What do you know about secrecy?

What are the provisions of the state on the confidentiality of citizens?

1. Article 53 of China's current Constitution clearly stipulates that citizens must abide by the confidentiality provisions in the Constitution and laws;

2. Article 3 of the Secrecy Law stipulates that all state organs, armed forces, political parties, social organizations, enterprises and institutions and citizens have the obligation to keep state secrets;

3. Article 24 of the Secrecy Law stipulates that it is forbidden to disclose state secrets in private contacts and correspondence. Carrying documents, materials and other articles belonging to state secrets out shall not violate the confidentiality provisions. Don't talk about state secrets in public;

Article 25 of the Secrecy Law stipulates that security measures must be taken to transmit state secrets in wired and wireless communication. State secrets shall not be transmitted in plain codes or passwords that have not been examined and approved by the relevant central departments. Documents, materials and other articles belonging to state secrets are not allowed to be transmitted by ordinary mail.

What are the serious violations of 12 stipulated in the secrecy law?

The Secrecy Law lists 12 kinds of the most common and typical serious illegal acts, which lead to the invalidation of secrecy measures, the loss of control of state secrets, the destruction of the technical protection system of secrecy and the serious threat to the security of state secrets. These acts are:

1. Connect classified computers and classified storage devices to the Internet and other public information networks;

2. Failing to take protective measures to exchange information between classified information systems and public information networks such as the Internet;

3. Using unclassified computers or unclassified storage devices to store and process state secret information;

4. illegally copying, recording or storing state secrets;

5. Transmitting state secrets on public information networks such as the Internet or in wired or wireless communication without security measures;

6. Involving state secrets in private contacts and correspondence;

7. Uninstalling or modifying the safety technical regulations and management regulations of classified information systems without authorization;

8. Giving away, selling, discarding or using classified computers and classified storage devices that have not been processed by security technology for other purposes;

9 illegal acquisition and possession of state secret carriers;

10. transmitting the carrier of state secrets through ordinary postal service, express delivery and other channels without confidentiality measures;

1 1. buying, selling, transferring or destroying state secret carriers without permission;

12. Sending a state secret carrier out of the country or carrying or transmitting a state secret carrier out of the country without the approval of the relevant competent department.

The secrecy law stipulates that anyone who commits one of the above acts shall be punished according to law; If the case constitutes a crime, criminal responsibility shall be investigated according to law; If the above acts do not constitute a crime, this punishment is not applicable, and the secrecy administrative department shall urge its organs and units to deal with them.

How to distinguish state secrets from work secrets?

1. Different stakeholders. Working secrets are directly related to the interests of the relevant state organs, and once leaked, it will only harm the local interests of the relevant state organs in fulfilling their functions and responsibilities entrusted by the state; State secrets are directly related to national interests, and once leaked, they will cause damage to the overall interests of the country;

2. The determination method is different. The determination of work secrets is mainly determined by state organs at all levels, and only a few central state organs have unified regulations or explicit authorization, and they will be followed; The determination of state secrets must be carried out in accordance with the law, and it must be operated within the scope of the Provisions on the Specific Scope of State Secrets and Their Classification formulated and issued by the state secrecy department in conjunction with relevant central state organs, and it is not allowed to be determined at will;

3. The signs are different. Documents, materials and other carriers belonging to work secrets may be marked as "internal", and shall not be marked with signs of state secrets;

4. Different management. The management of work secrets by state organs at all levels can refer to the measures for the administration of state secrets, but it does not need to be standardized according to legal procedures. For example, the delivery of state secret documents, materials or other items must be delivered by confidential mail, not by ordinary mail; There is no uniform requirement for documents, materials or other articles that convey work secrets, which can be selected by the organs themselves;

5. The applicable laws are different. The applicable legal norm for protecting work secrets is the national civil servant law, which mainly protects work secrets through administrative means. For the protection of state secrets, the secrecy law can be applied not only by administrative means, but also by legal means.

