Thunderstorm planning analysis

I'm afraid this account will be familiar to domestic readers, because it is basically a standard account of the outbreak of the Soviet-German war that we read from official textbooks and official history books. Judging from the heavy losses suffered by the Soviet Red Army in the early period of the Great Patriotic War, it seems that the Red Army was really caught off guard by Nazi Germany, which seems to have deepened the innocence of the Soviet Union as the victim of aggression.

However, is it really that simple? Are the warring sides really as simple as the aggressor and the victim? For a long time, international historians have been debating a question, that is, why did the Soviet Union assemble such an amazing army in its western border area when the Soviet-German War broke out? If it is only to defend Hitler's attack, then its deployment is obviously too close to the border line and obviously lacks depth, which does not conform to the deployment principle of strategic defense depth echelon configuration. The deployment of Soviet troops is more aggressive than defensive. However, due to the lack of convincing evidence, before the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, it was difficult for historians to make a clear judgment on the real intention of the Soviet Union at that time, and they could only reason on the basis of the actual situation. Because the Soviet Union was beaten at the beginning of the war, it seems that the Soviet Union did not have enough vigilance and preparation for the war, and Stalin should be the "victim".

Von manstein, a famous German Nazi marshal and designer of 1940 outstanding western blitzkrieg plan, analyzed the strategic intention of the former Soviet Union in the eighth chapter of his book "Lost Victory". He wrote:

"There has been a lot of debate about whether the deployment of Russian troops is defensive or offensive. However, if we consider the number of troops concentrated in western Russia and the powerful armored forces concentrated near Bialystok and Lava, then perhaps we should echo Hitler's statement that Russia will take the offensive sooner or later. On the other hand, however, when Russia launched its troops on June 22nd, 194 1, it cannot be said that Russia is ready to take any aggressive action immediately.

I think the closest thing to the truth is that the purpose of Russia's deployment is to be able to cope with various situations-in order to occupy eastern Poland, Belgium and the Baltic Sea, Russia has used quite a strong army. There is no doubt that on June 22nd, 194 1, Russian troops were still scattered in these deep areas, so they could only be used for defensive tasks. However, once the political or military situation in Germany changes, the form of this deployment can also be changed immediately. Without any delay, the Russian army can immediately turn to attack. Therefore, although they were still on the defensive in form before June 22, Russia's deployment was indeed a potential threat to the Third Reich. As long as there is a favorable opportunity-military or political-Russia may directly attack Germany.

Of course, in the summer of 194 1, Stalin might prefer to avoid conflict with Germany. However, if the development of the international situation sooner or later makes the Russian authorities think that they can exert political pressure on Germany or even take military action, then this temporary defensive deployment can quickly turn into an attack. That is, what I said is enough to deal with any situation. "

According to manstein's judgment (of course, when he made this judgment, he couldn't know the existence of the "Thunderstorm" plan), the Soviet army was on the defensive as a whole, but we can't rule out some seemingly abnormal deployments in this defensive, and this defensive seems to be strongly aggressive.

Amin Feng Long, a former Nazi German general, also said in the book The Lost World Empire translated by American Victor Henry: "In German works, it is generally said that the deployment of Soviet troops shows Stalin's offensive intention, and Hitler only strikes first to be strong. But most German historians now admit that Russia's deployment is defensive. "

It seems that "most German historians" were probably deceived by Stalin. The "thunderstorm" in Stalin's mind was so deep that German policy makers could not believe that Stalin might strike Germany before the outbreak of the Soviet-German war. In addition to the aforementioned manstein, Nazi general von Tippel (von Tippelskirch) said in a positive tone when analyzing the background before the Soviet-German war in the fifth chapter of the History of World War II:

"It seems incredible to say that the Soviet Union will provoke an armed conflict with Germany in the near future, both politically and militarily; However, it is entirely reasonable to worry that the Soviet Union may become an unfriendly or even dangerous neighbor under favorable conditions in the future. At present, there is no reason for the Soviet Union to give up its previous policy of achieving outstanding achievements with little force. ..... The cautious and sober policy of the Kremlin will not produce an attempt to attack Germany. "

