About Zhou Enlai.

1954 Dulles' refusal to shake hands with Zhou Enlai at the Geneva conference is a mystery, but 1972 Nixon said during his visit to China that the President of the United States should shake hands with Zhou Enlai first to make up for Dulles' rudeness.

After the Geneva Conference, it was widely rumored in the international diplomatic circles that Dulles and Zhou Enlai not only fought fiercely at the meeting, but even Dulles refused to shake hands with Zhou Enlai outside the meeting.

It was Alexis Johnson, an important member of the American delegation and ambassador to Czechoslovakia, who clearly believed that Dulles refused to personally shake hands with Zhou Enlai during the Geneva meeting.

Mr. Johnson wrote on page 204 of his memoir "Where is the Power" published in 1984:

Just before the first meeting on North Korea (1954-sic, which is the time difference between US Eastern Time and Geneva Time-author's note), an incident happened, which has troubled US-China relations for many years.

That day, Dulles walked into the lounge of the Palais des Nations. It happened that Zhou Enlai was inside. When Dulles came in, Zhou Enlai came from the other side of the room and planned to shake hands with Dulles with a gentle smile as usual.

I was standing next to Dulles. At first, Dulles didn't find Zhou Enlai. When he saw it, Zhou Enlai had approached.

Dulles glanced at the photographer waiting for the photo with the symbolic meaning of reconciliation, and quickly turned around, ignoring Zhou Enlai's outstretched hand.

I always feel that Dulles' apparent rudeness contradicts his usual practice.

But he did consider the possible political impact of such a photo once it appeared on the front page of the newspaper, and the impact on the hardliners in Congress.

This issue is really sensitive to American domestic politics, which led Dulles to take unusual measures.

Zhou Enlai never forgets this matter. He often mentions it to visitors, giving people an impression of being hurt.

In the following years, Johnson and his colleagues in the State Council repeatedly mentioned this matter for sure.

In an interview with reporters, he also affirmed many times, and he was puzzled by Wang Bingnan's denial.

Influenced by him, John Holderidge, a member of the US Presidential Security Committee who followed Kissinger's secret visit to China during the Nixon period, also wrote in his memoirs: "At the beginning of the Geneva Conference, there was an episode in which john foster dulles refused to shake hands with Zhou Enlai.

Obviously, the people of China will not forget or forgive this incident.

Because later, when Dr. Henry Kissinger secretly visited China at 197 1, Huang Hua also mentioned this matter to him. "

Among the works published by China, what is closer to Johnson's statement is the record in My Husband's Life published by Mrs. Wang Xiangtong at the age of 1997.

This book is dedicated to the Geneva conference, which says:

Throughout the meeting, the representative of the United States tried to regard the representative of China as non-existent.

Dulles, head of the American delegation, ordered the members of the American delegation not to shake hands with the members of the China delegation.

When Premier Zhou was waiting in the lounge to enter the venue, Dulles didn't know who was in the lounge, so he pushed the door and went in.

When the Prime Minister saw Dulles come in, he was going to step forward and shake hands with him. As soon as he saw the prime minister, he turned and ran.

However, General Smith, deputy head of the American delegation, was very dissatisfied with Dulles' practice. He believes that even the enemy will shake hands and make peace after the armistice.

So he went to Premier Zhou.

Dulles had ordered not to shake hands with each other, so he reached out to Premier Zhou and put his hand on Premier Zhou's shoulder.

However, Wang Xiangtong did not attend the Geneva meeting that year. She recorded the memories of the parties.

Li, who attended the Geneva Conference and served as assistant to spokesperson Huang Hua, and later served as vice president of China Academy of Social Sciences and director of American Institute, told the author that he did not see the legendary "handshake" at the scene, but only heard many rumors afterwards.

Li believes that if Dulles meets head-on during the Geneva meeting, his courage and courtesy may make him reach out and prepare to shake hands with Dulles first.

Li pointed out that Americans have their own judgment as to whether to contact Dulles.

Zhou Enlai fell off his horse in Yan 'an and broke his right arm. The treatment failed to fully recover, and the right arm could not be straightened, so the right hand was always bent.

People who are not familiar with Zhou Enlai often think that his right hand gesture is to reach out and shake hands with each other.

At that time, several important assistants of Zhou Enlai basically denied the possibility of Dulles meeting Zhou Enlai head-on at the Palais des Nations.

China delegation secretary-general Wang Bingnan's memoir "Review of Nine Years of Sino-US Talks" was published in 1985, and the author wrote in the book:

It was said that Premier Zhou Enlai wanted to shake hands with Dulles during his stay in Geneva, but Dulles refused.

In fact, such a thing did not happen.

During the whole meeting, I was always by Premier Zhou's side.

At meetings, I always accompany Premier Zhou into the meeting.

I know in advance which door to enter and where the seat is.

I led the way, and Premier Zhou and members of the delegation followed me to my seat.

The seats in the venue are arranged according to the first word of the English name of each country.

CHINA's China, C comes first, and the United States' USA, U comes last. They are with the Soviet delegation, which is far away from us.

There are several entrances to the conference hall of the League of Nations Building. We and the American delegation did not enter the conference hall through the same door, so it is impossible to meet.

There is a 15 minute break in the middle of the meeting. Members of the delegation can have snacks, coffee, tea and alcohol in restaurants and bars. Our delegation never gets together with American Watch.

