How was the Kuomintang army defeated in Huaihai Campaign?

The Huaihai Campaign was a strategic decisive battle with the largest scale, the longest time and the largest number of enemy annihilation in the War of Liberation. The poorly equipped 600,000 People's Liberation Army defeated the well-equipped 800,000 Kuomintang troops and won the battle. Stalin spoke highly of the victory of this campaign and once wrote in his notebook: "It is a miracle that 600,000 defeated 800,000, which is really a miracle." ......

The Huaihai Campaign was a strategic decisive battle with the largest scale, the longest time and the largest number of enemy annihilation in the War of Liberation. The poorly equipped 600,000 People's Liberation Army defeated the well-equipped 800,000 Kuomintang troops and won the battle. Stalin spoke highly of the victory of this campaign and once wrote in his notebook: "It is a miracle that 600,000 defeated 800,000, which is really a miracle." Under the guidance of a series of operational policies of Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission on the Huaihai Campaign, the General Front Committee correctly applied Mao Zedong's military thought, strategized and used troops flexibly, showing superb war guidance strategy. On the other hand, the Kuomintang army, which is dominant in the number of troops and weapons and equipment, lost 22 people in 5 regiments and was defeated by its high-level decision-making group because of its stupid military guidance strategy and chaotic organization and command. This paper puts forward some shallow analysis on the military reasons for the victory or defeat of both sides.

First, the General Front Committee has the overall situation in mind and correctly implements the Central Military Commission's determination to fight the battle of the southern line. The Kuomintang army is hesitant in strategy, and the million-strong army of the People's Liberation Army is in a dilemma. It acts under the overall strategic situation and resolutely and flexibly implements the operational policy of the Central Military Commission. At that time, judging from the national war situation, the strategic decisive battle situation has gradually matured. Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission made a decisive decision, and they fought for it first. They resolutely launched the Liaoshen Campaign in the northeast, and then the Jinan Campaign in the south. Before the Huaihai Campaign, the operational policy formulated by the Central Military Commission was to annihilate only the main force of Xuzhou Group on the southern line, and then imagine that the two field armies in East China and the Central Plains would fight several big battles together to annihilate the enemy in large numbers and drag the enemy along the river. 165438+17 October, the head of the delegation, Hua Ye, discovered that Liu Zhituan might have a big retreat and reported it to the CMC. On the same day, CMC called Nakano and Hua Ye to express their determination to expand the scale of the campaign. On the 9th, Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission cut off the enemy's retreat and revised the original plan of "annihilating the enemy's main force near Xuzhou". After the establishment of the General Front Committee, it correctly understood and grasped the central government's strategic decisive battle thought, grasped this favorable decisive battle opportunity from the objective situation of the battlefield, and actively put forward suggestions to the Military Commission in the subsequent campaign implementation process, so that after the victory of the first battle of the Yellow Corps, the campaign developed in the direction of Xu and Mu, achieving the goal of destroying the Huang Wei Corps first and then the Du Group, which reflected the firmness and flexibility of the General Front Committee in implementing the strategic policy of the Military Commission.

Faced with the upcoming large-scale operations of the People's Liberation Army, the high command of the Kuomintang army has different opinions and can't come up with a decision-making strategy. As the highest decision-maker, Chiang Kai-shek hesitated for a long time to defend Xu or Huai. When he found that the East China Field Army had left Subei and the Central Plains Field Army attempted to attack Zhengzhou, he ordered Herry Liu Group to "consolidate Xuzhou and ensure it" on June 24, 65438/kloc-0. 10/0 On October 30th, Minister of National Defense He called a military meeting and hastily formulated the Xubang Operational Plan to prepare the main force of Herry Liu Group to retreat to the occupied position on the south bank of Huaihe River. However, the ink on this plan was not dry. On June 4th, 165438+ Chiang Kai-shek changed his original intention and decided to deploy 700,000 troops of Herry Liu Group in Xuzhou-Bengbu section of Jinpu Road and its two sides to carry out offensive defense, ensure traffic and defend Nanjing-Shanghai. When Chiang Kai-shek's final determination reached the front-line generals, the powerful offensive launched by the People's Liberation Army had already begun. Because of Chiang Kai-shek's indecision in formulating operational policies, the dominant Kuomintang army lost the initiative on the battlefield, and the million-strong army in Herry Liu and Bai Chongxi was caught in a dilemma.

