Li's theory of characters

Li: The historical tragedy of the Soviet Union's "non-party"

19 17 During the October Revolution, nearly 200,000 Bolshevik party member led the Red Guards and revolutionary soldiers with less than 30,000 workers, seized political power and established a socialist country. During the Second World War, the Soviet Union, with more than 2 million party member, led the people to defeat the German fascists. More than 70 years later, with nearly 20 million party member and 5.3 million troops (including 6,543.8+3,000 officers), Su * * denied himself, disarmed himself, lost political power and lost the party and country. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Robert Gates, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, flew to Moscow. He proudly walked on the Red Square and declared: "We know that no matter whether we exert economic pressure or engage in an arms race, we can't even take it down by force. Can only be destroyed by implosion. " At that time, Su gave up the leadership of the army, and the army stood by at the critical moment of the country. At the last moment, the Soviet Union fell apart, and the Soviet Union fell apart. The lesson was profound!

First, the Soviet Union abandoned Lenin's principle of building the army and canceled the party's organizational guarantee for the leadership of the army, resulting in the army not listening to the command at a critical moment.

On the question of "who will lead the proletarian army", there was a fierce and sharp debate in the Soviet Union before and after the establishment of the Soviet Red Army. Lenin and Stalin's attitude and guiding ideology are very firm, that is, "proletarian political parties must independently exercise their leadership and command over the Red Army". 19181kloc-0/In June, the Soviet Central Executive Committee decided to set up the Workers and Peasants National Defense Committee to lead the Red Army and all armed forces, with Lenin as the chairman of the Committee, the leader of the party and the head of the government, thus realizing the absolute unified leadership of the Soviet Union over the Red Army. At the same time, Su * * established a solid organizational system in the Red Army. Party organizations at all levels, political departments and military political commissars were incorporated into the organization of the Red Army, and the political department became the organizational core of the Soviet Union in the army. In many difficult historical moments, Su * * * resolutely implemented Lenin's principle of building the army, overcame the crisis and defeated various enemies at home and abroad. During the civil war when the Red Army was just established (19 18 to 1920), the Soviet army implemented the collective leadership system of units above the regiment level, with the corps under the joint command of military and political leaders, and the group army and the front-line army under the command of the Revolutionary Military Commission. The Party mobilized half of the outstanding party member into the Red Army, which constituted the basic core of the army and defeated the armed interference of 14 capitalist countries. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, in the face of the sinister situation that the Soviet Union suffered serious losses on the battlefield, Stalin issued the Order on Reorganizing Political Propaganda Organizations and Implementing the Military Political Committee System, and re-implemented the political Committee system in units above the regiment level. Generate, the Soviet Red Army, showed strong and tenacious fighting will and shattered the myth that the Germans were invincible at the gates of Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad.

In 1980s, Gorbachev began to carry out reforms. The military reform began with the reduction of military expenditure, then adjusted the mission and organization, and voluntarily gave up the leadership of the military. In order to show "new thinking" and establish the image of reform, Gorbachev and some Soviet leaders deliberately kept their distance from the army. Gromov, commander of the 40th Army of the Soviet Union, said that when the troops withdrew from Afghanistan (1February, 985 15), "no national leaders or leaders of the Ministry of National Defense greeted us" and "deliberately ignoring the withdrawal from Afghanistan was one of the mistakes of Kremlin leaders, and Gorbachev's comrades casually blamed us for the mistakes of their predecessors". ([Russia] Bao F. gromov: "Limited Sending Troops-Memoirs of the Commander of the 40th Army of the Soviet Union", Military Science Press, 20 10, p. 239) Lyakhovski, deputy head of the Soviet operational command group in Afghanistan, also said: "None of the top leaders of the Soviet Union thought it necessary to participate in welcoming soldiers who fought bloody battles abroad for many years back to China, which once again exposed their indifference and indifference to the army, and the army carried out. ([Russia] A. Lyakhovski: The Tragedy of the Afghan War, Social Science Literature Publishing House, 2004, p. 394) In a series of incidents in which the army maintained domestic order from 1986 to199/kloc-0, whenever the army clashed with separatist or nationalist activists, Gorbachev and the Politburo of the Soviet Union. Especially in the Tbilisi incident in April 1989, Gorbachev publicly accused airborne troops and internal affairs forces of "maintaining public order" according to his orders and those of the Political Bureau. Lebed, then the commander of Tula 106 Airborne Division, mentioned in his memoirs: "This incident made the officers' attitude towards the leadership of the Party begin to change in a dangerous direction, and then various combat divisions and regiments delayed or refused to carry out orders. "([America] William Odom: How the Soviet Army Collapsed, Xinhua Publishing House, 200 1, p. 30 1).

