Who is Zheng Chenggong?

Introduction to the life of Zheng Chenggong Zheng Chenggong (1624-1662), a national hero during the Ming and Qing Dynasties, a famous military strategist and politician in the history of our country. His real name is Sen, his childhood name is Fusong, his courtesy name is Mingyan, and his nickname is Damu. He is Han nationality and a native of Shijing Town, Nan'an City, Fujian Province. He was born on August 27, 1624 AD. History records record that he was "a smart young man, brave and promising." At the age of 11, he was already very smart. He wrote an article: "A boy should sweep and sweep in response to advance and retreat." The article said: Tang and Wu conquered and punished by sweeping and sweeping; Yao and Shun bowed and responded by advancing and retreating. His teacher was full of praise for it. His father is Zheng Zhilong, and his mother's name is Tianchuan. His ancestral home is Dengdamiao Village, Wangpeng Township, Gushi County, Henan Province. When he was a supervisor in the Hongguang period, Emperor Shaozong of the Ming Dynasty granted him the surname Zhu and the title of Uncle Zhongxiao. This is how he was commonly known as "Guo Surnamed Master". When the Qing troops entered Fujian, his father Zheng Zhilong surrendered. He cried and remonstrated but refused to listen and raised troops to resist the Qing Dynasty. Later, he joined forces with Zhang Huangyan in the Northern Expedition, which shocked the southeast. In February of the second year of Longwu in Ming Dynasty (1646), Emperor Longwu (King Zhu Yujian of Ming and Tang Dynasties) moved to Yanping Mansion. In March, Zheng Chenggong made a "statement" to Emperor Longwu in Yanping: "According to dangers, control them, select generals to make progress, join ships to attack, and open up the ocean to enrich the country" (later known as the "Yanping Statement"), which was lamented by Emperor Longwu. In a strange move, Zheng Chenggong was granted the title of "loyal and filial uncle", was given Shang Fangjian, and was given the seal of "recruiting the general". Set up a military headquarters and naval training base in Yanping, and patrol the Nanping border between Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangxi. In late August, Zheng Chenggong bid farewell to Emperor Longwu and fought with the Qing army on the Minjiang River in Yanping. "The encounter was unfavorable and he led his troops south." "Sui secretly led a brigade to escape from Jinmen" and raised the righteous flag along the coasts of Jin and Xiamen in the name of "recruiting the general". In the seventh year of Yongli (1653), Emperor Longwu granted Zheng Chenggong the title of "Gong Yanping". In the first month of the twelfth year of Yongli (1658), Zheng Chenggong was granted the title of "Prince of Yanping County" by Emperor Yongli of the Ming Dynasty. Later generations also called Zheng Chenggong Zheng Yanping. In the first year of Kangxi (1662), he led tens of thousands of soldiers from Xiamen and landed at Heliao Port in Taiwan. He defeated the Dutch colonists, recovered Taiwan, and built Taiwan. This made him shine through the ages and leave his name in history. However, because Taiwan was in the tropics and the sanitary conditions were relatively poor at that time, Zheng Chenggong contracted the epidemic not long after arriving in Taiwan and died of the disease on June 23, 1662 (the eighth day of the fifth lunar month). He lived for 38 years. [Edit this paragraph] Loyalty to the monarchy and fight against the Manchus. In 1644, the Manchus entered the customs and occupied Beijing. In the second year of Shunzhi (1645), they destroyed the Ming Dynasty's Fu Wang Zhu Yousong established in Nanjing. Hongguang regime, so Zhu Yujian, king of the Ming and Tang Dynasties with Ming Dynasty descent, proclaimed himself emperor in Fuzhou, with the reign title "Longwu". Emperor Longwu granted Zheng Zhilong the title of Jian'an Bo, and later granted him the title of Ping Guogong. Zheng Zhilong took Zheng Sen, who was 21 years old at the time, to visit the emperor to express his gratitude. During the meeting, the emperor asked how to save the country. Zheng Sen said in the words of Yue Fei of the Southern Song Dynasty: "Civil officials do not love money, military officials