Second, the subjective guidance of PLA commanders conforms to objective reality and firmly grasps the initiative in the battlefield. The Kuomintang generals are incompetent and the battlefield decision-making and command are chaotic. Mao Zedong once said to the leading comrades of the General Front Committee of the Huaihai Campaign that a well-fought Huaihai Campaign is like a pot of "uncooked rice", which is eaten by you bite by bite. This popular and vivid metaphor is a full affirmation of the General Front Committee's realistic operational decision, flexible operational plan and superb operational command art. For example, the Yellow Corps encircled the Corps and moved eastward to the Xu and Mu Corps. Because Qiu and Li Corps always relied on Xuzhou's lair, the People's Liberation Army could not divide its troops and surrounded them. Herry Liu was afraid that the People's Liberation Army would annihilate the weaker corps first and make it flee south quickly. Under this circumstance, the General Front Committee put forward a proposal to the Military Commission to attack Huang Wei in a timely manner, and the Military Commission immediately replied: fully agreed. The General Front Committee adjusted the plan in time, accurately pointed the operational target of the second stage to stevie hoang Corps, and formulated detailed safeguard measures. The day after the Yellow Corps was wiped out, it quickly reached the encirclement of the Corps and adapted to the new and changed situation.

The General Front Committee followed Chairman Mao's instructions of "concentrating on destroying the enemy". After capturing Suxian County, cutting off the deployment of the Kuomintang military center and dividing Herry Liu's heavily armed group, it dismembered its powerful corps into several isolated parts on various battlefields to prevent them from getting close to each other, and then successively switched to superior forces and used the tactics of "attacking economic difficulties" to carry out devastating blows. Because the officers and men of the PLA give full play to their subjective initiative and use flexible and correct tactics, the advantages of the PLA and the disadvantages of the Kuomintang troops have been increased at every operational stage. Until Chiang Kai-shek lost all bets on the long-term civil war, including the 5 th Army and the 18 Army, which the Kuomintang called "the five main forces".

Before the Huaihai Campaign, it was suggested that Bai Chongxi, known as "Little Zhuge", should come to Xu for unified command. But Chiang Kai-shek and others were afraid that Bai Chongxi was too powerful to control, so they decided to use honest and reliable Herry Liu as Xuzhou's "general suppression". Herry Liu, his colleagues called him "General Fu" to his face and "Stupid Pig" behind his back. After the battle started, Herry Liu could not judge the complicated battlefield situation and was incompetent in command. 165438+1On October 8, Shandong Corps of the People's Liberation Army took advantage of the uprising and the Yellow Corps did not cross the canal, and quickly went south. He panicked, causing the Li Mi regiment near Cao Baji to retreat to Xuzhou, leaving the Yellow Corps unprotected and surrounded by the People's Liberation Army. 10, Chiang Kai-shek tried to fight the main force of the People's Liberation Army in the west of the canal and east of Xuzhou. He sized up the situation and telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek: "The * * army west of Xuzhou still has a strong force, trying to contain Qiu Corps and cooperate with its Eastern Corps to fight. Our basic policy should be to take offensive defense. " In fact, at this time, there was only a part of the main force of the People's Liberation Army to the west of Xuzhou, which was the wrong decision he made by listening to Qiu Qingquan's false military intelligence and passively avoiding war. Chiang Kai-shek immediately criticized his operational policy for being too negative and made it follow the policy of the Ministry of National Defense. It was not until 12 that we concentrated our forces to attack eastward. However, after another two days' delay, the People's Liberation Army not only completed the encirclement of the Yellow Corps, but also formed a large-depth sniper position with most of its troops.

