The Campaign Process of the Battle of East Carpathian

The breakthrough area selected by the Soviet Union is located in the northwest of East Carpathian Mountain, which is the narrowest place in the north-south direction of East Carpathian Mountain, with an average elevation of 650-850 meters. There are dense forests on the mountains and few roads here, and there are only a few mountain passes through the main ridge. Among them, the road through the Dukla Mountain Pass at an altitude of 503 meters is the most convenient for the army to maneuver, and it is also the junction of 17 Army, Heinrich Cluster and Soviet assault.

In the plan submitted by 1 Ukrainian1Army to the high command on September 3, 944, we can find that konev is too optimistic about the coming war: First, the preparation time for the campaign is insufficient. According to the plan, the 38th Army has only five days to prepare, which is obviously not enough for a group army lacking experience and ability in mountain operations. Second, it overestimated the fighting capacity of Slovak rebels. Konev plans to pass through Dukla Pass, a key point heavily guarded by German troops, in five days. One of the most important conditions is to ask the Slovak Army 1, the 2nd Division and guerrillas in the enemy-occupied area to assist in attacking the Dukla Pass in the rear. But the subsequent war proved that the Slovak rebels did not have such ability.

1The strength comparison between the German Heinrich cluster and the Soviet 38th Army in early September, 944. The 38th Army of the Soviet Union of Heinrich Cluster has 10 German divisions, 9 infantry divisions,/kloc-0 tanks,/kloc-0 guards and 8 infantry divisions in Hungary. Two mountain brigades, one Czech army, 300,000 men, 65,438+10,000 men, 3,250 guns and mortars, 1.724 tanks and 90 1.008 vehicles. Although it is found from the above comparison that the 38th Soviet episode is not dominant, it should be noted that the breakthrough area of the 38th Soviet episode only accounts for about 40% of the total defense line of Heinrich cluster. In view of the delay in making progress on the front of Duke, a key fortified German town, in September 1944, 1 1 day,1kloc-0/0/army opened a German position between Lisagula and Gloissy village (these two villages are located 5-8km northwest of Dukla town). This gap passed through a valley, and the Soviet army was pleasantly surprised to find that the Germans did not form heavy troops in the mountainous areas around the valley. Konev immediately realized that this was an excellent opportunity to break the deadlock. He immediately ordered the guards 10 1 cavalry troops behind the army to go forward lightly, cross this gap, and quickly go south to join the insurgents in eastern Slovakia. He confidently told General baranov, commander of Guards 1 Cavalry Army: "Cavalry has favorable conditions. When you break through the enemy's rear, you will get the full support of residents, guerrillas and insurgents. Take bold action. " However, it turns out that konev's order is still open to question. He ordered the cavalry to lay down most of the technical weapons and carry out a deep assault on the enemy's rear in mountainous conditions when the enemy's situation and terrain were unknown. Moreover, he may not know that the two divisions of the Slovak rebels, which he had high hopes for, were defeated by the Germans in early September. The so-called meeting and cooperation was impossible from the beginning of the campaign.

Guards 1 Cavalry made good progress two days before entering the breakthrough, with a breakthrough of about 20 kilometers. By September 1944 and 13, the Guards 1 Division and the Guards' 7th Division had crossed the Boje border in Baja Polanka and Baranez respectively. However, the good times did not last long. The German reserve came quickly and launched a fatal counterattack against the 1 cavalry of the guards: on September 1944, the 1 armored division under the command of Colonel Varna Max moved eastward from Lisagula, and the 8th armored division under the command of Major General Gottfried Florig launched a powerful counterattack from Dukla to the west at the same time. Cut off the contact between the guards 1 cavalry and the main force of the 38 th Army in one fell swoop. Arrogant Soviets can taste the bitter fruit of underestimating their enemies. The sudden counterattack of two German armored divisions, like a rope tied tightly in a pocket, forced the guards 1 cavalry to repeat the Moscow counterattack and be surrounded by Heinrich's troops behind enemy lines. Due to the light load and the broken back road, the guards 1 cavalry had to give up the attack and turn to the circular defense west of Bolian. At that time, General baranov discovered how reckless it was to let the follow-up troops act alone. Most of his artillery is still far away on the roads of Novzmikrud and Dukla, and only a few 45 mm cannons and 82 mm mortars advance with the cavalry combat team. Facing the German siege, the guards 1 cavalry suffered serious casualties, and ammunition and food were quickly exhausted. 1944 September 16, its supply can only be guaranteed by front-line aviation.