6. Different responsibilities. After the work secret is leaked, the responsible person will only bear administrative responsibility and will only be subject to corresponding administrative sanctions; Whoever divulges state secrets shall determine the legal responsibility of the responsible person according to the possible harmful consequences. If the circumstances are minor and the consequences are not serious, they can bear administrative responsibility, and if the circumstances are serious and the consequences are serious, they can bear criminal responsibility;

In short, due to the different stakeholders involved in work secrets and state secrets, the harmful consequences caused by leaks are quite different in scope and degree. Therefore, the protection of work secrets is obviously not as good as the protection of state secrets. Other differences come from this.

What are the confidentiality requirements for using mobile phones?

1. Do not involve state secret information in mobile phone calls, send state secret information with mobile phones, or store state secret information in mobile phones;

2. Do not bring mobile terminals such as mobile phones to attend confidential meetings or enter confidential activities or key departments;

3. Do not use mobile terminals such as mobile phones to record, take photos, take videos, make video calls and surf the Internet in confidential places;

4. Mobile terminals such as mobile phones shall not be used as classified information equipment, and shall not be connected with classified information equipment and carriers;

5. When applying for a mobile phone number, registering a mobile phone mailbox or opening other functions, it is strictly forbidden to fill in the information such as the name and address of the institution, or store sensitive information such as the work unit and position of the core secret-related personnel in the mobile phone, or enable the remote data synchronization function of the mobile phone;

6. Conduct necessary security checks on the mobile phones used by core and important secret-related personnel, and try to equip and use special mobile phones. Do not use mobile phones without network access permission and mobile phones with location service, Internet connection and other functions;

7. When the mobile phones of core secret-related personnel and important secret-related personnel fail or find abnormal conditions, they should immediately report and go to the designated place for maintenance. Mobile phones that cannot be restored to use should be destroyed according to the sorting equipment.

What are the common sense of security technology prevention?

1. Do not connect confidential computers and networks to the Internet or other public information networks;

2. Mobile storage media such as USB flash drives shall not be crossed between confidential computers and non-confidential computers;

3. Data on the Internet and other public information networks shall not be copied to classified computers and networks without protective measures;

4. Do not set the password of the classified computer in violation of regulations;

5. Do not install software or copy other people's files on classified computers without authorization;

6. Don't use wireless peripherals for confidential computers;

7. Confidential computers and mobile storage media shall not be sent through ordinary mail channels or illegally handed over to others for use and storage;

8. Confidential laptops and removable storage media shall not be taken out without authorization;

9. Do not leave the office automation equipment for handling confidential information, such as computers, mobile storage media, fax machines and photocopiers, to external personnel for maintenance without authorization;

10. Do not sell, give away or discard office automation equipment such as classified computers without professional classification;

1 1. Don't connect the all-in-one machine that handles confidential information with ordinary telephone lines;

12. Do not equip and install video and audio input devices on networked computers in classified places;

13. Don't bring your mobile phone into important confidential places;

14. Do not store or process confidential information on computers connected to the Internet and other public information networks;

15. Don't store or process confidential information on the unclassified office network;

16. Confidential information shall not be published on government portals;

17. Don't use computers with wireless interconnection function to process confidential information;

18. Personal computers and mobile storage media shall not be used to store or process confidential information;

19. Office automation equipment that has not been tested by safety technology shall not be used in key departments and parts that are classified;

20. Don't use ordinary fax machines, telephones and mobile phones to transmit or talk about confidential information.

(Article Source: China Confidential Online Network)

On network leakage from several cases

In recent years, with the continuous development of Internet technology, e-mail, QQ, WeChat, etc. The endless stream has greatly facilitated our work and life. However, the ensuing leakage incidents are on the rise. Because of their fast spread time and wide spread, the harm caused by them is enormous and should be highly vigilant.