are not willing to die, and the world is peaceful." Emperor Longwu was very happy. Appreciating Zheng Sen's answer, he was given the Ming Dynasty's national surname Zhu, changed his name to Chenggong, and was granted the title Zhongxiao Bo. This is how he was commonly known as the national surname Ye. At the age of 22, Zheng Chenggong was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief of the Central Army of Emperor Longwu of the Southern Ming Dynasty. In the third year of Shunzhi in the Qing Dynasty (the second year of Longwu in the Southern Ming Dynasty, 1646), the Qing army conquered Fujian, and Emperor Longwu of the Tang Dynasty was killed. Under the recruitment of Hong Chengchou, a scholar of the Qing Dynasty, Zheng Chenggong's father believed that the Ming Dynasty was exhausted, and regardless of Zheng Chenggong's objections, he became single. He went north and surrendered to the Qing court. At this time, the Qing army looted the Zheng family. Zheng Chenggong's mother, Tian Chuan, committed suicide by committing seppuku in order to avoid being humiliated by the Qing soldiers. Under the "hatred of the country and the family", Zheng Chenggong raised troops in Lieyu (Little Kinmen) in December of the second year of Longwu (January 1647). The title on the flag was "Uncle Loyalty and Filial Piety Recruited the General and the Criminal Minister Zhu Chenggong." In the third year of Yongli (1649), he was renamed Yongli of the Southern Ming Dynasty. Emperor Yongli named him the Prince of Yanping County, so some people also called him Zheng Yanping. From 1651 to 1652, he won three major victories in Xiaoyingling, Haicheng (now Longhai) and other places in southern Fujian, and annihilated the main force of the Qing army stationed in Fujian. Later, he sent his troops to capture Zhoushan in Zhejiang in the north and Jieyang in Guangdong in the south. In the twelfth year of Shunzhi (1655), Qing Dingyuan General Jidu led about 30,000 troops into Fujian, and together with the Qing troops stationed in Fujian, attacked the Zheng army. Zheng Chenggong took advantage of the Qing army's weakness in water warfare and lured it to go to sea to fight. In April of the following year, his navy was annihilated in the waters of Weitou, Xiamen. During the 16 years after the uprising, Zheng Chenggong took full control of the sea power in the small islands near today's Little Kinmen and Xiamen (it was a small island at the time and was not connected to the mainland) to do business with foreigners and collect funds. , prepared military strength, and went deep into the inland to establish commercial strongholds, collecting a lot of information about the Qing army and the court. They raised troops several times, and negotiated peace with the Qing court to buy time to restore their troops. During this period, Zheng Zhilong, who surrendered to the Qing Dynasty, wrote to Zheng Chenggong many times at the request of the Qing court to surrender. The Qing emperor also issued an edict to confer Zheng Chenggong as General of Jinghai, Haicheng Gong, but Zheng Chenggong refused; in the 14th year of Shunzhi (1657) , the private messages between Zheng Zhilong and Zheng Chenggong were intercepted by the Qing government, and Zheng Zhilong was exiled to Ninggu Pagoda for treason. In the 16th year of Shunzhi (1659), the Qing army captured the provincial capital of Yunnan, and Emperor Yongli was in danger. Zheng Chenggong and Zhang Huangyan, the general of King Lu, restrained the Qing troops in Fujian and Zhejiang, and led the 170,000-strong navy and army in the Northern Expedition. The following year, they entered the Yangtze River, conquered Guazhou and Zhenjiang, besieged Nanjing, and recovered areas near Nanjing and parts of Anhui. Zheng Chenggong sent Zhang Huangyan to Wuhu to defend this important town along the river west of Nanjing, while Zheng Chenggong himself led troops to attack Nanjing City. The man who guarded Nanjing in the Qing Dynasty was Lang Tingzuo, the governor of Liangjiang. This man was very cunning. In order to delay the attack and wait for reinforcements, he used a delaying strategy and pretended to surrender to Zheng Chenggong, which made Zheng Chenggong relax his vigilance and secretly sent people out of the city to ask for help.