In order to embody the idea of "democratization", the Soviet Union gradually reduced political organs at all levels and about 80,000 political officers, abolished the General Political Department, and stipulated in the Regulations on the Work of Soviet Organizations in the Armed Forces that "Soviet organizations and their institutions shall not interfere with the work of administrative personnel and military command organs". In particular, the Supplementary Law on Establishing the President of the Soviet Union and Amending the Constitution of the Soviet Union, adopted by the Third People's Congress of the whole Soviet Union, legally deprived the Soviet Union of the supreme power to lead and command the army. As a result, there was a "withdrawal from the party style" in the Soviet Union, especially for young officers who voluntarily quit the party. "Eventually, it merged into a torrent, including shaposhnikov, commander of the Air Force, who also quit the party." ([America] William Odom: How the Soviet Army Collapsed, Xinhua Publishing House, 200 1, p. 25 1).

The direct consequence of Su * * * giving up the leadership of the army from the organization is that "one person can take an army", and the army defected at a critical moment of the country. 1 In the "August 199 19" incident, airborne troops headed by Commander Grachev entered Moscow to perform the task of controlling the White House, the office building of the Russian Republic. Part of Grachev's actions supported the democratic and separatist forces in the name of executing the orders of the Ministry of National Defense, and turned their guns before the war. The "Alpha" action group headed by KGB general Karpukhin refused to carry out the order issued by KGB headquarters to raid the White House and arrest Yeltsin. Shaposhnikov, commander of the Air Force, first delayed the take-off of the transport plane carrying airborne troops on the grounds that the weather was not suitable for flying, and then led the fleet to land at the airport by mistake, so that the airborne troops could not assemble at the scheduled time, and at the same time directly expressed to Yeltsin that the Air Force supported him. The Soviet Union and the Soviet government lost control of the country. Less than a week after the "819" incident, the Soviet Union collapsed, and at the end of the same year, the Soviet Building collapsed.

Second, the "new thinking of reform" promoted by the Soviet Union disintegrated the ideological basis of the party's leadership over the army, which led to the inability of the army to unify its determination and will at a critical juncture.

In the administrative structure of the Soviet Union, "the General Political Department is a department under the Central Secretariat of the Soviet Union with a separate chain of command". Relying on this unique organizational system and chain of command, Lenin's view of war, the party's ideology and the tradition of patriotism and heroism were once the core values of the Soviet Union's construction and development, and the cornerstone of political thought for unifying the Soviet Union's will. At the critical moment of the Battle of Moscow in the Great Patriotic War, Croce Koff, the instructor of the Soviet 3 16 Infantry Division, rushed to the enemy tank and shouted the last cry-"Russia is a vast country, but we are in no way back, and Moscow is behind us", which quickly became the battle slogan from commander zhukov to soldiers, condensing the fighting will of all combat troops, so that Hitler specially issued the political order of "shooting all Soviet political commissar caught on the battlefield on the spot". Faced with the disastrous battlefield situation at the turn of spring and summer in 1942, Stalin and the high command No.227 "No Retreat" immediately unified the determination and will of commanders at all levels, which enabled the Soviet army to withstand a series of strategic battles such as Smolensk, Kiev, Minsk, Donbass and Viarima, and finally turned the tide. After World War II, in maintaining the international pattern of Yalta, the Soviet Union's theory and ideas on war are the political and strategic basis of Soviet military doctrine, military strategy and maintaining a huge military force in Eastern Europe.

