Meituan's annual net loss was 8.5 billion yuan, and its share price plummeted by 9.69%. The root cause is mobike?

Mobike was renamed Meituan Bicycle, and this action alone led to the impairment of intangible assets of 654.38+0.3 billion yuan.

On March 1 1 day, Meituan commented on its first annual report after listing, with a revenue of 65.2 billion yuan in 20 18 and an adjusted net loss of 8.5 billion yuan.

Meituan's three main businesses are food and beverage take-out featured by Meituan app, arrival at stores, hotels and tourism featured by Meituan APP, and new businesses of Meituan taxi, mobike, hazelnut B&B and elephant fresh food.

It is worth noting that Meituan claimed that "the adjusted operating profit was recorded on the basis of the merger of two major businesses: food and beverage take-out+arrival, hotel and tourism". However, in 20 18, its operating loss reached11billion RMB, an increase of 7.3 billion RMB over that in 20 17.

Takeaway is the main battlefield of the US Mission, as well as its base camp, traffic pool and locomotive, and its importance is self-evident.

Since the establishment of 20 10 Meituan, the take-away plates have been expanding, but as the main business, they have not been profitable. If you want to gain market advantage in the early stage, you must bear the loss. After listing, with the pressure of performance, the profit appeal of take-away business has also risen.

In 20 18, the gross profit margin of take-away business increased from 8. 1% in 20 17 to 13.8%, and the realization rate increased from 12.3% in 20 17 to/kloc-.

Takeaway is a door-to-door service. On this track, there are JD.COM's home, Wumart's multipoint and 58' s home. Whether the takeaway can be profitable or not, the US Mission unilaterally said that it does not count. On the contrary, to some extent, it can be said that it is determined by the hunger and thirst of old rivals.

Last year, when we were hungry, we adjusted our organizational structure, sank our strategy, and invested heavily in subsidizing C-end users and B-end business, which made Meituan very passive, but we must follow up, otherwise we will face the risk of losing users and business, which will eventually lead to a decline in market share and the failure of scale effect. Once the US Mission falls into a "price war" initiated by Hungry, it will inevitably drag down its liquidity.

At the beginning of 20 19, Baidu take-out was upgraded to Hungry Star Selection, which competed with Meituan for white-collar users in first-and second-tier cities and digitally transformed well-known catering brands. In the process of transformation, we can directly use the technology of Alibaba Cloud, Cainiao and other brother companies, saving a lot of time and cost, while Meituan has to invest a lot of technology research and development from scratch.

In 20 18, the turnover of food and beverage take-out of Meituan reached 282.8 billion yuan, and the revenue was 3.81100 million yuan, contributing 58.5% of the total revenue. In terms of cost, the sales cost is as high as 32.8 billion RMB, accounting for 65.6% of the total cost.

From 2065438 to 2008, Wang Xing made the most wrong decision. If mobike ranks second, ranking first should be nothing.

Mobike, bought by $2.7 billion, once made Meituan thank 65.438+0.5 million every day. Wang Xing flew into a rage, and Wang Huiwen came out and had to press the pause button. After tragic internal integration, three key figures, founder Hu Weiwei, co-founder Wang Xiaofeng and CEO Liu Yu, left one after another. Under the leadership of Wang Huiwen, mobike closed its international business, moved to the headquarters of Meituan, and began to accelerate Meituan.

This round of restructuring has burned the balance sheet of Meituan. At present, only mobike's overseas restructuring needs to make provision for impairment of RMB 358 million. Not long ago, mobike was renamed Meituan Bicycle, which only resulted in the impairment of intangible assets of 654.38+300 million yuan.

* * * On the battlefield of enjoying cycling, mobike and ofo compete with each other, and hello fishermen benefits. At present, Hello has been upgraded from the "two-wheel business" of bicycles to the "four-wheel business" of online car-sharing, which has strongly invaded the ride business. In contrast, less than a year after mobike was incorporated by Meituan, it changed from a unicorn with a valuation of billions of dollars to a bicycle department of Meituan's LBS platform.

At its peak, mobike's market density kept pace with Huang Xiao's, but now its popularity in city streets is greatly reduced, and the damage rate is extremely high. Visually, the density of mobike is only one third of that of Hellobike. Bicycles are included in the company's fixed assets, plus loss and depreciation, which is not a small sunk cost for Meituan's balance sheet.

Once vigorous, now, on the eve of Meituan's listing, mobike, which was acquired with heavy money, has completed the historical mission of supporting asset packages, expanding trading volume and telling good stories in the capital market. How to end it has become an unavoidable practical problem.

A month ago, some media reported that under the pressure of investors, Meituan planned to merge public comments into Meituan APP to increase the number of daily users. Although Wang Huiwen denied this rumor, it is an indisputable fact that the importance of public comments has declined.

On February 22nd, Wang Xing released an internal letter, and the comment platform was renamed as the comment APP department, which belongs to the user platform led by Wang Huiwen at the same rate as Meituan APP. In the future, the trading function of public comment will introduce more Meituan App, which will focus on search and search.

At one time, public comment was Wang Xing's biggest headache. Will its fate today be a portrayal of mobike?

The US Mission takes "eating" as its strategic core. Whether it is to strengthen the stickiness of C-end users or to promote the digital transformation of B-end catering enterprises, it is necessary to come up with a convincing weapon, that is, to have a self-operated new retail sample project, that is, elephant fresh.

In order to attack the new retail hill, Meituan established the Elephant Division, led by senior vice president Chen Liang. Chen Liang was an old minister when Wang Xing founded the campus network. He left his job halfway and rejoined the US Mission on 20 1 1. Now he is one of the five senior vice presidents of Meituan.

Last May, the first elephant fresh opened in Beijing Fangzhuang Times Life Plaza, and now it has entered Beijing, Wuxi and Changzhou, with 7 stores. Judging from the pace of expansion, it is still in the stage of "from 0 to 1".

Elephant Fresh is located in the online and offline integrated fresh supermarket, covering 14 categories, focusing on fresh food, catering, e-commerce and instant delivery. In fact, it follows the "box horse model". On this track, Boxma Xiansheng achieved a single store profit and began to expand to more than 0/00 stores nationwide on a large scale, and behind it was the tragic killing of followers such as Elephant Fresh and 7FRESH.

Fresh elephants have fallen behind. Although there is a beautiful group that provides enough food and grass, there is not much time left for it.

On 20 18, Wang Xing and Cheng Wei made an appointment to have dinner together, and then turned around and launched the online car service. Coupled with the acquisition of mobike, it is quite ambitious in the field of travel. A year later, meituan. Com stops in Nanjing, Shanghai and other individual cities, and there is almost no sound.

Whether elephants are fresh or not is related to the strategic trend of the new retail of Meituan.