Email leak

20111February, a city secrecy bureau conducted a secret spot check on the municipal organs and their affiliated institutions, focusing on the use of office networks, storage media management, website information release and so on. During the inspection, it was found that the staff of the Transportation and Energy Department of the Municipal Development and Reform Commission used the Internet to work, and all documents and materials were sent and received through 126 e-mail. The inspection team immediately asked the office staff to disconnect the network connection of all office computers, and the Security Office of the National Development and Reform Commission made a backup of the documents and materials stored in the e-mail. After identification, the staff of the Transportation and Energy Department used 5 126 e-mail boxes to store and transmit 7 confidential documents, in addition to some work secrets and internal information. It is understood that the Transportation and Energy Department of the Municipal Development and Reform Commission exchanges a large amount of business data and statistical data with the relevant departments of all districts and counties under its jurisdiction on a daily basis, and also conveys a small number of documents. Because the office private network is under construction, through collective research in the office, it is decided to temporarily use Internet e-mail to transmit all kinds of documents and materials until the private network is qualified, and all the staff in the office have applied for the e-mail with the serial number 126. Afterwards, the Municipal Development and Reform Commission gave Qiu, director of the Transportation and Energy Department, administrative demotion and transfer from the department, while Ma, deputy director, gave administrative demerits and informed criticism punishment to three other staff members who used Internet e-mail. Yuan, the deputy director of the National Development and Reform Commission in charge of the Department, was given administrative warning and warning within the party because of his leadership responsibility.

Wechat leaks

At the end of 20 13, a copy of a confidential document was spread in several wechat groups, causing serious leaks. Relevant departments immediately intervened in the investigation, and the case quickly came to light. After investigation, on a certain day at the end of 5438+ 10, a unit organized a collective study of a meeting spirit in an internal guest house. In the process of reading and learning a confidential document in his personal room, Liu received a chat from his colleague Zou. At Zou's request, Liu took photos of relevant content with his mobile phone and sent it to Zou through WeChat. After that, Zou organized the photo of the document into a relatively complete document and sent it to his friend Wang through WeChat for information sharing. Wang passed it on to friends and colleagues, and Wang's friends and colleagues spread it on a large scale through WeChat, which led to the large-scale disclosure of the confidential document. After the incident, Liu was placed on probation for one year, dismissed from his post and transferred from a classified post. Zou was fired.

QQ leaks

20 13 10, an important confidential document was leaked on the internet. After investigation, the document was published by the portal website of a middle school in a county, and it came from the QQ group of the county education system to which the school belongs. This QQ group is composed of primary and secondary school directors organized by the county education bureau office for the convenience of issuing notices and conveying documents. In late June, 10, Ma, director of the office of the county education bureau, asked Zhou, director of the office of a department of the county party Committee, for the meeting documents of the relevant departments of the municipal party Committee in order to organize and convey the spirit of a meeting in time. The document in Zhou's hand comes from Hong, the director of an office of his superior department. It was Hongmou who let Wang, deputy director of the office, know that the material was a state secret and sent it to Zhou online through QQ. After Zhou received the documents, he distributed them at the meeting organized by the county party Committee and sent them to Ma through QQ mailbox after the meeting. Ma uploaded the file to the QQ group folder for all primary and secondary schools to communicate and learn. The director of a middle school office downloaded files from QQ group files and posted them on the school portal website, causing leaks. After the incident, Hong and Zhou were severely punished by the party, and Wang was punished by the party; The relevant departments have admonished the leaders and ordered them to make a written examination.

Internet e-mail leakage warning

The above-mentioned cases reflect some of the same characteristics of the responsible personnel: one kind of responsible personnel is lucky, thinking that using the Internet to transmit state secrets temporarily or in a small amount will not lead to leaks, and some "highly confidential" institutions also encrypt documents and materials, but they do not know that only the act itself has constituted a serious violation of the law; Another kind of person in charge has a technical blind spot. Some people involved even think that the information records of both parties can be deleted immediately after the recipient receives the confidential document, and they have no idea that all copies of the mail are still kept in the server of the Internet service provider. In fact, it is very simple to avoid such leaks. The internet is not confidential, and the internet is not confidential. As long as we completely cut off the connection between state secret information and the Internet, including e-mail, and resolutely put an end to the use of e-mail to transmit state secrets, we can fundamentally block this leak channel.