65438+September16,0944 "Heinrich" cluster sequence (can be compared with the sequence one month ago)

Heinrich group

Germany 1 panzer corps:

1 1 Army: 168, 254th and 96th Infantry Divisions.

49th Mountain Army: 100,1kloc-0/Hunter Division, 6th Division of Hungary,13rd Division.

24th Panzer Corps: 68th, 75th and 357th Infantry Divisions, "Picler" Battle Group (Commander Lieutenant General Picler, under his command 1 Panzer Division, 8th Panzer Division 1 Panzer Division and 208th Infantry Division).

Hungary 1 Army:

Hungarian 6th Army: Hungary 10 Division, Hungary 1 Mountain Infantry Brigade.

Hungarian 3rd Army: 16, 24th Division of Hungary.

Reserve: 1 Hungarian mountain infantry brigade

General preparation for "Heinrich" cluster:No. 154 Reserve Division1September 944 15 At noon, the 67th Army of the Soviet Union and the 4th Tank Corps of the Guards launched an attack on the left wing of the 38th Army. At first, because the main force of the German army was still confined to Dukla town and its west area, the Soviet attack was relatively smooth, and the 4 th tank army of the Guards quickly occupied Lehman Nuff. However, to the south of Lymanov, Soviet tanks met with stubborn resistance from German anti-tank artillery fire, and the attack had to be stopped. In this case, konev and Moscow Lianke realized that the suddenness of the Soviet attack would soon disappear if they continued to consume in the south of Lemanouf, so they quickly ordered to change the assault direction, stop the attack in the south of Lemanouf, and transfer the tank troops to Besko (about 6 kilometers east of Lemanouf) to carry out an assault on Fuka, Thallner through the mountain passage, and then develop the attack in the direction of Dukla along the southern slope of the mountain.

