How did the Taiping Army's "Tianjing City" fall and how did Hong Xiuquan die?

0 1 Tianjing fell, and the Taiping Army failed in its second expedition to the west, which led to the fall of Anqing. Since then, the situation has turned sharply, Tianjing is in danger, and the defense of Tianjing has entered a decisive battle stage.

At this time, Li Xiucheng once again won Hangzhou, sweeping a large area of land in western and eastern Zhejiang. Although this was also part of the victory of the war, it could not compensate for the loss of the Taiping Army's western front, let alone play a role in supporting Tianjin's defense. On the contrary, the military progress in Zhejiang deepened the unfavorable situation of the Taiping Army fighting on both sides, and the military victory in Zhejiang accelerated the fall of Nanjing.

From 1862, Tianjing was the main battle, followed by the invasion of Huainan.

On the eve of Tianjing Battle, in order to cope with the military situation of fighting on both sides, Li Xiucheng advocated taking a defensive position against the Xiang army under Tianjing, in an attempt to avoid its anger first and then attack its feelings. On the other hand, it advocates taking an offensive and planning to occupy Shanghai; Consolidate Suzhou and Hangzhou. On the contrary, this strategy of attacking and defending upside down is conducive to the deployment of the so-called "first defend and then fight, and gain a firm foothold" in the periphery of Tianjing.

1862 In August, Li Xiucheng invited the kings to hold the second military meeting in Suzhou to discuss the operational deployment and decided to divide the army into three ways to save Tianjing. That is, Yang Fuqing and other departments were sent to attack Ningguo in southern Anhui to contain enemy reinforcements, and Chen Kunshu and other departments were sent to attack Jinzhuguan in Wuhu to cut off the enemy's route for providing foodstuff. Li Xiucheng is advancing on the enemy outside Tianjin.

In mid-June, 5438+10, Li Xiucheng army began to storm the Xiang camp in Yuhuatai. Taiping rebels have an advantage in both strength and firepower in this campaign, and the offensive is extremely fierce, which makes Zeng Guofan in Anqing have to admit:

"The alarm sounds constantly, such as stormy waves" and "the danger in the north and south of the Yangtze River is really like a tired egg".

However, after 46 days of fighting, the Taiping Army came to nothing. On the cause of the failure of the battle, Li Xiucheng himself admitted:

"We didn't have winter clothes when we came in August, it was cold in September, and the soldiers didn't have food. We can't do anything here."

In fact, this is just an objective difficulty derived from strategic mistakes. Li Xiucheng's strategic mistake in this campaign was, first of all, to use the main force of Taiping Army in the face-to-face battle, and to use a lot of firepower in the battle, but once the ammunition was used up, he had to retreat in frustration. If we can insert the main force of Taiping Army behind enemy lines, outflank the enemy and cut off its supply lines and grain routes, the war situation will definitely change.

Moreover, at the beginning of the battle, Zeng Guofan was very worried, fearing that "the thief will come again, the road will be completely broken, and an ant will burst its banks." However, Zeng Guofan had a heart, but he was despised by Li Xiucheng.

Secondly, Li Xiucheng failed to concentrate on the war. As soon as he learned that "Wang's four men were defeated in Shanghai, their shares were lost and they were empty", he hurried back to take care of the site, and the battle of Tianjing ended in failure.

In order to make up for the failure of Tianjing Campaign, Hong Xiuquan ordered Li Xiucheng to carry out Huainan Campaign and implement the strategic plan of "invading the north and attacking the south". It can be said that it imitated the plan of "encircling Wei to save Zhao" and the failure was even worse.

The so-called "attack from the north to the south" has three strategic objectives:

First, the Taiping Army crossed the river to the north, and the Xiang Army on the south bank rescued the hinterland of the north bank, thus solving the danger of Tianjing.

Second, Huainan is a grain-producing area, and occupying it can alleviate the grain shortage in Tianjing.

Third, we can get in touch with Xiangwang, Chen Decai, Nianjun and Zhang Luoxing in northern Anhui to revive the situation in southern Anhui.

However, these intentions were quickly detected by Zeng Guofan. Zeng Guofan personally went from Anqing to the front line of Tianjing, and commanded the item to break all the stone foundations of the Taiping Army enclosure Tianjing. In this way, the Taiping Army's "northern attack" not only failed to lead the Xiang army on the south bank to save, but had to save Tianjing by itself.