Gorbachev's "new thinking of reform" completely dried up the political and ideological foundation of the army. The "new political thinking" made the Soviet Union lose its dominant position in the field of military ideology, and the ideological trend of "depoliticization" and "nationalization" flooded in the army. The Soviet Union's attack on the country's political system and its self-denial and self-uglification of history, on the one hand, fundamentally shook the ideals and beliefs of the broad masses of officers and men, on the other hand, caused a profound ideological and organizational division within the army, and there was a serious confrontation between the broad masses of officers who were in favor of and opposed to reform, actively participated in and passively hated political activities. The "new diplomatic and military thinking" made "millions of soldiers and their families in Eastern Europe and Mongolia abandon their homes and businesses, equipment, shooting ranges, airports, houses and facilities worth billions of dollars, withdraw their troops to China, and stay in open fields, tents or other people's homes". "We can't wait to unilaterally disarm and surrender to reduce strategic nuclear weapons and medium-and short-range missiles, which has caused the army to have a lot of tasks and massive problems without mental preparation and planning." "Honor, self-confidence and dignity have been completely lost, and the Soviet Union, as a unified multi-ethnic overall political force, has ceased to exist." ([Russia] Gennady yanayev: The Last Battle to Defend the Soviet Union, Social Science Literature Publishing House, 20 12, p. 6).

In stark contrast to the Soviet Union's initiative to give up the ideological leadership of the army, domestic opposition parties and Democrats have stepped up their efforts to win over and support the personal forces in the army. Yeltsin specially instructed and arranged for his assistant Yuri Skokov to keep in touch with the military, especially the airborne troops. 1991February, Jelchin made a special trip to Tula Airborne Division to watch the exercise and express his condolences. After listening to the report that the troops urgently need to solve difficult problems, he said in his pre-team speech: "Once I am elected president of Russia, I will add 500 apartments for officers and non-commissioned officers of the Tula Airborne Corps." At lunch, Yeltsin asked Grachev, commander of the airborne troops, "If something special happens suddenly and the legitimately elected Russian president encounters danger and rebellion, can he rely on the soldiers and you?" Grachev replied, "Yes, you can!" ([Russia] Roy Maidevijeff: The Last Year of the Soviet Union, Social Science Literature Publishing House, 2009, p. 70)1991March, the Soviet Union held a referendum on whether to retain the Soviet Union and the League of Nations. Defense Minister Yazov solemnly told the media: "Other things in the Soviet Union can be divided, but the army and the nuclear shield will never be divided." Zhang San, Li Si and Yeltsin can all be presidents, but the country cannot be changed and the army cannot be divided. "The armed forces of the Soviet Union are an extremely important factor in social unity and political stability." (Xiao Feng: My Interpretation of the Disintegration of the Soviet Union, Central Party School Press, 20 1 1 edition, p. 107) He may not realize that the political and ideological disintegration of the Soviet Union and its army has completely shaken the ideals and beliefs of officers and men and will inevitably lead to the collapse of state entities.

In the turbulent 199 1 year, "some officers of the Soviet Ministry of National Defense and the General Staff demonstratively tore up the party cards and deliberately told their colleagues loudly that their grandfathers were members of the Self-Defense Forces, or their grandfathers set fire to the collective farms originally established by the Soviet Union." ([Russia] NI BRANETZ: The Destructive Teacher: Notes of the Colonel of the Russian General Staff, Xinhua Publishing House, 2007, p. 108) In the "8. 19" incident, the decision of the emergency committee was influenced from the beginning by the commander of the navy, the commander of the air force, shaposhnikov, the commander of the rocket army and the commander of the Leningrad Military Region. After the "819" incident, Gorbachev, who resigned as the general secretary of the Soviet Union, tried to save the "alliance" from dissolution. However, the president who lost the Soviet Union and the "multi-ethnic, unified thinking army" is worthless.