At dawn on July 23, Zheng Chenggong's army was attacked by the Qing army and suffered heavy casualties. Zheng Chenggong led the remaining troops back to the Xiamen base area. After Zheng Chenggong retreated, Zhang Huangyan was unable to support himself in Anhui and was defeated by the Qing army. He disguised himself and fled back to Zhejiang. Anhui and places near Nanjing were occupied by the Qing army. Although Zheng Chenggong failed in this attack because he underestimated the enemy, it shook the Qing rule in the southeast and also shocked the Qing central government in Beijing. In the 17th year of Shunzhi (1660), Zheng Chenggong annihilated more than 40,000 naval troops led by the Qing governor of Fujian Li Shutai and the Qing general Da Su at Haimen Port in Fujian (today's Longhaidong), and the military power was restored. Zheng Chenggong’s most important ally—Jin King Li Dingguo. If Zheng Chenggong’s biggest regret in his life was his relationship with Li Dingguo, the leader of the Southwest Anti-Qing Dynasty. Zheng Chenggong's name can be said to be a household name, and his popularity in the world is far higher than that of Li Dingguo. But few people may know that Li Dingguo was the person he respected the most in his life, his closest strategic ally, and his closest relative "old relative". One was the King of Xining in Nanming (later named the King of Jin), and the other was the King of Nanming. King Yanping (later named King Chao), whose status and influence were still under Dingguo. (Cheng Chenggong’s niece married the eldest son of Dingguo. Later, the Qing soldiers launched a large-scale attack on Yunnan and Guizhou. Nanming was defeated and she was killed along with her husband.) Zheng Chenggong’s most glorious achievement in his life was not to recover Taiwan but to fight against the Qing soldiers. He and Li Dingguo were in Yunnan and Guangxi, One on the southeast coast frequently dealt fatal blows to the Qing troops and supported the Nanming regime for twenty years. It was called the twin pillars of the sky; it forced the Qing government to make concessions and laid the foundation for the subsequent "Kangxi Reign" . He is an out-and-out national hero, not just because he conquered Taiwan, but also because he tenaciously resisted the Qing invasion, provided protection for overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, and founded the "Tiandihui" to leave a spark of resistance against the Qing that lasted for several years. The "Tongmenghui" a hundred years later. There are many articles in the historical circles discussing the relationship between Li Dingguo and Zheng Chenggong. Most of them are based on the fact that both of them insisted on resisting the Qing Dynasty. Their achievements were far beyond the comparison of other anti-Qing forces. They also wrote letters back and forth and concluded a marriage. Therefore, historical books are full of praise. It seems that both of them are outstanding people who are loyal to the cause of restoring Ming Dynasty and went to the national disaster. However, as far as historical facts are concerned, the plan to join forces in Guangdong was formulated by Li Dingguo. In 1653 and 1654 (the tenth and eleventh years of Shunzhi), what he dreamed of was to attack with Zheng Chenggong from east to west and take the first step to regain Guangdong and reorganize the country. step. However, this is just Dingguo's wishful thinking, Zheng Chenggong does not want to do this. The reason is not that he fails to see that joining forces with Guangdong is the key to the resurgence of Nanming, but that Zheng Chenggong puts the interests of the Zheng Group headed by him as the most important. Studying Zheng Chenggong's entire experience after he raised his army, we can see that he was a very ambitious man. When the Ming and Qing Dynasties were in conflict and the country was divided, he was not strong enough and could not have the same political influence as the Ming and Qing Dynasties. The two coexisting regimes competed for the hearts and minds of the people (including officials and gentry). Therefore, his strategy was to serve as "Zhengshuo" to whoever in the Ming and Qing Dynasties allowed him to act arbitrarily, or to cede territory to himself. In his own words, his ideal is to be a "phoenix" who "takes care of everything" and does not want to become a "tiger and leopard" "in the trap". So he would say something like this: "If the Qing Dynasty can trust your son, you will be a Qing Dynasty; if you don't trust your son's words, you will be a Ming minister." In short, he can only "serve from afar" and cannot "be controlled by others." This is the source of the idea of ??"comparison to Goryeo" that he and later Zheng Jing consistently proposed. The Qing government's many attempts to appease him (called "peace negotiations" by Zheng Fang) failed precisely because they only gave him high titles and generous salaries, but never promised him relative independence. Under these conditions, Zheng Chenggong could only be a "clear minister". In the same way, his "always serving the Ming Dynasty" does not mean that he is willing to obey the orders of the Ming court without reservation and abide by his ministerial integrity. On the southeast coast, after the death of Emperor Longwu, he "always served the Tang Dynasty" (Zhang Huang's words), treated the Lu Jianguo who was just around the corner