At that time, the Prime Minister was very cautious and rigorous, Dulles was a firm leader, and the Prime Minister never wanted to shake hands with him, so there was no possibility that the Prime Minister's initiative to shake hands was rejected, both objectively and subjectively.

Wang Bingnan's reason is very good, it is not clear whether Wang Bingnan's explanation is aimed at Johnson's memory.

If there is any room, it may be that it has been 30 years since he wrote this passage, and many memories have been washed away by the tide of time.

In addition, he can also discuss whether there is a motive to shake hands with Zhou Enlai, because Wang Bingnan himself wrote in the same memoir:

Of course, in hostile situations, it is not absolutely impossible to shake hands.

I remember an unpleasant thing that happened before.

The American military attache in Denmark is drinking in a military club. He offered to shake hands with our military attache, but he was rejected on the spot, which embarrassed the host and embarrassed the Americans.

This matter is reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and I will handle it myself.

Later, after discussing with the Prime Minister, the Ministry leaders stipulated that our diplomats should not be so straightforward in public in the future. First, we will not take the initiative to shake hands with Americans. Second, if they take the initiative to shake hands, we will not refuse.

So, on the question of "shaking hands", it was China who refused to go first, so he made plans when he went to Geneva.

Xiong Xianghui, a participant in the Geneva Conference and later assistant to the Prime Minister, agreed with Wang Bingnan.

He published an article "Rumors about Dulles' Refusal to Shake Hands with Zhou Enlai" in the 4th issue of 1997 Centennial Tide, recalling that Aidan walked through the conference hall and shook hands with Molotov after the first meeting of the Geneva Conference on the afternoon of April 26th.

At this time, Molotov introduced Zhou Enlai to Aidan, Aidan immediately held out his hand to Zhou Enlai, and the foreign ministers of the two countries warmly shook hands.

After the meeting, Humphrey Humphrey Trevelyan, a member of the British delegation and Chargé d 'affaires of the British Embassy in China, found his acquaintance, a member of the China delegation and director of the Western Europe and Africa Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China.

Humphrey Humphrey Trevelyan said that Foreign Minister Eden had an idea that before or after the second meeting, Eden would introduce Dulles to Enlai and shake hands with each other.

If Premier Zhou Enlai agrees, Aiden will send someone to consult Deuce.

Official villages and towns asked Zhou Enlai for instructions.

Zhou Enlai replied that he appreciated Foreign Minister Aidan's idea. Since we are meeting together, we should contact each other.

He is willing to shake hands with Mr. Dulles through Mr. Aidan's introduction.

This is an important signal that Zhou Enlai intends to break the deadlock in its relations with the United States in Geneva.

If Dulles accepts this proposal, many pages of this chapter on Sino-US relations will not look like this in the future.

However, Humphrey Humphrey Trevelyan found the official townsman the next morning and said that Mr Dulles had made a statement and he refused to shake hands with Zhou Enlai.

Xiong Xianghui recalled: "Is there such a situation that Zhou Enlai and Dulles met during the meeting, and Zhou Enlai offered his hand and Dulles refused? I can say for sure,no. "

Li Yueran, a participant in the Geneva Conference, also pointed out to the author that Dulles refused to shake hands with Zhou Zhou at that time.

However, the narrative or paraphrase of this incident has appeared in a large number of diplomatic history works, which has become a remarkable event in the normalization of Sino-US relations.

Zhou Enlai himself talked about this many times in his conversations with foreign guests, even when he made a major report.

For example, he said at the national diplomatic conference on April 5, 1958/kloc-0: "We can't be as stupid as Deuce. There is also a rule in Geneva: no shaking hands."

Perhaps nothing impressed me more than President Nixon's first visit to China.

1February, 972, on his way to Beijing, he told the staff around him six times that they should not follow him out of the hatch when the plane arrived at Beijing Capital Airport, and let the President of the United States shake hands with Zhou Enlai alone to make up for Dulles' rudeness.

1972 February 2 1 day, Mr. and Mrs. Nixon stepped down the gangway after "Air Force One" landed in Beijing.

At this moment, Zhou Enlai is waiting for him in the cold wind.

Nixon wrote in his memory: "I know that Foster Dulles refused to shake hands with Zhou Enlai at the 1954 Geneva meeting, which made him deeply insulted.

So, when I finished the gangway, I decided to reach out and walk towards him.

When our hands shake hands, one era ends and another begins. "At the 1954 Geneva Conference, Nixon served as the vice president of the United States, and his memory of this matter is always well-founded.

In order to find out what happened, the author of this book carefully searched in the National Archives of the United States, and then carefully read the Collection of American Foreign Relations Documents: Documents of the Geneva Conference compiled by the State Council. He is willing to say responsibly that there is no file to prove that this happened.

In fact, whether the details of "handshake" exist or not will not affect Zhou Enlai's personality strength, Zhou Enlai's image or people's judgment on the US policy toward China at that time.

Dulles ignored the attitude of the representative of China, which made the opportunity for the United States and China to shake hands at the Geneva meeting disappear. China and the United States continued to isolate and confront each other until Zhou Enlai and Nixon made up for this isolation in the future. It was the 1970s.

From a macro point of view, Dulles is unwilling to shake hands with Premier Zhou of China, and this "statement" itself has historical authenticity.

Therefore, after the Geneva Conference, "handshake" really became the symbolic vocabulary of Sino-US relations.