Now, it seems that this misjudgment really can't be regarded as the negligence of the Germans, because even today, until people have more historical materials than Tippel's era, there are still quite a few people (including historians) who don't believe that Stalin will take the lead in attacking Germany at 194 1. Sokolov's book tells the world a truth. In his book The Secret Archives of World War II, he used considerable space to analyze and demonstrate an amazing fact: Stalin planned to launch a devastating military attack on Germany in 194 1 year, thus dominating Europe in one fell swoop. The plan was named "Thunderstorm". What else can we refute this? If even Russian historians admit the existence of Thunderstorm, what reason can we deny it? I might as well add another material here. I remember reading Interview with German Soldiers in World War II written by Zhu (in general, I don't want to read China's historical works about World War II, but this book is an exception. Because its content is basically the personal memories of German soldiers about that war, not historical research works, so I think it can be regarded as the first-hand collection of historical witnesses. This book is the author's long interview with German veterans of World War II in Germany. In this book, a German veteran named Dyke (born in 19 19, and received a doctorate after the war) is convinced that the Soviet Union has plans to attack Germany. He said:

"I participated in the Soviet-German war from the first day of the attack. What I saw and heard in the Soviet Union convinced me that the Russians were fully prepared for the attack. We fought one siege after another in the Soviet Union, and we met numerous Soviet troops. In just two months, there were more than 3 million Russian troops captured, which was a sea of people. Later, I learned that the Russians deployed 170 divisions in the western military region near Germany, more than half of their total strength. So many troops are deployed near the German border just for defense? I don't believe it! " (See page 29 of Looking for German Soldiers in World War II by Tongxin Publishing House, 2005).

Then, Deco further explained:

"As a soldier, whether the enemy is on the defensive or ready to attack can be felt in battle. You know, no army can be in these two States at the same time. Because the Russian army is fully preparing for the attack, it lacks defensive preparation and deployment, and its depth is very weak, so it will be defeated under a sudden attack. " (See Tongxin Publishing House, Looking for German Soldiers in World War II, page 30, 2005).

At the end of the interview, Zhu pointed out that Dicko's above viewpoints (of course, more than these viewpoints) are quite representative among German World War II veterans. The views of ordinary German soldiers seem to be different from those of some senior German generals and historians after the war. Perhaps, ordinary soldiers are the most intuitive witnesses of the war and the direct witnesses of the first-line war scenes. Their views on some issues may be closer to the truth than those scholars who lived in comfortable study after the war and judged history only by data.

I heard of the "rumor" that the Soviet Union tried to attack Germany in 194 1, but before I came into contact with sokolov's works, I didn't have exact materials, especially the positive conclusions of Russian historians, so I had to make the following judgment when writing the ninth part of Notes on the History of War, according to the description of relevant western works and the logical analysis of the current situation:

"As for whether the Soviet Union would take the initiative to attack Germany at that time, it seems to me that it is only theoretical. The more obvious sign is that the military and diplomatic actions taken by the Soviet Union at that time seemed to meet the needs of strategic defense (although their actions were aggressive to some injured countries). It should be clear that the strength of the Red Army at that time was never enough to defeat the Germans. Moreover, at that time, the German army was in full swing and its combat effectiveness was at its peak. There is no decent opponent in the whole battlefield except the isolated Britain. From a strategic point of view, even if Stalin has the idea of actively attacking Germany, it is unlikely to be implemented in this period and under this background. It is better to choose when the Germans attack on the western front. As a shrewd political leader like Stalin, I'm afraid it is impossible to strike at the enemy when it is at its strongest. Besides, after all, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a treaty. Stalin may think that as long as the Germans don't break this treaty, the Soviet Union should be satisfied with taking advantage of the war that has already broken out and the current situation in Europe, and there is really no need to risk attacking Germany.