Senior commanders are like this. What about other commanders? When Sun, commander of 16 Corps, retreated in Xuzhou, he disobeyed orders and withdrew the cover troops two days in advance, resulting in all the personnel and materials behind Du Tuan being captured by the People's Liberation Army. Qiu Qingquan Corps is the backbone of Xuzhou Battle, but Qiu is arrogant and unable to coordinate with friendly forces. Because there are many contradictions among Kuomintang generals, they struggle for power and profit, form gangs, beggar their neighbors and exclude dissidents, so it is impossible to implement good coordination in combat. When the Yellow Corps was in a precarious situation, Herry Liu did not actively send troops to rescue it. Instead, he made Qiu Qingquan Corps stick to the yellow mouth and made He Sun Corps shrink to Xuzhou in an attempt to protect themselves. Under Chiang Kai-shek's repeated orders, they marched eastward at turtle speed, but they could not climb 5 kilometers in 7 days.

Third, the PLA accurately grasps the timing of decisive battle, correctly selects the target of destroying the enemy, and has a flexible combat style. The deployment of Kuomintang troops was unfavorable at the beginning of the campaign, and all subsequent decisions were miscalculated. The army's actions were repeatedly defeated, and the Liaoshen campaign ended successfully. The national military situation has reached a new turning point, and the PLA has changed from a long-term disadvantage in quantity to an advantage. Mao Zedong sized up the situation, seized this favorable fighter in time, made a decision to wage a large-scale decisive battle with the enemy in the area north of the Yangtze River, and expanded the scale of the Huaihai Campaign on the basis of the original campaign plan, thus opening the prelude to the largest strategic decisive battle in the history of the PLA war.

The target selection of the first battle of the Huai Hai Campaign is related to the overall situation. 10 7, the Yellow Corps began to retreat from Xin 'an Town to the west. At that time, the flank of the corps was exposed, with a prominent position and no help. The northern and southern parts of the battle zone are both liberated areas. With the support of the masses, the PLA can attack the north and south, which is the ideal goal of the first attack. Therefore, the main force of Shandong Corps cut off the retreat of the Yellow Corps on11,cooperated with Hua Ye's main force of six columns, surrounded the enemy in Nianzhuang area, and conquered Nianzhuang on 1 1.22, thus winning the first battle. Then our army decisively attacked Huang Wei in the second stage of the campaign with an iron fist. Because although the enemy has four armies, 1 fast column, and more than * *1.20 thousand people, it is a strong enemy among the three enemies, but it is far tired, separated from the rear and alone in the movement. So the People's Liberation Army concentrated its main force to surround and annihilate the Huangwei Corps in the Shuangduiji area, creating a brilliant example of how several enemies went hand in hand and chose to annihilate the strong enemy in the Huaihai Campaign. Among the targets of the Huai Hai Campaign to wipe out the enemy, solving the Du clique is the most distinctive move in the overall situation of the campaign. At this time, the battle of Ping Jin has already begun. In order to realize the strategic offensive intention, stabilize the enemies in Ping Jin, and prevent the frightened birds from fleeing south and west, they will be captured after the PLA achieves its strategic intention. This not only effectively cooperated with the Ping Jin Campaign strategically, but also ensured the realization of the final goal of the campaign on the premise of security, thus ensuring the final victory of the Huaihai Campaign.

Adopting flexible and changeable combat style is a vivid embodiment of the superb command art of Huaihai Campaign. The people's liberation army dares to surround the dense enemy separately; It is necessary to reinforce the attacking enemy and quickly encircle it; For the fleeing enemy, pursue and annihilate it with all your strength. It realized the campaign plan that the Yellow Corps was first annihilated in Nianzhuangwei, the Huang Wei Corps was annihilated in Shuangduiji, and the Du Tuan fled from Xuzhou to Yongcheng and was annihilated, which declared the complete victory of the Huaihai Campaign.

As Qin Yiming, the commander of the Third Division of Central China's "General Suppression", analyzed Bai Chongxi, the battle situation of the Kuomintang army in the early stage of the Huaihai Campaign was "unable to fight, retreat and defend". When Hua Ye has concentrated its forces in southern Shandong and southwestern Shandong to complete the strategic deployment and can launch a large-scale attack at any time, the Kuomintang army is still deployed with Xuzhou as the center, which can neither create momentum nor fight, and the start is a dead chess. During the campaign, the PLA seized the weakness of their deployment and carried out various interceptions. First of all, the PLA cut off the links between the right-wing Yellow Corps and Xuzhou, Huaibei and Lianyungang. In this way, Xuzhou's right arm was cut off, and the middle and left arms had to retreat to Xuzhou and could not move. In particular, after the People's Liberation Army conquered Su Xian and the southern section of Jin-Pu Railway was cut off between Xu and Mu, the army followed the Corps closely, and the main force set up a strong sniper position between Su Xian and Meng Cheng, and the Kuomintang troops put into the Huaihai battlefield were wiped out.