Provisions on the specific scope of state secrets and their classification in educational work

(Jiaomi [2001] No.2, July 9, 2006 54 38+0)

Article 1 In order to keep state secrets, safeguard national security and interests, and ensure the reform and development of education, these Provisions are formulated in accordance with the Law of People's Republic of China (PRC) on Guarding State Secrets and the Measures for the Implementation of the Law of People's Republic of China (PRC) on Guarding State Secrets.

Article 2 State secrets in educational work refer to matters related to national security and interests, which are determined according to legal procedures and known only to a certain range of people within a certain period of time.

Article 3 The specific scope of state secrets and their classification in educational work:

(1) Top secret matters: test questions (including sub-questions), reference answers and grading standards before the national unified education examination.

(2) Confidential matters: 1. The prevention plan, treatment measures and comprehensive situation of national student riots; 2. The current situation of secret associations in the education system and its countermeasures: 3. The dynamics and reflection of major sensitive issues affecting the stability of society and colleges and universities; 4 national staff strikes, demonstrations and other emergencies prevention programs, treatment measures and comprehensive situation; 5 questions (including sub-questions), reference answers and scoring standards before the national education provincial unified examination; 6 major adjustment plans that have not been announced in the national long-term development plan for education; 7. Statistics of special professional education in institutions of higher learning; 8. Special incidents, special personnel and their handling opinions among international students and international students in China; 9. Strategies for participating in international organizations and foreign exchange activities and fighting for safeguarding national sovereignty and reputation; 10. Analysis, suggestions, domestic responses and countermeasures of major policy adjustments in education and scientific research in the countries where overseas educational institutions send overseas students, trainees and visiting scholars to China through special channels; 1 1. Internal policies and regulations on educational exchanges with Taiwan.

(3) Secret matters: 1. The relevant information of the national, provincial and district (city) unified examination proposition work and participants; 2 national education district (city) level unified examination questions (including sub-questions), reference answers and scoring standards before opening; 3 national education, national, provincial, district (city) level unified examination after the test; 4 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government teachers strike, demonstrations and other emergencies; 5. It is not appropriate to openly select the plans of international students and the party affairs of international students; 6. Bilateral and multilateral educational exchange projects (including memoranda) that should not be made public; The comprehensive situation of 7 national security departments to recruit college graduates.

Article 4 Institutions of higher learning undertake national confidential engineering research projects and topics, as well as confidential research projects and topics approved at or above the provincial or ministerial level, and their classification shall be implemented in accordance with the classification determined by the competent department or the national scientific and technological confidentiality regulations; State secrets involving other departments or industries in educational work shall be classified according to the confidentiality scope of relevant departments; Whether it is a state secret or not, and what kind of secret level it belongs to is not clear, which shall be determined by the Ministry of Education.

Article 5 The following matters in educational work are not state secrets, but only held by a certain range of personnel, and shall not be spread and made public without authorization: 1. Unpublished national education statistics, annual plans and development plans; 2. The budget and final accounts of education funds have not been announced, and the use of education funds has not been announced; 3. Internal discussions and relevant materials on the opinions, plans and cadre assessment, promotion, appointment and dismissal, rewards and punishments of the proposed institutions and personnel; 4. The dynamic situation of educational social situation mastered by educational administrative departments at all levels; 5. Questions and candidates' answers and candidates' archives that should not be made public after the exam; 6 national education, national, provincial and regional (city) level unified examination paper printing, storage, storage, transportation and other matters; 7. Internal documents and materials that should not be made public in educational work; 8. Other major educational issues that should not be made public.

Article 6 The Ministry of Education shall be responsible for the interpretation of these Provisions.

Article 7 These Provisions shall come into force as of the date of promulgation. 00 1) promulgated by the State Education Commission and the State Secrecy Bureau on February 65438+2, 2002 shall be abolished at the same time.