with courtesy, and tried his best to make the soldiers who originally belonged to the Lu Jianguo obey his orders. . He was conflicted about the Yongli court. On the one hand, he hoped that the original Daxi, Dashun troops and other anti-Qing forces under Yongli Zhengshuo could sustain themselves and hold back most of the Qing soldiers, thereby reducing his own pressure. . On the other hand, he was very politically savvy and foresaw that if the main force was dispatched to attack from the east and west in response to the Dingguo agreement, victory would be certain, and what would follow would be a change in the situation where the Fujian and Guangdong armies would become one and the territory would become one, and the situation would change. . Zheng Chenggong would not fail to consider that his relative independence would be greatly restricted, and major military and political affairs must be reported to the imperial court, otherwise he would not be able to escape the argument of overstepping his authority. More importantly, he was slightly inferior to Li Dingguo in terms of military strength, title and reputation, and Li Dingguo had a closer relationship with the Yongli court than him. These factors must have been part of Zheng Chenggong's foresight. Therefore, no matter how correct the strategy formulated by Li Dingguo was, and no matter how hard Dingguo tried to persuade him to realize the resurgence of Nanming, Zheng Chenggong was always like an elastic steel bar inserted in the Minhai area. The size of the external force could only cause him to sway left and right. , in the end I am still the pillar of the south that remains unwavering. The tragedy of Li Dingguo, the best military strategist during the Ming and Qing Dynasties, was that he was jealous of Sun Kewang in the early stage of his war against the Qing Dynasty and was unable to display his talents and strategies on the battlefields of Huguang (now Hunan and Hubei) and Jiangxi. Fujian, joined forces and went north, but the reward was a false story. Xinhui was defeated, lost troops and lost ground. From then on, there was no hope for Zhongxing in Nanming. All he could do was to follow Zhuge Liang's example of "dedicate himself to death." Zheng Chenggong has always attached great importance to the Chaozhou area of ??Guangdong, which is the main source of military supplies for the Zheng family.

This is the reason why Zheng Hongkui and Zheng Chenggong entered Chaozhou many times. But his intention was to use the Chao and Hui areas as his own food and military supply areas. It was best to leave a Qing jurisdiction between Zheng Jun and the Yongli court, and destroy this fire wall. The Zheng Group is unfavorable. Therefore, when Li Dingguo was anxious, he blindly adopted the strategy of delaying and delaying. As mentioned above, Li Dingguo had notified the Guangdong Volunteer Army of the scheduled rendezvous date half a year ago when deploying the second campaign to enter Guangdong. It was absolutely impossible not to inform Zheng Chenggong, who expected to play a key role in the overall strategy. After the envoy sent by Dingguo in Gaozhou arrived in Xiamen in April, Zheng Chenggong was in "peace talks" with the Qing side and placed the envoy under house arrest. In August, Li Jing was sent as an envoy to Dingguo's army. Dingguo's reply said that "Zi Bugu has been stationed in Xingyi" (Xinxing County, Guangdong). According to the records of Chen Shun who treated Dingguo, he was On August 16, he went to Guangzhou and Zhao (Xinxing belongs to Zhaoqing Prefecture) with the Dingguo camp. It can be proved that this letter was written after August 16. The letter said: "From May to now, I have been waiting for your noble Lord to respond." "It means that he sent a messenger in April expecting to receive a reply in May. Unexpectedly, in August, the successful messenger arrived late and the news he brought was unclear. Dingguo's reply clearly showed his dissatisfaction, but he still held great hope for joining forces. "Be careful not to let your promises sink or sink, which will cause delays in the palace. You must know that looking back in ten months may not help the opportunity." It can be said that The words are serious and the heart is deep. It is known from "Records of the Former Kings" that Li Jing and Dingguo's envoy returned to Xiamen no later than the third day of September with a reply letter. "The vassal received the second letter of the meeting and wanted to send troops south to attack King Qin. The envoy was detained in Quan, and the envoy was ordered to stay temporarily. Golden Gate". However, he had to delay the period of looking forward to the division in October (before the 15th) specified in Dingguo's letter. It was not until October 19th that he "sent the division south to meet with the King of Jin (Li Dingguo had not yet been crowned King of Jin at that time) and others." Joining forces with King Qin, he appoints Lincha, the Marquis of Ming Dynasty from the left army, as the governor of land and water, and arranges all the opportunities in the army; he appoints Zhou Rui, Marquis of Min'an from the right army, as the commander of the navy." He leads tens of thousands of troops and hundreds of warships to "defeat Japan's southern expedition." He sent an official, Lin Yunqiong, to visit Master Qin, and held a letter to meet with the King of Jin and others (he was the