The battlefield situation of China Kuomintang troops in Huaihai Campaign was always like squatting in a dark room, and they made tracking mistakes again and again, which was mainly manifested in Chiang Kai-shek's three changes of determination and even total annihilation. Chiang Kai-shek changed his mind for the first time, thus destroying Huang's corps. On October 30th, 65438/kloc-0, the "battle plan of Xubang" was determined, but on October 8th, 165438/kloc-0, Chiang Kai-shek changed it to "to fight the * * * army east of Xuzhou and west of the canal". Due to the vibration of the uprising and the confusion of the battle report "People's Liberation Army troops encircle Xuzhou", he did not take advantage of the encirclement of the Yellow Corps by the Shandong Corps of the People's Liberation Army, and immediately covered it with the nearby corps, so that the Yellow Corps concentrated its forces and quickly broke through. Instead, we asked the Yellow Corps to stick to Nianzhuang and wait for Qiu and Li Corps to move eastward, so that the Yellow Corps lost the opportunity to break through and became the first victim of Chiang Kai-shek's wrong decision.

Chiang Kai-shek changed his mind for the second time, and stevie hoang Corps was wiped out. 165438+1After the Yellow Corps was annihilated on October 22, the People's Liberation Army quickly transferred its troops and surrounded the Huang Wei Corps with seven columns of Nakano; With eight columns of Hua Ye North Regiment and five columns of South Regiment, the north and south blocked the enemy and prevented the Kuomintang troops from joining forces. At this time, Chiang Kai-shek fantasized about not sending more troops, marching north and south, and getting through Xubang section of Jinpu Road. However, on the 27th, I didn't know my decision-making mistake until I was repeatedly attacked and frustrated for three consecutive days. On the 28th, a military meeting was held, and it was agreed that Du Sacrifice Corps would cover Xu Sanbing Corps and retreat to the south bank of Huaihe River, which completely changed the original situation of "getting through, meeting with each other in three ways", so that the corps that had already fallen into tight encirclement got deeper and deeper in Du's retreat and was finally wiped out.

Chiang Kai-shek changed his mind three times and collapsed. In 65438+February, 1, the PLA found that du step abandoned Xuzhou and fled to the southwest. But to adjust the deployment and turn the main force into pursuit. However, Chiang Kai-shek was confused by this strategic trend, which made Du Bu, who was withdrawing from the south, attack Suixikou, cooperated with the Corps to divide and rule, and at the same time separated the * * * Army to solve the encirclement of the Corps. Du was frightened by Chiang Kai-shek's orders and turned around to attack Suixikou. Surrounded by the main force of the PLA, it ended in complete failure.

The People's Liberation Army is united from top to bottom, supported by the people and fearless. The general trend of the Kuomintang army has gone, and the army spirit is decadent. After the third year of the war of liberation, especially after the autumn offensive launched by the People's Liberation Army, the victories of Liaoshen Campaign and Jinan and Zhengzhou Campaign brought about a new turning point in the whole political and military situation in the country, which had a strong shock and profound impact on both camps. Encouraged by the great orders issued by Mao Zedong and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China that "the main force should wipe out the enemy north of the Yangtze River" and "an unprecedented annihilation war", the officers and men of the whole army actively fought and killed the enemy bravely. During the Huaihai Campaign, the People's Liberation Army firmly believed in "overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek and liberating all China", the wise leadership of the Central Committee and Mao Zedong and the correct command of the General Front Committee, and always maintained a strong fighting spirit and a heroic and tenacious revolutionary spirit. In pursuit of the enemy, the troops marched through the night 140 miles, regardless of difficulties and hardships. In order to attack the enemy, the troops were not afraid of sacrifice, braved the bullets and jumped into the biting cold water, and set up a "human bridge". In order to win the battle, the people will support wherever the PLA hits. Front-line operations and rear support have always ensured a large supply of front lines, fully demonstrating the great power of the people's war.