Detailed process of Huaihai Campaign

1After the fall of Jinan on September 24th, 948, the National Army Headquarters thought that the East China Field Army needed a long rest, but failed to expect that the East China Field Army had little loss in the battle of Jinan and could quickly attack Xuzhou south. The result is carelessness and underestimation. In order to confuse the national army, Su Yu set up more than a dozen high-power radio stations in Shandong, and kept issuing instructions. The national army mistakenly thought that the main force of the East China Field Army was still in Shandong.

The deployment adjustment and troop mobilization of Xuzhou Anti-Banditry Headquarters have also slowed down. 1948165438+1October 1 * * The Central Military Commission decided that there were 7 columns of the Central Plains Field Army, * * about150,000 people, and some local troops and the East China Field Army * * were engaged in the Huai Hai Campaign, with 600 participants. As a matter of fact, about 500,000 People's Liberation Army (PLA) began to sneak into Xuzhou secretly from different directions without the knowledge of the national army.

stage Ⅱ

After the 7 th Corps of the National Army was annihilated, the 6 th Corps of Li Yannian and the 8 th Corps of Liu Ruming, which set out from Bengbu, were afraid of being attacked by the People's Liberation Army, and delayed their northward advance. As a result, the 12 Corps (commander Huang Wei) reinforced by the Central China General Command to March into Suxian County was in a prominent and isolated position. Under the sniper of the People's Liberation Army, these three regiments could not get close to Xuzhou and get through the connection between Xuzhou and Bengbu. The battlefield situation was extremely unfavorable to the national army.

12 Corps set out from Mengcheng and crossed the Wohe River. On the night of 23rd,1948165438+1October 2 1, 12 Corps arrived in Nanpingji and crossed back to the river. Finding it possible for the PLA to camp, they turned to Guzhen in the southeast in an attempt to move to Li Yannian. The Central Plains Field Army concentrated its forces to encircle Huang Wei 12 Corps.

The third stage

With the elimination of 34 divisions of the National Army, 22 divisions of the Second Corps of Qiu Qingquan and Li Mi 13 Corps have been surrounded. In order to cooperate with the division and encirclement of Fu Group in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, and to prevent it from making a quick decision to flee by sea and south, the People's Liberation Army suspended its attack on the besieged Du Department for 20 days, launched political war propaganda and surrendered to Du Department, exhausted its psychology and made final preparations for encircling Du Department.

Although Du refused to surrender, it hit the morale of the officers and men of the national army. There are two shortages of grain, grass and ammunition for the national army in the encirclement. Although there are air-dropped supplies, they are far from enough. 1948 12 19 The besieged army had planned to break through under the cover of the air force, but failed to implement it.

Extended data:

Huaihai Campaign was the largest of the three strategic decisive battles in the War of Liberation, which lasted 66 days from1October 6 1948 165438+ to1949 10. The Kuomintang army invested seven regiments, two appeasement zones, thirty-four armies, eighty-six divisions, about 800,000 men, and flew 2,957 sorties.

Sixteen columns of the East China Field Army and seven columns of the Central Plains Field Army, plus local troops of the East China Military Region and the Central Plains Military Region, number about 600,000.

* * * Destroy the Xuzhou General Suppression Forward Command of the Kuomintang Army and its five regimental headquarters, 22 military headquarters, 56 divisions and an appeasement area. The regular army and other troops ***555099 people, accounting for about 69% of their combat troops, including 320355 prisoners,171566.

Senior Kuomintang generals above Major General were captured 124, 22 defected and 8 defected. The above results do not include the number of people who broke up and fled. We mainly seized 42 15 guns, 65438 light and heavy machine guns +04503 guns, 65438 long and short guns +05 1045 guns, 6 planes, 265438 armored tanks +05 cars, 65438 cars +0747 cars and 65438 shells.

The PLA killed 25,954 people, injured 988 18 people and lost 1 1752 people, totaling 136524 people. The loss ratio between the enemy and us is 4.06: 1. Weapons and equipment losses include 1 tanks, 34 mountain guns, field guns and howitzers, 2 19 mortars and infantry guns, 26 grenade launchers, 1884 light and heavy machine guns, 14588 long and short guns and 67998 various shells.

Explosives (lack of statistics of double-stack battlefield) 97025 kg. Among the three major battles of Armageddon, Huaihai Campaign suffered the most casualties of the PLA, exceeding the sum of the other two battles, accounting for 53.8% of the total casualties of Armageddon, and the consumption of various weapons and ammunition was also the largest, of which artillery losses accounted for 48.6% of the total losses.

The consumption of artillery shells accounts for 68.7% of the total consumption, bullets account for 62.7% and explosives account for 57.4%. The total number of enemies wiped out was the largest, accounting for 35.8% of the total number of enemies wiped out, and the number of prisoners was the least. The intensity of the Huaihai Campaign is remarkable. Among them, Hua Ye wiped out about 440,000 enemy troops, accounting for about 80% of the total number of enemy troops wiped out in Huaihai Campaign.

Hua Ye suffered about 9 1000 casualties, accounting for 67% of the total casualties of the PLA in Huaihai Campaign.

Baidu Encyclopedia-Huaihai Campaign

People's Network-Historical Contribution and Valuable Spirit of Huaihai Campaign