King of Anxi at the time of the founding of the country). The letter said: "Ji Qiu was fortunate to receive the envoy, read the Han Dynasty teachings, repaired spears and halberds, and played skin skills. Da Fu's long-cherished wish... Is it better to endure the stagnation and risk the disaster? When Naizun's envoy arrived at our camp, the south wind was blowing, which was conducive to the northern expedition but not the southern expedition... He wanted to send his troops south. , I went with your troops to capture Wuyang, but due to the bad weather, it was not possible to launch the army... At the end of Mengdong, the north wind picked up, so I ordered the commanders such as Fuming Hou Lincha and Min'an Hou Zhou Rui to sail east (? ) pointed out that although it is not the banner of Shunchang, it can still help. If the navy attacks three sides and the land army captures one, the Cantonese chief can capture it without a fight. "There are several points worth noting about Zheng Chenggong's military expedition this time. First, Zheng Chenggong has personally commanded every major battle since he started his army. This battle to enter Guangdong is of great importance to both the Southern Ming and Qing Dynasties. Li Dingguo, the king of Anxi, is the commander of the Western Front. In his letter to him, he repeatedly emphasized the need to join forces in Guangdong. For example, "Guangdong is harmonious while Fujian, Zhejiang, and Zhizhi are competing for the same message." Then, why did he refuse to personally lead the army to the west? The only explanation is that he was ready to shirk responsibility. Second, Zheng Chenggong was very discerning in choosing Lin Cha as the admiral of the Marine and Land Division among many generals. When the Yongli court was first established, it was Lin Cha who supported the Shaowu regime and started a civil war. At this time, he was asked to command the army. The main force supporting the Yongli court was indeed the "best candidate" in a sense. Third, Zheng Chenggong was a long-time military commander. In his letter to his younger brother Shizhong, he also said that he was "veteran in the military." Not to mention that when Zheng Jun fought against the Qing army, he lost the city and lost his troops several times due to untimely rescue. Understanding the principle that "there is no time to lose when winning or losing", then why did he wait until the 19th to mobilize officers and soldiers after receiving the letter from Dingguo in early September that Zheng Jun would arrive at the designated position on October 15th? What about the "Cruel Southern Expedition"? Fourth, Zheng Chenggong had known about Li Dingguo's plan to attack from the east and west and restore Guangdong in one fell swoop since the previous year. During this period, Dingguo repeatedly sent envoys to urge him to lead troops to respond. In the age of sailing ships, it is undoubtedly a fact that maritime navigation was greatly affected by monsoon winds. But Zheng Chenggong's failure to send troops for such a long period of time cannot be explained by "unfavorable weather". Otherwise, how could Zheng and Li's envoys travel across the sea? What's more, from June to August of the previous year (1653), Zheng Chenggong had led his navy to Chaozhou and Jieyang; in August of the next year (1655), Zheng Chenggong had sent his navy to south to Guangdong, and in September he occupied Jieyang, Puning, and Chenghai counties. , proving that the southern expedition in autumn is not impossible. To take a step back, in the 10th year of Shunzhi (1653), when Li Dingguo planned to jointly attack Guangdong from the east and west the following year, if Zheng Chenggong, who had rich maritime experience, was sincere about joining forces, he should also inform Li Dingguo of the best time to use troops at sea so that Dingguo could confirm the east-west joint attack. The month and day it started. It is not difficult for a discerning person to see that Zheng Chenggong's attitude is ambiguous. Fifth, the most eye-catching thing is that the reinforcements sent by Zheng Chenggong moved extremely slowly and seemed to be creating a lot of momentum without any intention of actual combat. Judging from Qing archives, on the first day of October, Zheng Chenggong issued licenses to mobilize soldiers and generals and make arrangements for the southern expedition; on the fourth day of the lunar month, he personally visited Tongshan (today's Dongshan County) to inspect the soldiers and boatmen, and "appointed Lincha, the Marquis of the Ming Dynasty, as the chief admiral." , the Marquis of Min'an (Zhou Rui) was appointed as the deputy admiral, in charge of a hundred large ships, and was sent to Guangdong to join the bandits in the west." On October 22, Xu Long, deputy general of the Guangdong Navy of the Qing Dynasty, reported, "Hundreds of ships have gathered upstream, and the Marquis of Min'an, Zhou Rui, and the Marquis of Fuming, Lincha, are likely to lead their troops southward. Gai on the 23rd and 24th We set out on the same day, and we have plans to go to Jieshi, and we have plans to go to Guangdong." On November 19, Lin Cha's troops camped in Nan'ao to "discuss military affairs." Tongshan is only a hundred miles away from Nan'ao. Zheng Chenggong wrote in his letter that "it is Mengdong and the north wind is picking up." It is a favorable wind and can be reached in one day.

