have dropped to only tens of thousands of tons per year.

In the 31st year of Guangxu (1905), the Russian Siberian Railway was fully opened to traffic. It is not only low-cost but also very convenient for Russian businessmen to transfer to railway transportation via Vladivostok, so it is difficult for Shanxi businessmen to carry out tea trade with Russia on a large scale. In order to open the market, Shanxi merchants also sold tea to Russian small and medium-sized businessmen on credit, and then returned the tea money after they sold it out. Unexpectedly, it caused trouble: some Russian businessmen deliberately defaulted on their debts, and some small and medium-sized Russian businessmen were squeezed out by domestic big tea merchants or their own management was poor, and there was no hope of repayment. Shanxi merchants were exhausted and lost 622 thousand silver. In order to recover the losses, Shanxi merchants wrote to the Qing government to negotiate with the Russian authorities, demanding to recover the silver owed by Russian businessmen, but the Qing government was afraid of westernization and flattered westernization, and simply refused to accept the letter from Shanxi merchants. In Xuantongyuan (1909), the Russian government suddenly violated the tea agreement between the two countries and imposed heavy taxes on Chinese businessmen in China, crowding out Russian businessmen doing business in Russia. Shanxi merchants suffered various blows and finally failed in the war against Russian tea merchants.

Second, the government is corrupt, and Shanxi businessmen have suffered heavy losses in investing in mining.

At the end of 19, foreign capitalism began to plunder Shanxi coal resources. In the 23rd year of Guangxu (1897), British Fu Company established Jinfeng Company through comprador Liu E and Fang Xiaojie in China to mine coal in Yuxian, Pingding, Zezhou, Lu 'an and other places in Shanxi. Later, due to the opposition of Jin officials in Beijing, the Qing government withdrew Liu E and others and turned to negotiate with British businessmen. Soon, Shanxi Bureau of Commerce signed a contract with Fu Company, and Fu Company obtained the mining rights of subway deposits such as Pingding in Shanxi. In the thirty-first year of Guangxu (1905), the railway was connected to Yangquan, and Fu Company sent people to mine in Zhanshan, Pingding, banned folk kilns and seized the mine site, which aroused the great indignation of Shanxi people and overseas students and broke out the movement for mining rights. In this struggle, Shanxi merchants took an active part and went on strike.

In the thirty-second year of Guangxu (1906), Li Peiren, a student studying in Japan in Yanggao County, Shanxi Province, jumped into the sea in Tokyo, Japan. Li's daring to go into the sea and tens of thousands of impassioned "desperate letters" further inspired the Shanxi people's struggle for mineral rights. Fu Ying Company felt that forced mining of Shanxi coal mine was no longer feasible, so it changed to money extortion. At first, the condition for handing over the mining right was to ask for 1 1 twenty-two thousand silver to redeem the mine, which was sternly rejected by the Shanxi representative. Finally, on the condition of extorting 2.75 million taels of silver from the mine, he agreed to hand over the mining right and quit Shanxi. The two sides agreed to pay the redemption money in four installments, with half of the redemption money paid first. Because the amount of money redeemed is small and there is no money left in the national treasury, in order not to lose faith with outsiders and protect the reputation of Shanxi Province, the Shanxi authorities used the donated mu as collateral, and the banks in Qixian County, Shanxi Province raised the money for all banks in Shanxi. Fu Ying Company heard that Shanxi Bank wanted to pay for the redemption of mine silver, so it secretly entrusted the banks with contacts to collect money outside to trap Shanxi Bank. However, Shanxi's banks were calm, and they raised 654.38+0.52 million silver in ten days, which surprised foreign businessmen. The activity of Shanxi merchants in the financial sector can also be seen. As Yan, a neighbor, said, "Without the help of the ticket merchants of that day, today's mining area would still be in the hands of Fu Company, and the British business forces have long been rampant in Shanxi."