Third, the unrealistic military reform of the Soviet Union destroyed the discipline and order of the army and led to the crisis of the army.

Soviet leaders and collective leaders have always attached importance to the innovation of military theory and army building, one of which is the idea of managing the army with strict words first. Stalin once emphasized that the proletarian army needs iron discipline and strict management, and maintaining discipline and order is the primary duty of the party to lead the army and all the staff. Throughout the history of Soviet war, there are many examples of innovative operational theory, strict punishment and strict law to ensure discipline and win battle victory. The more critical the moment, the more distinct these two points are.

Gorbachev not only failed to inherit and draw lessons from the historical experience of the party in running the army, but also ignored the particularity of military reform when promoting the national economic and political reform. The Soviet Union * * and the upper-level military leadership and command organs have never reached an agreement on the new "national military doctrine" and the military reform plan, and formulated a practical work plan. Middle and senior officers are even more confused about military reform. Faced with the turbulent "open and democratic" political environment, they were helpless and did not take any strict and effective measures to control and manage the army, which led to the disorganization and discipline of the army, which was out of control. In less than a year, nearly one million troops were withdrawn from Europe and Mongolia. "A large number of weapons and equipment have been stolen and misappropriated, lost through black market transactions, and corruption within the military has spread rapidly. The generals took the lead in arms trading, transported the whole ship's weapons and equipment to international arms dealers, put a large amount of foreign currency into their pockets, and deducted the funds provided by the German government to Russian officers to build houses. " ([America] William Odom: "How the Soviet Army Collapsed", Xinhua Publishing House, 200 1 Edition, p. 355) The relationship between officers and men is becoming increasingly dirty under the erosion of money, and the situation of desertion and military service is serious, and the internal order is chaotic. 1990, the number of Soviet troops leaving the team without authorization increased to more than 30,000; More than 500 engineers stationed in the Far East fled in one day to protest against the injustice in the military camp. Less than half a year after the reunification of Germany, more than 700 soldiers of the Group Army stationed in East Germany fled. The tension between the army and soldiers of different nationalities, such as corporal punishment of soldiers by officers and bullying of recruits by veterans, further aggravated internal contradictions and increased the crime rate of the army. In the middle and late 1980s, 69% of officers and men admitted to smoking Indian marijuana. Among the troops stationed in Afghanistan, 33% of the soldiers admitted to using drugs. Stealing and selling weapons, uniforms, gasoline and motor vehicle parts without permission is common in the army. Military crimes are particularly prominent in Afghan combat troops, with 64 12 cases recorded, including 7 14 murders and 524 drug trafficking cases. From 1990 to 199 1, the number of weapons, motor vehicles and other equipment scattered from ground troops to ordinary people is amazing.

In the critical period of national transformation, the organizational discipline of the Soviet Union was lax until it collapsed, which made various training and management accidents frequent and basically lost the ability to perform duties and responsibilities. This powerful armed force, which has iron discipline and has been tested by countless wars, has become a crumbling "mud giant" from the strong backing of safeguarding state power. 1989, only one navy nuclear-powered submarine sank, one missile was launched, which caused great damage and three submarines had serious accidents. In the "819" incident, three divisions (Kanye Milov Tank Division, Taman Motorized Infantry Division and Tula Airborne Division) entered Moscow according to the orders of the Ministry of National Defense, ranging from commanders to cyclists and individual soldiers. Many officers do not act according to the ordered time, and even walk directly into the store with their own platoon and squad; Moving tanks and armored vehicles break away from the formation or stop at will. Many soldiers accept people's tobacco, alcohol and food, dance with onlookers, and even get drunk in armored vehicles. In addition to political and ideological reasons, the army's management is loose and its organization and discipline are scattered, so it is difficult to ban and keep pace, and it is even more impossible to carry out the special political and military task of "implementing a state of emergency."

Fourth, the "new cadre policy" implemented by the Soviet Union changed the purity of the army, which led to the withdrawal and defection of the army at a critical juncture.