Zheng Chenggong inspected his generals at Tongshan on October 4th, and stopped in Nan'ao a month and a half later to discuss military matters. Another week later, from November 25th to 27th, more than 300 boats led by Lin Cha and others entered the village of Honzhai, Haifeng, Guangdong (immediately overlooking the village, on the south coast of Haifeng County). . On the fifth day of December, Lin Cha led more than 400 ships and more than 30,000 soldiers and arrived at Pinghaisuo (now Pinghai, Huidong County). On the 14th of the same month, Lin Cha sent a team of white snail boats to Dapeng Station (across Daya Bay from Pinghai) to collect grain and rice from the villages. Here they met the teams of Guangdong coastal volunteers Li Wanrong and Chen Qice. According to Qing reconnaissance, Li Wanrong once rewarded Zheng Jun with pigs and wine. On the 15th, Lin Cha and other troops took more than 300 boats and sailed to the gate of the Buddhist temple (more than 200 miles south of Humen and more than 400 miles away from Guangzhou). As mentioned above, the date of Li Dingguo's defeat in Xinhui was December 14, which was the day when some ships sent by Lin Cha met Li Wanrong and Chen Qice at Dapeng Station. At that time, Li Wanrong and others only knew that Xinhui was fighting fiercely, and it was impossible to know that Dingguo was defeated. It was almost certainly due to their strong persuasion that Lin Chacai entered the Buddhist Hall from Pinghai in one day. About a few days later, they must have received news from the Guangdong Yishi that the Dingguo army was defeated and quickly retreated westward. They watched on the sea for a long time (one of them must have sent someone to ask Zheng Chenggong for instructions). In the twelfth year of Shunzhi (1655) ) Return to Xiamen in May. Archives and records left by both the Ming and Qing dynasties indicate that although Zheng Chenggong sent troops, he had no intention of participating in the war. Senior officials from the Qing provinces of Fujian and Guangdong paid great attention to the movements of Zheng's army. They reported to the court in detail the date and activities of Lin Cha and others' southward movement, but there was no content about the fighting. In other words, Lin Cha and Zhou Rui's troops were by no means attacked by the Qing army. The blocking force could not reach the designated position in Dingguo as early as possible; it took two months and ten days from October 4th to December 14th before arriving at Pinghai and sent some warships to Dapengsuo Village to collect grain. Yang Ying recorded that Lin When Cha and Zhou Rui sent troops, as a household officer, he "agreed" with Zhongzhenbo Hongxu to issue grains for ten months. It can be seen that it was not due to insufficient grains and wages. The only remaining explanation is that Zheng Chenggong personally gave the instructions when he was in command: Do not pretend to be real. This judgment can not only be seen from the above-mentioned delay of Zheng Jun's time, but also from the Qing archives and Zheng Fang's records, no traces of combat can be found. It gives the impression that Zheng Chenggong organized a large-scale South China Sea tour and was not responsible for organizing this. In the battle that changed the situation of the Ming and Qing Dynasties for the first time, Li Dingguo adopted the method of hypocrisy and subterfuge, and the consequences were very serious. Volume 4 of "Taiwan Foreign Records" records that Lin Cha and Zhou Rui returned to Xiamen and reported that "the boat division went to Hutoumen (i.e. Humen) and found out that Li Dingguo was defeated and Wuzhou was lost. They did not dare to advance and returned the troops." Zheng Chenggong played with power and accused Lin Cha, Zhou Rui and others of "King Qin came to help, but the king's orders were not immediately dispatched. He just waited and returned, where is the court code? You and others are willing to avoid it, and they should be punished." Immediately, he ordered Zhou Rui to "remove his position, seize the title, remove his military power, and never use him again"; Lin Cha and others were demoted incorrectly. In a letter to Li Dingguo, he wrote: "Last year, envoys came from far away, and the agreement between the same enemies and the same robes was in line with the long-cherished intention. I used it to command the troops to gather the ships in large numbers, so that the schedule could be set, and my official Li Jingfu ordered me to do so. At the end of the day, I read again and again. I know that your highness is worried about your father's worries on the inside and the pain of your hatred on the outside. If you don't want to be honest, you can't go straight to the Pearl River and pick up your homeland to welcome the sailors. Unfortunately, the captain has not arrived, but the master has not arrived. We