In order to ensure the rights, Qu, a Shanxi merchant, established a mining company with Liu Maoshang, Feng Jichuan and other gentry and scholars in Guangxu 33 years (1907), with Qu as the general manager to mine coal and iron ore in the province. Jinbao Company agreed to receive 8 million taels of silver shares, and actually received 1.93 million taels. As mentioned earlier, the original silver redemption money raised by Qu's bank from Shanxi banks was mortgaged by Shanxi mu donation, but Shanxi authorities withheld Shanxi mu donation with 19 1 1 In order to return the redemption money borrowed from various banks, Qu had to transfer the equity silver absorbed by the company to various banks. In this way, the company was unable to maintain normal production due to a serious shortage of funds from the date of its establishment, and Qu was forced to resign as general manager. However, it was not until 19 16 that the money owed by Shanxi authorities to Jinbao Company was repaid in cash of 600,000 yuan. For the remaining arrears, the Shanxi provincial government gave Jinbao a "courageous" certificate and wrote it off. Shanxi merchants actively participated in the people's mineral rights struggle in Shanxi, tried their best to redeem the mineral rights and invested in the earliest and largest mining company in Shanxi in modern times. However, due to the oppression of Shanxi authorities at that time, it was impossible to make a difference in funds.

Third, Shanxi businessmen lost four opportunities by sticking to the rules, but they were unable to get up in spirit after all.

In the late Qing Dynasty, Shanxi Bank operated by Shanxi merchants declined gradually. However, there are also many people of insight in Shanxi who recognize the new situation and advocate reform for survival. Unfortunately, due to the stubbornness and ruthlessness of some financiers and general managers, they lost the opportunity of development four times. For example, in the 29th year of Guangxu (1903), Yuan Shikai, Minister of Beiyang, invited Shanxi Bank to join Tianjin Official Bank, but Shanxi Bank refused to be appointed. In the 30th year of Guangxu (1904), Lu was appointed as the Minister of Household Affairs and was ordered to form the Household Bank of Qing Dynasty. Lu also invited Shanxi Bank to become a shareholder and invited people to organize the bank. Most managers of Shanxi Bank Beijing Branch are in favor of Lu's proposal, and they are all eager to try. However, Shanxi Bank is dictatorial, and major events must be decided by the general manager.

The general manager of the bank is too hidebound, only enjoying ready-made happiness and having no foresight. He even wrote back to the manager of the Beijing branch of the bank, refusing to let him enter the stock market or send someone to participate in the formation, which led to a missed opportunity. Later, the bank was organized by Jiangsu and Zhejiang silk merchants, and the Jiangsu and Zhejiang consortia came from behind. Soon, Hubu Bank was reorganized into Daqing Bank, and Shanxi Bank was invited to co-sponsor, but Shanxi Bank did not call. As a result, Shanxi draft bank has never been able to participate in the National Bank and lost the opportunity to reorganize the bank for the first time.

In the thirty-fourth year of Guangxu (1908), Li Hongling, manager of Beijing Branch of Shanxi Weifuhou Bank, realized that Shanxi Bank would disappear in the business and financial circles if it did not conform to the trend and reformed as soon as possible, so it was the general trend to reorganize the bank. To this end, he and Qu planned a bank reorganization plan, and at the same time sent a letter to the general number in conjunction with the three banking groups of Qixian, Taigu and Pingyao in Kyoto, asking Qu to personally go to the general number to state the bank reorganization plan. At that time, the banks of Wei Fuhou, Wei Taihou, Tianchengheng, Xintaihou and Wei Shengchang were five joint numbers, and Cai Dong was also the surname of Jiexiuhou. Among these five joint names, Mao Hongwei, the general manager of Wei Empress Dowager, is the most authoritative. Shi Mao stuck to a rut and voted against bank restructuring. On the contrary, he falsely accused Li and others of having other intentions, which prevented them from taking any action. In Xuantong Yuannian (1909), Shanxi banks in Kyoto once again put forward the proposal of restructuring banks through Shanxi banks in various ports, and Shanxi banks in Hankou, Lanzhou and Jinan wrote to the general bank, requesting that the banks be reorganized into banks. Helpless, the general manager remained unmoved, the demands from all over the country were shelved, and the bank's bank restructuring plan failed again. Shanxi merchants lost the opportunity to restructure banks for the second time.