So my judgment is that Stalin should not have taken the initiative to attack Germany at that time, and his more logical idea should be how to stop a possible German attack. So I think Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union at 194 1 may be aimed at eliminating a potential rather than a real threat. "

Now, it seems that my above views may not be consistent with the real situation of the Soviet Union at that time in three places:

(1) According to sokolov's records, Stalin in 194 1 did not think that the strength of the Red Army was inferior to that of the Germans. On the contrary, he believes that the quality of the Red Army is at least as good as that of the German army, and the size of the Red Army is obviously stronger than that of the German army. Therefore, Stalin with a soldier has nothing to hide. Sokolov wrote in his book:

"He (Stalin) does not doubt that the Red Army is indeed stronger than fascist Germany. It has more tanks, planes and cannons. So Stalin thought Hitler should be afraid of him and take defensive measures on his eastern border because he was afraid that the Soviet Union might attack. Stalin himself was not as afraid of Hitler as people misunderstood. " (See Chapter III of Secret Archives of World War II) I specially introduced the comparison of military strength between the two countries before the outbreak of the Soviet-German war (2).

(2) The Germans quickly ended the war on the Western Front and did not give up Stalin's plan to attack Germany. Of course, it was really out of Stalin's expectation that the German campaign on the western front went so smoothly and quickly. He intended to stab Germany in the back when it was difficult for Germany to fight on the western front. Sokolov said:

"Before Germany began to attack the western front, Soviet leaders were in a good mood. He dreamed that the fascist armed forces were trapped in insurmountable maginot line, and the Red Army marched westward on a large scale, seized the weak links of the German army, occupied Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and directly hit the enemy's heart. Meet the grateful Anglo-French allied forces somewhere on the Elbe River-in the Rhine if you are lucky. Half of Europe will be controlled by the Soviet Union. This is not far from the peaceful revolution created by the Soviet Red Army with bayonets. " (See Chapter 3 of Secret Archives of World War II)

However, even after the German army ended its operations on the western front and the main force began to move eastward, Stalin continued to push forward his "Thunderstorm" plan in an extremely confidential way, only delaying the implementation time from the original planned 1940 to 194 1 year. Even the German victory on the Western Front may make Stalin see a broader prospect than 1940. In this regard, sokolov wrote: "After the French were defeated and the British were driven out of the mainland, the Red Army suddenly showed an extremely attractive prospect in front of them because of its victory. You can expect to reach the Strait of La Manchi, or you can-anything can happen, cross the Pyrenees and establish Soviet regimes in Spain and Portugal. The Balkans is like a ripe fruit. Together with Istanbul, it will really fall into Stalin's hands. " (See Chapter 3 of Secret Archives of World War II)

Perhaps in Stalin's view, the surrender of France and the forced withdrawal of British armed forces from the European continent made the Soviet Union suddenly lose two powerful military opponents in the strategic offensive actions that might be launched in Central and Western Europe in the future, leaving the Soviet Union with only one opponent-the German army. If Stalin really thinks so, we should be surprised not only by his ambition to annex the whole of Europe, but also by his extreme confidence in the bloated and inefficient Soviet combat effectiveness.

(3) Stalin's attitude towards the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty is actually the same as Hitler's, and they just use it as a tool to cover up their war plans. Once the attack was ripe, both dictators decided to tear up the treaty without hesitation. According to the official tradition, the purpose of Stalin's signing the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty was to delay Hitler's invasion as much as possible, if not completely stop it, so as to win the preparation time for defense. Sokolov's works tell us that this is not the case. On the one hand, Stalin didn't want to carry out strategic defense at all, and his starting point was to take the initiative to attack; On the other hand, he didn't believe that Hitler dared to face the well-equipped Soviet Red Army with millions of soldiers in the border areas (they had obvious advantages in equipment and personnel).

So, when did Stalin begin to have the idea of attacking Germany? Sokolov thinks it can be traced back to the end of 1939 at the earliest. He said:

"When zhukov was still in distant Mongolia, Stalin had made a very specific plan to attack' friends and allies' Hitler. This friend also sincerely congratulated the Soviet leader on his 60th birthday in1939+February, and wished Stalin personal "good health" and "all the best for the friendly Soviet people in the future". (See Chapter 3 of Secret Archives of World War II)