From the beginning of the founding of the Party, Su regarded "taking special measures to train and select loyal and qualified Red Army commanders and political workers" as one of the important tasks of the Party. 1935 In May, Stalin put forward the argument that "cadres decide everything" at the graduation ceremony of Red Army college students, which was the programmatic slogan of Su * * * guiding army building. In order to ensure that officers at all levels, especially senior commanders, are loyal to the party and the people and adapt to the needs of modern warfare, the Soviet Union and its army have adopted an effective cadre promotion system, the most important of which is the strict selection and use standards and the system of political review and practical inspection and appraisal of officers. In the early days of the most crucial patriotic war in the Soviet Union, some officers released from reform-through-labour camps were still burdened with unfair grievances and still led the troops to fight bravely until they died. They did not give up their loyalty to the party and the country because of injustice, chickened out or defected; Marshal Rokosov is a typical representative. Until his death after the war, the order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to shoot him was still kept in the file.

In order to clear the resistance of "new thinking of reform" and push away "political pluralism", Gorbachev canceled the political review of the promotion of officers by the Central Committee and the General Political Department of the Soviet Union, and arranged a large number of "new military leaders" by using the "rust incident". By the end of 1988, the minister of national defense, all deputy chiefs of staff, all commanders of military clusters and fleets, and all commanders of military regions had been replaced. The consequences of the Soviet Union's abolition of the political censorship system for military cadres, as Colonel Lenny Blanie of the Russian General Staff said, "It often expelled capable people from the army, while leaving mediocre people in the army, making swindlers carry the general's epaulettes." ([Russia] Ni Blanie: Chess Piece-Russian General in the Eyes of the Secretary of the Ministry of National Defense, Xinhua Publishing House, 2003, p. 336) Army officers' loyalty and reliability to the party and the country are rapidly declining, and the leadership of the army is seriously corrupt, the morale of the army is lax, and factions are numerous. Major General dudayev, the leader of the Chechen separatist movement before and after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Ivan Bizan, the Ukrainian independent activist, and Grachev, the commander of the airborne troops, were all promoted to senior generals or important positions during this period, and started their own "one-pole team" and later became grave diggers of the Soviet Union and the country; Especially the officers of the airborne troops of the Soviet strategic reserve played a mysterious and key role in it.

Soviet airborne troops were under the direct command of the General Staff. Commander Grachev served as the commander of the airborne division in the Afghan war and was awarded the title of hero of the Soviet Union. He enjoys a high reputation among airborne troops. After being promoted by Gorbachev, airborne troops actually became his "one-man army". During the turbulent period of the Soviet Union's "new thinking of reform", airborne troops participated in every action to maintain domestic order, and the ranks of officers formed an "independent group". In the "819" incident, Grachev's political duality made the airborne troops the object of contention between the emergency committee and the democratic forces. When Grachev commanded the Tura Airborne Division to enter Moscow to perform a state of emergency mission, he immediately informed Yeltsin and his supporters of every order given to him by the Ministry of National Defense, and recalled Lebed, deputy commander of airborne troops on vacation, to lead the vanguard troops to the White House, the office building of the Republic of China. At the critical moment of the most intense struggle between the democratic forces and the Emergency Committee, on the one hand, Grachev, together with Air Force Commander shaposhnikov, delayed the subsequent airborne troops to enter Moscow; On the other hand, let Lebede lead a battalion into the White House and turn the gun. Grachev declared to the Ministry of National Defense that he had entered the designated position; Yeltsin said that he sent paratroopers to protect the elected president. The actual actions of airborne troops inspired the morale of Democrats and their supporters, and the situation quickly turned to Yeltsin's side. The paratroopers battalion led by Lebed immediately announced that it would defend Yeltsin and stand with the Democrats. At the critical juncture that determines the fate of the country, the Soviet Ministry of National Defense and the General Staff Department "many officers firmly support the emergency committee, but they can't find loyal subordinates to kill for them." ([America] William Odom: How the Soviet Army Collapsed, Xinhua Publishing House, 200 1, p.411) Grachev led the airborne troops and "destroyed" the whole Soviet Union by one person.