How to prevent leaks in foreign cooperation and exchanges

In recent years, with the enhancement of comprehensive national strength and the improvement of international status, China's foreign cooperation and exchanges in the fields of politics, economy, scientific research and culture have increased significantly in quantity, level and scope, and the number of cases involving state secrets in the process of foreign cooperation and exchanges has increased day by day. Some units have not strictly implemented the relevant regulations on keeping state secrets when carrying out foreign cooperation and exchanges, and the confidentiality management is not strict, which provides an opportunity for foreign parties to obtain our state secrets (or internal) information. From the external reasons, a few foreign countries steal secrets in the name of cooperation, and use the psychology that some enterprises, institutions and research institutes are eager to cooperate and exchange with foreign countries to steal our country's secrets and business secrets by all means, which seriously damages the national interests. From the internal reasons, some enterprises, institutions and research institutes that cooperate with foreign countries have a weak sense of confidentiality and lax confidentiality management, which gives foreign countries the opportunity to obtain state secrets (or internal) information.

In the final analysis, the loopholes in foreign cooperation and exchanges are caused by problems in our internal management. Only by constantly strengthening internal security management and further improving control measures can we fundamentally avoid the occurrence of leaks. Specifically, we should do the following work.

First, carefully evaluate and ensure that the project is well established. Confidentiality review should be a necessary procedure before the project is established. For projects involving state secrets, foreign organizations and individuals should be avoided as much as possible to undertake or participate in cooperation. If the foreign party must undertake or participate in the cooperation, it shall report to the competent department for approval in accordance with relevant national laws and regulations before implementation, and shall not contract out the secret-related projects to overseas organizations or individuals without authorization, and shall not engage in scientific research cooperation involving state secrets with overseas organizations or individuals without authorization.

The second is to standardize the examination and approval and strictly implement the relevant confidentiality provisions. To provide information to foreign parties in foreign cooperation and exchange, we should proceed from the overall interests of the country and the reality of foreign economic cooperation, weigh the advantages and disadvantages, follow the principles of rationality, legality and moderation, strictly follow the requirements of the Interim Provisions on the Confidentiality of Information Provision of Foreign Economic Cooperation, clearly define the scope of provision, and conduct strict confidentiality review. If the state secrets that must be provided can be technically handled and meet the actual needs, technical measures should be taken. If technical measures cannot be taken, it shall be reported to the organs and units with the power of examination and approval for approval according to law. When providing state secret information upon approval, the other party shall be required to sign a confidentiality agreement and undertake the necessary confidentiality obligations.

Third, earnestly fulfill the relevant confidentiality obligations to ensure the security of state secrets. Enterprises, institutions and scientific research institutes engaged in foreign cooperation and exchanges shall, in providing state secrets to the outside world, sign a confidentiality agreement with the recipient in accordance with the provisions of relevant confidentiality laws and regulations, requiring them to undertake confidentiality obligations. The basic contents of the agreement should include: state secrets and reasons provided to the outside world, confidentiality obligations undertaken, liability for breach of contract, etc. The relevant units of foreign cooperation and exchange shall designate specialized agencies and personnel to regularly supervise and inspect the implementation of confidentiality agreements. Once found to violate the agreement or threaten the security of state secrets, we should immediately take effective measures to eliminate the hidden danger of leaking secrets, and seriously investigate the responsibility of the responsible person according to law.

Fourth, strengthen management and strengthen the implementation of internal security control measures. First, it is necessary to delimit the scope of confidentiality of the unit, and clarify the confidential content of the unit and the scope of information that can be disclosed to the public. Involving state secrets, it is necessary to strictly implement the relevant provisions on providing state secrets to the outside world. The second is to strengthen the confidentiality education for the confidential personnel of the unit, conscientiously implement the "Confidentiality Reminder System for Foreign Scientific and Technological Exchanges", and adopt various methods such as signing a confidentiality undertaking and participating in confidentiality training to clarify the confidentiality obligations and responsibilities of the confidential personnel, and strictly implement the disciplinary requirements for contact with foreign parties. The third is to strengthen the management of key departments of the unit, delimit safe areas in time, strengthen civil air defense and technical defense measures, and report the situation in time. Fourthly, strengthen the management of secret vector to prevent the loss of secret vector, and pay special attention to the security management of classified computers, networks and mobile storage media.

(Text selected from: China Confidential Online Network)

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