Our army suffered heavy losses in this war. Not only did the enemy not be annihilated, but two columns were also surrounded by the enemy.

1in March, 947, the Kuomintang army headed by Chiang Kai-shek mobilized 450,000 reorganization divisions of 24 armies and launched a key attack on Shandong liberated areas. In this campaign, the Kuomintang army concentrated its elite forces and took Yan' an and Shandong liberated areas as the two main directions. In the face of the attack of the enemy's superior forces, our East China Field Army and the Central Plains Field Army cooperated, and the main force constantly shifted, destroying the outstanding forces of the enemy in Tai 'an.

The enemy who becomes angry from embarrassment will naturally take revenge, but our army is also very clear that we can't confront the enemy head-on in any case. After all, the strength difference between the two sides is too wide. Therefore, until July, our army has been fighting in sports and constantly annihilating the effective forces of the enemy. The Kuomintang army has also changed its original strategy of attacking the east and defending the west. Instead, seven integrated divisions and two armies were deployed in Luzhong to attack southern Shandong, while four integrated divisions were retained in Luzhong.

Aware of the enemy's strategic gap, our army is determined to return to Luzhong to annihilate the enemy's four reorganization divisions. You know, these four BGF divisions are not ordinary. Among them, the 11th BGF Division is located in Nanma, and the 25th BGF Division of Huang is located in Donglidian. These two units have very strong combat effectiveness. Apart from the reorganization of the 64th Division, there are also the reorganization of the 9th Division stationed in Yishui and the reorganization of the 8th Division stationed in Linqu. We can help each other.

Our army mobilized four columns of troops, and Huang reorganized the twenty-fifth division, which was more prominent. Therefore, we are determined to eat yellow. However, due to the heavy rain and Huang's alertness, the 25th Division soon approached the 64th Division next to it, so the battle could not be carried out.

Later, our army found that the 11th Division of Hu Lian reorganization was located in South Malaysia, and its position was more prominent, so it was determined to annihilate the 11th Division. However, South Malaysia is relatively high-lying, while Hu Lian is very cunning. Before the war, we discovered the problems in the terrain where Lu Cun was stationed, so we built a strong fortress. Sure enough, when my fourth column attacked, relying on solid fortifications, our army failed to capture South Malaysia, but it suffered heavy losses, plus the 25th and 64th divisions.

In desperation, after our army withdrew from South Malaysia on July 2 1 and 1947, we found an opportunity to launch an attack on the eighth reorganized division stationed in Linqu. The eighth division commander is Li Mi, who is also a general who graduated from Huangpu Phase I.. Because of the previous Battle of South Malaysia, the 8th BGF Division was stationed in wei county. Being asked to rescue Hu Lian in time, but after our army left Nanma, Li Mi was ordered to reorganize the Eighth Division and its subordinates near Linqu, and time was short, so it was impossible to build fortifications like Hu Lian.

However, the reorganization of the Eighth Division is actually an elite force. However, because our army fought against it in the early stage, the evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the reorganized Eighth Division was not high. However, this mentality has been put into a state of combat, but there have been great problems. In the battle of Linqu, although the Eighth Division lost more than 4,000 people, it was still able to firmly hold its position. The delay in taking the position led to the arrival of the 25 th and 64 th divisions.

Including the battles in Nanma and Linqu, although our army achieved a record of 1.8 million, its own casualties also reached 2 1 10,000, which can be said to be extremely disproportionate. Our army also summed up the post-war experience and lessons, on the one hand, because of carelessness and underestimation of the enemy, on the other hand, because of the lack of correct guidance for recruits, coupled with bad weather.