When the Revolution of 1911 took place, various departments in Shanxi were caught off guard, and the released funds could not be recovered. However, deposits followed, and Shanxi Bank suffered serious losses, so the proposal of restructuring banks revived. At this time, Mao, the general manager of Weihou Bank, who has always opposed the bank restructuring, has awakened and supported the bank reform. 19 14, three banks in Shanxi, Qi, Tai and Ping, jointly applied to Beijing authorities to bid for the bank. At that time, Premier Xiong Xiling knew that Shanxi Bank had a close relationship with general businesses, supported the request of Shanxi merchants, and agreed to the government's guarantee. Shanxi Bank borrowed 2 million pounds from Australia-based Huali Bank with a term of 50 years and interest of 6% in accordance with the method of "commercial loan repayment". Unfortunately, Xiong's cabinet collapsed in a few days, the European war broke out again, the loan went up in smoke, and Shanxi Bank lost the opportunity to reorganize its banks for the third time.

The foreign loan failed, and the plan of restructuring the bank jointly by Qi, Thailand and Pingbang could not be implemented, so Pingyao Gang decided to go it alone. Mao Hongwei, general manager of Weitaihou, Yan, Xin Taihou, Huo Yiting, general manager of Weishengchang and Fan Zisheng, general manager of Tianchengheng, plan to set aside some funds from their respective banks as funds to form a big bank. However, this plan has never been realized, and the reorganization plan of Shanxi draft bank finally failed for the fourth time.

In the thirty years of Guangxu (1904), Shanxi Bank struggled for more than ten years, missed the opportunity of restructuring four times, and finally failed to recover its decline.

Shanxi merchants in Qing dynasty

The Development and Decline of Shanxi Merchants in Qing Dynasty

After the Qing soldiers invaded the Central Plains, Mongolia was brought under the rule of the Qing Dynasty, and the business of Guidaicheng began to flourish.

In the middle period of Kangxi, Shanxi merchants entered the trade of outer Mongolian grassland, Songliao plain and inner and outer Mongolian grassland, which became a new market for Shanxi merchants' trafficking trade. At that time, Mongolian-Chinese trade had to pass through Zhangjiakou and Shahukou (later changed to Cheng Guihua), commonly known as Dongkou and Xikou. The eight famous businessmen in Zhangjiakou are from Shanxi, and the biggest enterprise is "Xinglong Kui" founded by Jia Fankai, a native of Qixian County. This commercial enterprise has more than 290 employees (some people say that * * * is about 65,438+0,000), and it was the second largest foreign trade enterprise of China in the Qing Dynasty.

In Shahukou, the western export of trade with Mongolia, Shanxi merchants often traded in Daqingshan and Xiying, which was specially taken care of by the Qing government and made a lot of profits. These Mongolian-speaking businessmen are called "general businessmen", and the largest of them is Dashengkui, which is run by Shanxi people and employs six or seven thousand people. It has been described that Dashengkui's property can be spread from Cullen to Beijing for fifty taels of silver ingots. In Ningxia, most of the famous big firms are operated by Shanxi businessmen in Wanrong, Pingyao, Yuci and Linyi, and half of the famous medicinal material Lycium barbarum in Ningxia is in the hands of "Qingtaiheng" operated by Shanxi people.

In Qinghai, Shanxi merchants are based in Xining and active in various counties. In Beijing, rice and flour lines are mostly run by Qixian people; Oil and salt hotels are mostly operated by Xiangling people; Paper shops are mostly operated by Linfen and Xiangling people; Most of the cloth shops are run by Yicheng people, and there is a cloth shop west of Xianyukou, all of which are Yicheng people. Up to now, Shanxi merchants such as Fushan and Linfen have established and operated such famous firms as Unichang, Liubiju and Lerentang in Beijing. In addition, Shanxi merchants also went to Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Anhui, Guangdong and other places for business activities. Most houses in Pan Hao Street were built by Shanxi merchants. Guang Sheng Yuan, Guang Maoxing and Guang Yiyi are actually enterprises established by Shanxi people in Guangzhou. Tea exported by sea, such as tea shipped to Indonesia, is purchased by Shanxi people at the place of origin and shipped to Guangzhou, and Chaozhou businessmen buy it from Shanxi businessmen and then ship it to Nanyang. As for the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River, salt merchants in Yangzhou, tea merchants in Jiangxi and Fujian, and trade with Japan from the Yangtze River estuary are also the most active.

