The development history of artillery: from the Franco-Prussian War to the Second World War

European artillery entered the 20th century under the shadow of 1870 ~ 187 1. For tacticians, there were many lessons in that war about how to deploy and use a new generation of artillery. For weapons experts, the fact that the winner is one generation ahead of the loser has triggered the arms race in the next 50 years. When death dealers and arms dealers make a fortune in this arms race, tacticians have to face one new problem after another. They just developed new tactical concepts based on the lessons of the Franco-Prussian War and artillery technology, but immediately found that their ideas could not keep up with the progress of science and technology. Although wars continued in other parts of the world during this period-those far away from the center of Western European civilization-and provided many clues and experiences for new weapons and tactics, the question of "how to use a new generation of artillery" was still inconclusive until the eve of the outbreak of the First World War.

Judging from the "hindsight" at the end of the 20th century, the fierce artillery battle in the Franco-Prussian War was a completely unequal scientific and technological competition. The breech guns used by the Prussian army far exceed their competitors in range, accuracy and more importantly, fuze reliability. The gunner of a standard 80 mm caliber four-pound Prussian Army field gun can project the shells to a distance of 3,800 meters and ensure that their shells will bloom; On the other hand, their French opponents use a four-pound field gun with a caliber of 86.5 mm, which can fire shells as far as 3 150 m-but only when the fuses of the shells are in the range of 1.400 ~ 1.600 and 2650 ~ 2950 can they work normally.

The weakness of French artillery technology is further highlighted by the strong organizational ability of Prussian artillery. In the Battle of Sedang, five infantry units of the Prussian army could concentrate more than 90 guns at the same time to form a "big artillery company"-even they could fight continuously under the command of an artillery commander. Even at the critical moment of the Sedang campaign, the Prussian army assembled 540 artillery pieces-accounting for 80% of all German artillery pieces-to form a "big artillery company" to fight.

But in infantry weapons, the scientific and technological advantages of the Franco-Prussian Armed Forces were reversed. French rifle is far superior to Prussia's pursuit firing pin rifle in mechanical reliability, ballistic levelness and range. But the scene that can be seen everywhere in the actual battlefield is that the Prussian infantry can't move under the fire of the French infantry, and when the French infantry is supported by several field guns and shrapnel at close range, it is a complete disaster for the Prussian infantry.

Faced with such a problem, the Prussian army divided the dilemma into two parts to solve it. The first is the "artillery duel" stage. Because the artillery range of Pu Junjun is much farther than that of the French army, and the fuze is more reliable, the most reasonable way is to tear the artillery position of the French army into pieces in the distance. Then it entered the stage of "close combat"-after destroying the French artillery, the "big artillery company" was immediately dispersed into a single artillery company, artillery team or even a single gun, which was directly pushed to the line of fire to directly shoot and support the infantry. This kind of "close combat" is often costly, especially when the general artillery has not completely eliminated the French artillery, but is eager to promote and support the infantry operations.

Military historians and coders quickly reorganized their theories based on the experience of the Franco-Prussian War. 1870 The imbalance of science and technology between the two countries was either forgotten or listed in the reference materials at the end of the book. European soldiers who have enjoyed peace for more than 40 years from 187 1 to 19 14 have learned two important lessons in this war that has greatly changed the balance of power in Europe: First, "the firepower of field guns must be concentrated", and the largest number of guns should be concentrated in one area as far as possible. The second is that "the enemy's artillery must be destroyed before the battle begins", and the battle between the two armies must begin with a duel of artillery.

The most important supporter of the "two-stage artillery battle", the artillery veteran of the Franco-Prussian War, Prince Hornloch-Engerfingen of Germany, published the following words in the1880s, strongly pointing out that although the range of artillery is increasing, the essence of artillery battle is no different from that of 1870:

The nature of artillery battle is no different from before, but the distance of artillery duel has increased. At present, in the stage of artillery duel, our army needs to fire at a distance of 5000 meters from the enemy. Although the efficiency will be reduced, our artillery still needs to fire to attract the attention of enemy artillery and prevent enemy artillery from obstructing our infantry. ... and then the commander will decide where to really attack. When the commander makes up his mind, the artillery units must advance to the edge of the maximum range of enemy shrapnel (about 3500 meters), and then use their shells to achieve maximum effect. The artillery unit must advance as soon as possible after the commander makes up his mind, and this moment is the moment when our army breaks away from the decisive artillery duel with the enemy. In order to realize this movement, our artillery must advance by leaps and bounds. Not only can't stop the gun, but also make good use of all the terrain and landforms to cover it. If the enemy artillery keeps silent in such an artillery duel, this is the moment when the commander launches the infantry attack ... that is to say, the infantry will attack the enemy's position within 30 minutes-the infantry will advance under the cover of our artillery 1 500 to 2000 meters-and during this period, the enemy infantry will be mercilessly hit by the shrapnel of our artillery.