Besides, when Li Xiucheng entered Huainan, it happened that there was no food in the land and no food in the Taiping Army, and many people starved to death. Li Xiucheng army encountered this desperate situation, where there is food support Tianjing. As for Zhang Luoxing, a twisting army in northern Anhui, he was unfortunately defeated by the Qing army. There are few other leaders left, and the situation in northern Anhui is devastated.

In this way, all three strategic objectives of Li Xiucheng's invasion of Huainan failed.

1June, 863, due to the crisis in Tianjing and Suzhou, Li Xiucheng was recalled to Tianjing by Tianwang, and Taiping Army crossed the river in Jiangpu area. But at that time, just as the river rose, the road was washed away by water and there was nowhere to go. Moreover, the flood is serious, and the officers and men have nowhere to live. Although they have rice, they have no firewood to cook. They are starving. When the water forces of Yang Shuai and Peng Shuai came to attack, they lost hundreds of thousands of soldiers before and after. This is the heavy loss caused by the strategy of "attacking the south from the north".

After the defeat of Huainan Campaign, Li Xiucheng began to participate in the Soviet-Zhejiang War from June 65438 to June 0863. After the fall of Suzhou, Li Xiucheng returned to Tianjing. 165438+ In October this year, Zeng Guofan's army had captured all the town strongholds outside Tianjing. According to the unfavorable situation in Tianjing at that time, only the Taiping Gate and the toilet gate in Tianjing were still connected with the outside world, and foreign aid was cut off. Li Xiucheng to Hong Xiuquan put forward the idea of "don't let into the city", namely:

"The capital cannot be conservative. Zeng Guofan's handsome soldiers are very sleepy, and the city is deep. There is less food and more grass inside, and there is nothing that can be saved outside. Let the city not go ... If you don't follow the minister's instructions, you are finished! " .

This proposal was approved by everyone when it was submitted to the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom generals for discussion, but Hong Xiuquan rejected the only feasible plan at that time, "Let the city not go".

1864 from the end of February to April, the Xiang army occupied the emergency exit and the toilet gate, and completed the siege of Tianjing. At this time, the Taiping rebels in the city are passive water. After four months of bitter guarding city and street fighting, most of the Taiping rebels died and one set himself on fire.

At this point, Tianjing's three-year defense was completely defeated, and the fall of Tianjing marked the failure of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom.

The death of Hong Xiuquan is due to the lack of historical materials and the contradiction between various historical materials, which leads to different opinions on the death of Hong Xiuquan.

It is said that Hong Xiuquan committed suicide by taking poison. For example, The General History of China written by Mr. Fan Wenlan said: "1 June, 8641day, Hong Xiuquan committed suicide by taking poison."

When Hong Xiuquan died of illness, the Outline of China History edited by Mr. Jane Bozan said that he died in June of 1 year after falling ill in mid-May.

On the whole, Hong Xiuquan was ill before his death and his health deteriorated extremely, but the direct cause of his death should be suicide by taking poison during his illness.

1864 On May 30th, the day before Hong Xiuquan's death, an imperial edict was issued:

"When the masses feel at ease, they will go to heaven, collect heavenly soldiers from the heavenly father and protect Tianjing."

This imperial edict shows that Tianjing is in danger, and Hong Xiuquan is unwilling to be a prisoner. He is determined to take death as his last commandment. It was the second day of this imperial edict that he suddenly died.

According to Hong Xiuquan's symptoms at that time, there was no fatal emergency. Hong Rengan, Li Xiucheng and others said that he was "ill for twenty years" and "refused to take the prescription and let him get sick", which is proof. Therefore, it is probably unfounded to regard Hong Xiuquan's sudden death as an emergency death.

Before Hong Xiuquan got sick, he was tired of the world and expected a dragon car to take him to heaven. This was consistent with the imperial edict issued by Hong Xiuquan the day before his death, indicating that Hong Xiuquan had already made emergency preparations, and he died when the time came.

In addition, you can also contact Tianjing in an emergency. Hong Xiuquan once wrote a poem and said:

"God ye try grass bridge water depth, why eat porridge is a change of heart? I didn't see brother Tian lay down his life and blood dripping on the cross. No pioneer, no leader, and a favored son of heaven! "

Facing the country's demise, Hong Xiuquan could not accept Li Xiucheng's aggressive strategy of "not letting the city go", and he could only commit suicide to show his determination to die for his country.

His sudden death was not so much dying as suicide during illness, which was more in line with Hong Xiuquan's ideological development and physical health at that time.