The adjustment of the Soviet army was extremely rapid. On the morning of September 18, the 4th Guards Tanker and 3rd1Tanker (two tanks with 144 tanks and self-propelled artillery) just joined the battle sequence and the 38th Army launched an attack from the south of Bi Skof. However, the narrow mountain road made it impossible for the tank soldiers to expand into combat teams and forced them to March in columns. Within 24 hours after the start of the attack, the Soviet tank columns lacking infantry cover were shot through by German anti-tank guns deployed on the mountains on both sides of the road, resulting in huge losses. Moreover, the destroyed tanks often blocked roads, which seriously hindered the advance of the Soviet army. The bloody battle between the two armies in the valley lasted for a whole day. On the morning of 19, the Soviet army finally got through the mountain passage and went out to the Fuka area of Thallner. It should be said that the Soviet left-wing attack on 18 paid a high price, but they succeeded in opening a breakthrough on the flank of the German defense line and detoured to the rear of Dukla town. Until then, Heinrich realized that something was wrong, and quickly ordered to suspend the counterattack launched by No.8 Armored Division 1 in Dukla Town, and evacuated the 75th and 68th Divisions fortified along the mountain range in Dukla Town and Lemanuff area to the northeast hillside of Tyrala for 2- 10 km to cope with the attack of Soviet tanks. However, before the Germans mobilized, Soviet tanks rushed to Dukla town like tigers down the mountain. On September 20th, the Fourth Guards Tank Corps marched westward to 18km, and approached Dukla town after noon. At the same time, Czechoslovakia's 1 army also approached the town of Dukla from the north. At 3: 30 p.m., the Fourth Guards Tank Corps led by the commander Pavel Pavlovich Boluboyanov invaded Dukla town from the east. By the end of the 20th, the Soviets had completely controlled the town of Dukla. This is the first major victory of Wuyi since the launch of the Carpathian Campaign. The Soviet army successfully attracted a large number of new German troops by using the besieged Guards 1 cavalry (although the siege of Close 1 was not konev's intention), decisively changed the direction of the assault, quickly detoured to the German rear, and captured the town of Dukla in two days. Konev later wrote in his memoir Notes of the Army Commander, "If we consider all the complexities of the mountain struggle and faltering, we can boldly say that this is a major victory for the group army and its affiliated tank army." This evaluation is pertinent. After the Soviet army conquered Dukla town, it launched an assault on Tyrala along the road from Dukla town to Dukla mountain pass on September 23rd. The 4th Tank Corps and 3 1 Tank Corps of the Guards made great contributions to the conquest of Dukla town. Although these two tanks suffered huge losses in the battle of 19-20, they were still led by 65438+ guards. In order to break through the German defense line as soon as possible, the breakthrough area selected by the Soviet Union was only 1 km, and the Soviet Union concentrated 300 guns and 39 tanks on this 1 km front. Facts have proved that the deployment of the Soviet Union is very effective. Five hours after the attack, the Soviets successfully captured Tyrala, 65,438+00 kilometers south of Dukla town. The next day, the Soviet main force finally joined the 1 Guards cavalry that broke through to Tyrala. The guards 1 cavalry who jumped out of the tight encirclement had to quit the first-line battle to be the army's reserve because of the huge losses. Back to the Ukrainian First Army, on September 23rd, after the invasion of Tyrala by the 38th Army, it has reached the strongest German defense line near Dukla Pass, the main ridge of Carpathian Mountains. By September 26th, the Germans had assembled 10 divisions to face the 38th Army. German fortifications in Albard are full of trenches, minefields and permanent fortifications. As you can imagine, it is very difficult to completely break through the defense line of Albard. Konev wrote in his memoirs, "So far, there is no precedent in military history to complete this complex task." To this end, the Soviet army changed its deployment again in late September and adjusted its main attack direction. The Soviets planned to avoid pushing directly into the Dukla Pass, but turned the main direction of advancement to the ancient pagodas Polanska and Zborov in the southwest of the Dukla Pass. It is planned that the 10 1 Army and the adjacent flank of the 67th Army will make a breakthrough. The three tank armies under the 38th Army-the 4th Tank Army of Guards and the 25th, 3rd1Tank Army (each army has only 60 tanks on average) are all concentrated in this direction to support the breakthrough of infantry. Drawing on the experience of fighting some time ago, the Soviet army assembled a large number of guns in the scheduled breakthrough area, so that the gun density in the breakthrough area reached 0/59 guns per kilometer/kloc.

On the morning of September 30, after 40 minutes of fire preparation, the Soviet army launched an attack at 9: 00. However, the rainy weather for several days made it impossible for the Soviet aviation to attack, and the complex terrain conditions made the Soviet attack fall into a quagmire from the beginning. The Soviets 10 1 were stubbornly blocked by the Germans in Bolian, only to be unable to move. The next day, 10 1 army decisively changed its deployment, and ordered 127 division to bomb the interior lines from the north, while the 70th guard division and the 14 guard tank brigade detoured this stronghold from the south. In addition, the Soviet army also sent a large number of artillery in the direction of Poliangnei. After a day of fierce fighting, the Soviets conquered Paulian Nie on the night of June 1. The situation of the 67th Army on the left side of 10 1 Army is even more difficult. The bad weather made the road more muddy and difficult. By June 3 10, the 24 1 division of the vanguard of this unit had only advanced 5 kilometers, an average of a little more than 1 km per day. However, the situation has changed in a blink of an eye. Although the Soviet army made slow progress (from September 30th, 10 to October 4th, 2000, the 38th Army only advanced 5-10 km), but it seriously threatened the safety of the flank of Dukla Pass. Moreover, after nearly a month of hard fighting in the mountains, the Germans have been quite tired. I am afraid that the Soviets will go deep behind the Dukla Pass Group (mainly 1 Ski Hunter Division and 359 Infantry Division). So, the Germans voluntarily gave up the Dukla Pass, and on the night of 10/0.5, the Germans began to retreat from Dukla Pass to the south. The next day, the Soviet 67th Army and Czechoslovakia 1 Army won the Dukla Pass without much effort. (Later, 65438+1October 6th was designated as the Army Day by Czechoslovakia. It may be unexpected that the Soviet side seized the Dukla Pass so easily. In my opinion, the Soviet breakthrough in Carpathian mountains in many directions made it meaningless to continue to hold the Dukla Pass. By this time of the war, it was impossible for the German "Heinrich" cluster to stop the Soviets from crossing the Carpathian Mountains and entering Slovakia. It has become a more realistic and effective goal for Heinrich Cluster to use favorable terrain conditions to contain more troops of the Soviet Union's First and Fourth Army and reduce the pressure on Poland and South European friendly forces. In this case, Heinrich ordered to abandon Dukla Pass and Albard Line, which should be said to be wise.