Every country has different conclusions about the experience of the Franco-Prussian War. Most artillery learned a lesson and must respect the power of infantry rifles, so they opposed pushing artillery into the range of enemy rifles. The Germans paid little attention to the casualties of artillery personnel, but attached great importance to the infantry being left alone in the line of fire to bear the bullets of enemy rifles. "This must be the belief and persistence of the artillery." The German guidelines stated that "our infantry must not be without the support of artillery, which means that at the decisive moment, artillery officers and soldiers must have the consciousness of directly facing the powerful firepower of enemy infantry."

The differences in the concept of artillery among countries are not so great. "Big artillery company" and "artillery duel" quickly became the two pillars of the artillery norms of European powers. In Germany, these two points were clearly listed in the 1876 version of the artillery code, and artillery theorists of this era kept repeating this view in various publications; In France, this concept was immediately written into the first field teaching mode after the war; In Austria-Hungary, this view became the core of the 1878 version of the artillery officer's manual. Among the European powers at that time, only the Russian empire was not affected by Prussia's victory at all, and still used the old method to develop its own artillery tactics.

The concepts of "big artillery company" and "artillery duel" not only influenced the norms of various countries and the works of tacticians, but also allowed the armies of various countries to reorganize their own artillery organizations. The battery consisting of six or eight field guns-traditionally regarded as the largest artillery tactical unit-began to form larger tactical units with other battery companies. No matter they are called "artillery group" in France or "artillery division" in Germany, these units, which are composed of artillery companies 2, 3 and 4, soon no longer enjoy the honor of "independent designation" and "name of special forces" like their predecessors, but are tired of naming them with a series of numbers, and finally they don't even have independent digital designations, so they directly use the designations of superior infantry units as their own designations.

Germany was the first country to try to expand the artillery unit from "company" to "battalion", and then they went further, forming a regiment from two battalions, and then forming a brigade from two regiments, taking the artillery brigade as an infantry unit. From the point of view of military personnel, the German practice provided more and higher positions for senior artillery officers. Tactically, now the commander can not only assign an officer to command all the artillery, but also directly assign two artillery regiments to the infantry division to provide fire support.

Although the authors who compiled the tables and guides have digested various lessons of the Franco-Prussian War, at the same time, scientists, engineers and inventors are still constantly improving the performance of artillery technology. The development of metallurgy means that lighter artillery can fire larger projectiles, and the breakthrough of gunpowder makes the range longer, making it more difficult for the enemy to find the position of the artillery. The invention of magazine shell-the propellant is combined with the warhead in a metal can-and the improvement of the mechanism in the gun bore has increased the launching speed by three to four times.

A weapon that combines the above inventions and innovations is called a rapid-fire gun. It is at least 70 kilograms lighter than the previous artillery, and the rapid-fire gun is more powerful than the previous generation artillery under the traction of six horses. The muzzle of the rapid-fire gun is smaller than that of the previous generation field guns (from 87 mm to 75 mm), but the range is greatly increased (from 4000 meters up and down to 5000 to 8000 meters). The previous generation of field guns can fire two bullets per minute, and rapid-fire guns can fire six to seven shells per minute.

The first choice of rapid-fire gun is shrapnel, which was invented at the beginning of19th century, but it didn't become a reliable ammunition until the end of19th century. The warhead is covered with a thin layer of metal, which contains metal pellets weighing 8 to 10 grams and a little gunpowder. Shrapnel can explode several meters above the enemy's head, like an oversized shotgun, throwing a metal bullet at the enemy infantry. The timing fuse used for shrapnel is a simple fuse, and the gunner can control the explosion time of shrapnel by cutting the length of the fuse.

Rapid-fire guns appeared in every powerful artillery battalion in Europe in a short time-whether buying new weapons or converting the original guns into rapid-fire guns-but it is not easy for tacticians to develop concepts and tactics that can match this epoch-making weapon. The rapid-fire gun has a long range and the shrapnel is powerful, which makes it more difficult for infantry to get close to the enemy. More importantly, it can effectively destroy enemy artillery before infantry attacks.

At the same time, the fact that the range of the high-explosive bomb of the rapid-fire gun is longer than that of the cluster bomb 1500 to 3000m means that as long as the artillery is willing to give up their most effective killing weapon and then spend a lot of high-explosive bombs, they still have a chance to deal with enemy artillery units in any known position.