This time is very telling, which means that Stalin began to plan to attack the other side before Hitler. In other words, Stalin planned the war of aggression against the other side earlier than Hitler, and Hitler's "Barbarossa" plan was put forward in the second half of 1940. Applying a criminology theory of criminal law, Stalin made "criminal preparation" earlier than Hitler. Sokolov specifically mentioned the once controversial famous "Polish officer in Katyn massacre" (this incident is no longer controversial, and it was really the Soviet Union rather than the Germans after full textual research by historians. ), 1940 In April and May, about15,000 Polish officers and about10,000 Polish civilians (most of them intellectuals and bourgeoisie) who were captured and held in Soviet prisons and prison camps during the Soviet invasion of Poland were collectively executed by Soviet internal affairs forces in Katyn and Kharkov forest parks in Smolensk. This incident has also become one of the evidences that Stalin intends to attack Germany. According to sokolov's explanation, Stalin wanted to kill these captured Poles because around February 1940, Stalin decided to go to war with Germany, which means:

Stalin must tear up the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty and vote for Britain, France (and the United States);

(2) Due to the change of position, we must also make changes on the Polish issue. We must recognize Poland's sovereign independence (because it will also become an ally of the Soviet Union), release all Poles captured by the Soviet Union in the war of 1939 with Germany, and form the Polish army. The more than 20,000 Poles captured by the Soviet Union are basically politically hostile to the Soviet Union. If a new Polish army is formed with these people as the backbone, it will be difficult for this army to obey the Soviet Union politically, but will obey the Polish government in exile in London. This prospect is totally unacceptable to Stalin who wants to completely control Poland after the war. Therefore, these "politically unreliable" Poles must be secretly executed before the Soviet Union went to war with Germany. What Stalin needs is a new Polish army and a new government that obeys the Soviet Union.

Militarily, the Soviet Union began to set up mechanized troops on a large scale in June 1940, and at the beginning of 194 1, the strength of the Soviet Air Force was further enhanced on the original basis. At the same time, the Red Army also made corresponding personnel adjustments. Zhukov, who was considered by Stalin to be the most adept at offensive operations among the Red Army generals, was transferred from Mongolia to the Western Front and served as the commander of the Kiev Special Military Region, the largest military region with the largest number of Soviet troops and the most substantial combat equipment at that time. Stalin told zhukov to apply his successful experience in Mongolia's war against Japan to the training of Soviet troops in the western front, while zhukov's experience in Mongolia was attack. During the period of 194 1, the Soviet army held two campaigns and strategic exercises. Although the background of the exercise was that the Soviet Union was attacked by Germany, the key exercise was actually an offensive war. As sokolov said, the Red Army was prepared to attack, not defend. The reason why the background of the exercise is to fight back against aggression is only to meet the official propaganda tone of "the Soviet people love peace" in name. Sokolov pointed out:

"The exercise in [194 1 year] 1 month is by no means a preview of the disaster in June194/year. They are a preview of the Soviet Union's future invasion of Europe. However, the rigid propaganda mode requires the Red Army to always attack to counter the' imperialist invasion'. Therefore, there is additional information about the "West", "Southwest" and "South" attacking the Soviet Union. Just to make the Red Army officers and men participating in the exercise not have any doubts, the so-called Soviet peace-loving policy is all just a cover for expansion plans. ..... In fact, during the two exercises, only the Soviet Union's plan to invade the territory of neighboring countries was formulated. " (See Chapter 3 of Secret Archives of World War II)

194 1 year 1 month, zhukov was transferred to the red army chief of staff. 194 1 in March, the Soviet army adopted the strategic development plan of the western front and chose southwest as the main attack direction. In the plan, the part that handed over the task to the later Southwest Army had a noteworthy sign: "June 12 began to attack." Sokolov thinks this sign is very convincing, which can only be understood as follows: the original plan to attack Germany at that time was to start on June 194 1 12. As we all know, Hitler's "Barbarossa" plan was put into practice on June 22nd. However, due to the limited transportation capacity of the Soviet Union, it is impossible to ensure that enough troops will be assembled before June 12, and the supply of fuel, ammunition and other materials can not be guaranteed. Therefore, the Soviet Union had to postpone its attack until July. In addition, when the war approached, the anti-German political propaganda in the Soviet army began on a large scale. 194 1 June (before the outbreak of the Soviet-German war), the Soviet army issued an instruction to various units called "Recent Political Propaganda Tasks", which clearly pointed out:

