Why did the Germans lose the battle in Moscow?

The Battle of Moscow1941September 30th-19421October 7th, the Soviet Union finally held Moscow, won the battle and declared the defeat of the German Blitzkrieg. So what is the reason for the victory of Moscow's defense war?

The reason for the victory of Moscow's defense war

The defense carried out by the Soviet Red Army at the gates of Moscow is completely the last resistance, which can be said to be at a disadvantage. The Germans attacked the core areas where Russians lived for hundreds of years, and the Soviet Red Army was supported by their determination to fight against powerful enemies, serve the country faithfully and retaliate against aggressors. Here is a quote from Marshal zhukov: "It was not the rain and snow that stopped the fascist troops near Moscow, but the indomitable, persevering spirit and heroism of the Soviet Red Army supported by the Soviet people, capital and motherland that defeated more than one million elite German troops." So here's the question. There is no denying that they played bravely. And this kind of morale strength gathered in the capital, and the spiritual strength made the Soviet Red Army soldiers give the Germans a desperate blow. On the other hand, the fact that the Germans hated the Soviets also frightened the Muscovites. * * * promised rewards and their own strong reserve forces reassure them. The superposition of the two factors created a Soviet army that regarded the German army as a dead thing. However, the Soviet Red Army did not have much advantage in morale. What about the actual military strength? According to the information released by Russia, during the defense period from September 30th to February 5th, 565,438 people died and disappeared, and 65,438 people were injured. During the campaign counterattack, from February 5, 65438 to1October 7, 139586 people died and disappeared, and 23 1369 people were injured. The total loss of the campaign is about 6.5438+0.03 million. At the same time, the Germans lost less than 1 10,000 people in the whole war. On the eve of the Soviet Red Army's counterattack, the strength of the two sides near Moscow was compared: the number of Germans exceeded 600,000 of the Soviet Red Army, 6,000 guns and 500 tanks. Only in terms of aircraft, the Soviet Red Army is slightly better than more than 300. Moreover, at that time, the weapons of the Soviet Red Army were inferior to those of the Germans in technology and quality. It can be seen that the Soviet Red Army's massive attack on Germany was indeed lacking in confidence. The personnel quality of the Soviet Red Army is also dwarfed. It was not until 1944 that the Soviet Red Army had to destroy 1 German soldiers at the expense of six people. In terms of reinforcements, the Soviet Red Army can dispatch troops from the Far East, but the Germans can gather a large number of troops from the two army groups in the north and south, a large number of garrison troops on the western front, domestic garrison troops and fascist allies. At the end of the Moscow campaign, the 2nd Brigade of the12nd Division, which was transferred from the western front by the German army, played a great role in resisting the counterattack. At that time, it was also ordered to organize drivers who were idle because of scrapped cars into combat troops, reduce rear organs and replace German workers with prisoners of war. 1in the middle of 942, Germany collected cannon fodder from its allies. From a macro point of view, after the Moscow campaign, the Germans still owned vast land accounting for 45% of the total population of the Soviet Union, 33% of the total industrial output value and 47% of the cultivated land area. At that time, the number of livestock in the Soviet Union was also reduced by half. The Soviet Union's military production only recovered to the pre-war level in 1942. Pro-German Japanese (1942 has been pressing the United States to fight) and Turks have held back many Soviet Red Army troops. The danger of Rommel attacking from the south also had to be guarded by the Soviets. (He created this situation in 1942) On the German side, the threat from Britain at that time was negligible (Churchill had admitted this many times), the Americans had just entered the war, and almost all the richest areas in Europe were under Hitler's control. In 194 1 and 1942, the Soviet Union did not have the upper hand in land and population. On the contrary, in 1942, Hitler's land reached its peak. Therefore, as a whole, Germany still has the upper hand (although the seeds of failure are growing, they have not yet grown into trees), and the warring parties are at least evenly matched.

Why did the Germans fail?

Blitzkrieg, as its name implies, is a tactic of concentrating fire and attacking quickly. In fact, it ignores the material supply and endurance of the rear, and the requirements for various conditions are very demanding. In Poland, France and other places with good climatic conditions, if a sudden attack is carried out with abundant firepower, the chances of success are naturally great. But the Soviet Union is different. Moscow, which is in the extreme weather of ice and snow, has poor road conditions, but it has a wide area and a long front. The serious defects in logistics support are exposed, and even the spare parts needed by tanks are not transported in place. Soldiers can't even guarantee the supply of food and ammunition, let alone fight. In such an extremely harsh environment, the superiority of Soviet troops in defensive position has become more and more obvious. The conceit gained by the Germans in their previous success was finally defeated. Aside from the influence of these external environments, the German army, as an invading army, itself represents the unjust side, and the justice of a war is closely related to the morale of the army. The soldiers and people of the Soviet Union were very angry with the invaders. Almost a national war, mobilizing ordinary people to participate in the construction of military defense lines. Such a war has neither geographical advantages nor positional advantages, and the reason why Moscow failed to hold the Germans is obvious.