have been back for a few days, and there are officers and soldiers from your army who have come from Guangdong to join us. I have heard about the reasons why they are defeated because of their arrogance, which is not the case for military leaders. Not being able to provide support is really a crime. We have judged the merits and demerits of the generals on land and water, but they know that they have violated the former. Zhou Rui, the Marquis of Min'an, has been re-employed and dismissed from his post because he has meritorious service, otherwise the law has been rectified... "Zheng Chenggong was very particular about his handling of the generals in the Southern Expedition and his restoration of Li Ding's credentials. Whether the East-West combined attack and victory in Guangdong could be achieved in 1654 was directly related to the future of the Yongli court, and it was a major strategic move of no small importance. Zheng Chenggong, as an outstanding politician and military commander, could not fail to see this. In his letter, he said in an understatement that "victory and defeat are common to military strategists, so there is no need to worry deeply." It can be said that the failure to realize key strategic intentions is equivalent to the victory or defeat of a general battle, which can be said to be official. The letter first criticized Li Dingguo's "arrogance and defeat", and then talked about his naval division's "playfulness" and "reluctance to move forward", intending to place the main responsibility for the failure of the battle on the other party. We cannot say that Li Dingguo did not make the mistake of being proud and underestimating the enemy, but the failure of the Xinhui Battle cannot be said to be Dingguo's "arrogance leading to setbacks." In terms of personnel management, Zheng Chenggong was famous in history for his strict management of the army, but he only lightly punished the generals who lingered in this fateful battle for Nanming. Lin Cha was the general in charge of the Southern Expedition, but Zheng Chenggong put the blame of "compliance" on the deputy admiral Zhou Rui, the Marquis of Min'an. The reason was that Lin Cha was a direct general of the Zheng family, and Zhou Rui was originally a general of the Lu Supervisory State. The distinction between closeness and distance was obvious. By the way, Zheng Chenggong's domineering attitude was also fully reflected in his letter to Dingguo. According to the system of the Ming and Qing Dynasties, the maximum power granted by the emperor during the special campaign for generals was limited to those below the rank of deputy general who could be executed with a sword without request. Zhou Rui was ranked as a Marquis, and his letter of success said that "it is a meritorious service, otherwise the Dharma will be rectified", which is completely the tone of the leader of a country. In short, there is no doubt that the failure of the Southern Expedition was due to Zheng Chenggong's own will. To sum up, the Guangdong Campaign planned by Li Dingguo from 1653 to 1654 was the last chance for the resurgence of the Southern Ming Dynasty. The focus of the plan to establish the country is to contact Zheng Chenggong to jointly attack from the east and west, and cooperate with the volunteers from all over Guangdong to first annihilate the Qing army in Guangdong and then develop his grand plan.

Among the three anti-Qing forces, Li Dingguo's army and the Guangdong Volunteer Army went all out. However, because Zheng Chenggong was not determined here, they finally fell short. The enthusiasm shown by the Guangdong Yishi in order to realize the strategic intention of establishing the country is quite commendable. After the failure of the Xinhui Battle of Dingguo, Lian Chengbi, the governor of Guangdong and Guangxi in the Ming Dynasty, who was responsible for liaison with the Guangdong Volunteer Army, still advocated for this east-west joint attack strategy. In his memorial to the Yongli court in June 1655, he appealed: "I hope that the Western Division will advance quickly and the Fujian sail will be raised again. However, I and my assistant Guo Zhiqi drummed again and again to take advantage of the enemy's fatigue and use my strength to conquer eastern Guangdong." "It's not even enough." In July of the following year (1656, the 13th year of Shunzhi and the 10th year of Yongli), Liancheng Bi said in his book that the Yuezhong Yishi he contacted was "standing on the seashore... waiting for Wang Shi's return. Meet with the Fujian army on a regular basis to make up for the unsatisfactory results." Because Li Dingguo suffered heavy losses in soldiers and equipment in the Xinhui Battle, and was eager to rush to Anlong to welcome Emperor Yongli into Yunnan, he could no longer attend to the battlefield in eastern Guangdong. A great opportunity wasted.