Shanxi businessmen have also opened up foreign markets. Shanxi people first traded with Russia by land. In more than a dozen Russian cities, such as Moscow and Petersburg, firms or semicolons run by Shanxi people have appeared. In Korea and Japan, the trade of Shanxi merchants is also very active. Yuci Changjia exported Xiabu from China and imported Ginseng from North Korea, and was called "Ginseng Rich Man". Jiexiu Jia Fan almost monopolized the import of crude copper to Japan and the export of department stores. During the reign of Qing Dynasty, the most famous commercial families that flourished for more than 200 years were: Chang family in Yuci, Nie family, Cao Shi in Taigu, Qiao family and Qu family in Qixian, Li family in Pingyao, Hou Shi family and Ji family in Jiexiu, Kang family in Linfen, Pan Shi in Wanrong and Yang family in Yangcheng. They are not only big businessmen, loan sharks, but also big landlords. They all have extremely abundant capital. The internal and external causes of the decline of Shanxi merchants in the Qing Dynasty are mainly manifested in the following four aspects:

1. Shanxi merchants in Ming and Qing Dynasties were vassals of the feudal ruling class. At the beginning of the Ming Dynasty, Shanxi merchants were entrusted by the rulers of the Ming Dynasty to raise salaries for northern border towns. After entering the Qing Dynasty, as imperial businessmen, they gained commercial privileges. By the Qing Dynasty, they occupied the top spot in the financial circle because of the capital contribution and the exchange of military salaries by the Qing government. In a word, Shanxi merchants in Ming and Qing Dynasties always prospered by relying on and serving the feudal government. However, when the feudal government went into decline, Shanxi merchants were bound to self-harm. For example, after the Gengzi Incident, Zhixin Bank sent funds to the southern province to lend, but most of the funds sent to the southern province during the Revolution of 1911 were lost. However, the Qing court was anxious to refund the money. As a result, there were 4 million taels of cashier on the books and 2 million taels of silver payable, but in fact they could not turn around and were forced to close down. In the early years of the Republic of China, creditors mostly sat in Taigu, Pingyao, Qixian and other places in Shanxi to collect debts. Due to the heavy losses of the banks, Cai Dong was unable to repay them, so he had to sell his house and land, even fled to other places, and some even became beggars.

The traditional concept of "keeping the foundation" has bound the development of Shanxi merchants. It is not uncommon for Shanxi merchants' capital to flow to the land in the Ming Dynasty. After the Qing Dynasty, it was very common for Shanxi merchants to buy land. There is a folk song that says: "Shanxi People's Congress mattress covers, build a house for the elderly and make a fortune." This "big mattress cover" refers to a cloth cover that looks like a mattress, and can also be put on the back of an animal for people to ride. This ballad reflects the traditional idea that Shanxi businessmen go out to do business and get rich, and then build houses and farm for the elderly. Under the control of this traditional concept, their commercial capital is not conducive to the development of modern capital.

3, stick to the rules, conservative thinking. As mentioned above, with the invasion of foreign capitalism, the old business model was broken. Accelerating reform and conforming to the trend is the way to seek self-development. However, due to the stubborn ideas of some influential financiers and general managers in Shanxi merchants, they lost the opportunity of banking reform four times.

4. The investment cycle of modern enterprises is too long. At the beginning of the 20th century, some people of insight in Shanxi merchants devoted themselves to the modern industry of national capital with great enthusiasm. However, due to the influence of the mine protection movement at that time, their funds were mainly invested in the coal industry with large investment, long validity period, high management requirements and restricted by transportation conditions, rather than the textile industries such as cotton spinning, flour and cigarettes with low investment and high profits, resulting in a large backlog of funds and being in trouble.