Germany 1 Panzer Corps Sequence (1September 28th, 944)

Commander: General Gothard Heinrich.

49th Mountain Army: 100 Hunter Division, 10 1 Hunter Division.

24th Armored Division: 357th Infantry Division, 68th Infantry Division, 75th Infantry Division, 1 Ski Hunter, 24th Armored Division Note 1.

1 1 Army: 254th Infantry Division,168th Infantry Division, 96th Infantry Division, 97th Hunter Division.

Group army reserve: 154 reserve division, 1 armored division.

Note: 1 Ski Hunter Division was formed by the merger of 1 Ski Hunter Brigade and the remnants of the 52nd Infantry Division in the summer of 1944. At this time, the division commander was 39-year-old Major General Martin Berg.

After successfully capturing the Dukla Pass, the Soviet army advanced 3-5 kilometers to the south, but met with fierce resistance from the German army. On June 8, 10, the Soviet attack stopped again. 10 10/0/0, in order to avoid attacking the strong defensive areas of the German army from the front, the Soviet army changed its assault direction again and carried out an assault in the direction of Vapenik and Nizhny Mirosev in order to seize the road to Zborov. However, bad weather conditions and bad terrain conditions once again restricted the mobility and logistics transportation of the Soviet Union. Until 10 and 19, the Soviet army still failed to achieve remarkable results on the Bojie border south of Dukla Pass, and the attack came to a standstill again. In order to get rid of the passive situation, Moskalenko once again ordered to change the direction of the assault, and attacked Crewe Zilova, Ka Poschova and Swanik with the main force. 10 year125 October, the 38th Army launched a new attack. By 10128 October, it had already broken into the Ondawa Valley, but it was resisted by the Germans to the north of Svednik and turned to defense in an all-round way. At this point, the 50-day Carpathian-Dukla campaign of the 38th Army finally came to an end. After 1.5 months of bloody fighting, the Soviet army successfully crossed the East Carpathian Mountain, but the losses were quite heavy. The 38th Soviet Army suffered more than 80,000 casualties, while the Germans relying on mountain fortifications only paid the price of about 60,000 casualties. Soviet mobile units-three tanks and 1 cavalry-suffered heavy losses in the 50-day bloody battle. The Soviet army originally planned to advance 95 kilometers in 4 days, with an average attack speed of about 24 kilometers/day and night. In fact, the battle lasted for 50 days, advanced 46 kilometers, and only half the task was completed. The average attack speed per day and night was less than 1 km, which almost returned to the level of World War I. From this point of view, the defensive operation of the German "Heinrich" cluster should be successful.

In addition, during the Battle of Carpathian-Dukla, the Soviet Union won numerous victories in the Balkans, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia successively fell into the hands of the Soviet Union, and the Second Army of Ukraine successfully crossed the Transylvanian Plateau and entered the Central European Plain. In this context, the Soviet army crossed the East Carpathian Mountains into Slovakia and retaken a small piece of Slovak territory near Uzhgorod, which actually had little military significance. However, this attack made the Soviet army pay a heavy price. Ukraine * * * lost more than 6.5438+0.2 million people in the first and fourth aspects (net decrease of 26.843 and injury of 99.368), accounting for almost one-third of all the troops participating in the war. (Note: The difference between this figure and the previous figure is that the Carpathian-Dukla Battle is a part of the East Carpathian Battle, which mainly includes the Battle of Wuyi Carpathian-Dukla and the Battle of Uzhgorod in Wu Si. The figure of1.20,000 is the total loss of Soviet troops in the East Carpathian Battle. )