"War is our border. Imperialism may attack the Soviet Union at any time. We should be prepared to use our own offensive military action to stop the enemy's attack ... The experience of military action tells us that the defense strategy will have little effect and will eventually end in failure when motorized troops are dominant. Therefore, to deal with Germany, we must adopt the offensive strategy supported by this powerful technical equipment. ..... The whole training process of all services and arms of the Red Army must firmly run through the main line of offensive spirit. " (See Chapter 3 of Secret Archives of World War II)

This directive clearly shows that before the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, the Soviet army did have a clear plan to preempt Germany. If Stalin didn't intend to tear up the non-aggression treaty and attack Germany first, but just delayed the German attack as much as possible, as many people (including me for a while) mistakenly thought, and didn't give Hitler an excuse to wage war, then the Soviet army would neither carry out anti-German propaganda (because such a move would undoubtedly arouse Germany's strong suspicion and even anger the Germans), nor would it highlight the main line of attack in the war against Germany.

Through sokolov's introduction, the truth of the outbreak of the Soviet-German war in front of us is roughly like this: during the period of 194 1, both the Soviet Union and Germany were in full swing to launch a bloody and destructive attack on each other, but neither side knew nor believed that the other side was also preparing to launch a terrible attack on itself, because both sides were very confident that the other side should be afraid of themselves. More interestingly, both sides obviously noticed the large-scale troop concentration of the other side in the border area, but both agreed that this was only a defensive measure to prevent attacks. So when war broke out, Stalin was shocked. He didn't understand why the Germans, whose numbers were obviously inferior, dared to throw eggs at the huge Soviet army and launch a general attack before ending the war with Britain. Hitler was also surprised. He didn't expect the Soviet troops to be so concentrated and advanced in the border areas, which didn't conform to the deployment logic of an army planning strategic defense, so that a large number of Soviet troops would be surrounded by large tracts of land a few weeks before the start of the war against the Soviet Union. Hitler could not have imagined that Stalin planned to attack Germany in 194 1 year. Sokolov has a vivid comment: "Both dictators are worried that the partners who signed the non-aggression treaty at some point in the future are planning to tear up the treaty and become the only masters in Europe, so they both try to take advantage of the favorable opportunity to launch the offensive first. The most amazing thing is that Stalin and Hitler chose almost the same date without consulting anyone. Hitler originally planned to attack the Soviet Union on May 194 1, but the date was changed to June 22nd because of the Balkan campaign. Stalin began to plan to attack Germany on June 194 1 day, but in the end, due to insufficient supply of troops and materials, the attack date was changed to July, so it was a step late. " (See Chapter 3 of Secret Archives of World War II)

Just like the one-sided war situation in the early days of the Soviet-German War, Stalin's "thunderstorm" was just a terrible attack plan. At that time, the Germans had finished fighting on the western front, and their main energy had been concentrated on preparing for the Soviet Union. More importantly, the Germans (especially the army) of 194 1 are at the peak of their combat effectiveness and have high morale. Even if it can catch up with Thunderstorm, sokolov said for sure:

"Even if the Soviet army really beat us to it, such as launching an attack on June 12 as originally planned, they will not suffer less losses than during the implementation of the' Barbarossa' plan." (See Chapter 2 of Secret Archives of World War II)

The author pointedly pointed out that the great defeat of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War proved that this army was not even competent for effective defensive operations, and if it was not good at properly organizing defense, it would have no chance of winning in the attack. Because in the final analysis, attack is a military action that is much more complicated than defense in many aspects.

Obviously, the key to the problem is not who starts the fight first, but who is better at fighting. In this regard, the Germans have established an unshakable advantage over the Soviets. Based on this advantage, no matter whether the Soviet army starts first or not, it is impossible to avoid the disastrous outcome at the beginning of the war. However, one question that may come to mind is very interesting, that is, if Stalin launched the attack on Germany first, how to define the behavior of the Soviet Union? Should the Soviet attack be defined as aggression against Germany?

Finally, sokolov's evaluation of the Soviet Union's World War II capability sounds harsh, but it is in line with the Soviet Union's performance in the war:

"Compared with the fascist German armed forces or the American and British troops, the Red Army was the army of the last century, and they belonged to the First World War. The level of technical equipment required by the Second World War is not only irreconcilable with the actual education level of most officers and men of the Red Army, but also irreconcilable with the psychology of the broad masses of the Soviet Union. "