200 articles look at Meituan’s 8-year strategy

This article actually originated from the homework of the White Crow course: drawing the overall system diagram of Meituan. In order to complete my homework, I read the articles in the media reports column on Meituan’s official website. There are currently 31 pages, and I have read about 5 articles on each page. In addition to searching for articles from competitors, I have read more than 200 articles in one day. articles.

After sorting out the route of Meituan from its launch to the present, I found that the step-by-step strategy of Meituan, which has experienced thousands of regiments, is really exciting, and it can definitely make an annual drama. In addition, I share some of my own thoughts with you.

2010.3-2011.10

With the success of Groupon, domestic followers launched the first batch of group buying websites in March 2010. Most of them opened in Beijing first and then expanded to other cities. Group buying at that time followed the Groupon model, where one product was purchased per day.

From the beginning, Lashou.com became the number one in the industry at an extremely fast speed.

Quoted from 2011.11 Chuangye.net "Why is Lashou.com so "popular""

Wu Bo, the founder of Lashou.com, believes that "the only martial arts in the world that cannot be broken is fast", and quickly opened the city and obtained financing ,hiring. I want to gain market share in a very short time, raise funds and go public, and become the leader.

At the same time, Meituan did not choose such a radical play style. (Of course they didn’t get much money at that time.) In June 2010, when Lashou.com reached 100 cities, Meituan only opened in less than 10 cities.

Later, capital went crazy for a time and staged a battle of thousands of regiments.

Quoted from 2018.3.23 36kr "The ups and downs of China's O2O life in fifteen years, where is the way back?" 》

The homogeneity of group buying is serious, so Wu Bo chose to use advertising to build his brand. In December 2010, Lashou.com received a Series B investment of US$50 million. Starting around November of that year, Lashou.com launched subway advertisements in Beijing and Shanghai and started an advertising campaign with Group Buying Network. At that time, Gaopeng.com, Manzuo.com, and Nuomi.com, a subsidiary of Renren.com (which was still a big player at the time), all carried out a large amount of advertising.

In April 2011, Lashou.com received a Series C investment of US$110 million. Immediately afterwards, Ge You was signed as the spokesperson and a batch of advertisements were launched. It can be seen that when Wu Bo received investment, he invested in advertising.

Meituan has also wavered. It was reported at the time that the advertising budget was over 100 million. But in the end I didn’t choose to advertise.

At the end of October 2011, Lashou.com’s IPO in the United States failed. This incident gave a big blow to domestic group buying investors, and was followed by a capital cold wave (the reason will not be explored in detail. It is said that all the Chinese concept stocks listed in those years fell below the issue price, and Chinese concept stocks were not favored. .), many group buying websites (yes, this is still the PC-based era) have closed down at this time.

By around December 2011, there were only three top group buying companies: Lashou, Meituan, and Wowotuan. Monthly sales exceed 200 million, the so-called "200 million club".

There are two points at this stage that I find very interesting.

| What about the "fast but never broken" promise?

Isn’t this almost regarded as the iron law of Internet success?

In the Thousand Regiments War, the articles have similar views on why Meituan has survived, including making money to survive the cold winter without advertising, emphasizing technology to improve operational efficiency, emphasizing users and launching many service policies, etc. None of it has anything to do with "fast", it's all about cultivating internal strength.

In fact, I think there is nothing wrong with Wu Bo’s thinking. If the IPO had not failed, the group buying pattern might have been rewritten. Although the problem of insufficient internal strength will eventually be exposed, there may still be time to solve it.

But when we use the "fast but not broken" strategy, we should also pay attention to the nature of this business. Is it suitable for a 100-meter sprint, a marathon, or something else? If it is a marathon, then while you have the mindset of seeking speed, you should also pay attention to cultivating your internal strength, especially if you cannot rely on various fathers and have money to let you play as you like.

Just like Bai Ya said when group buying first came out:

Quoted from 2010.4.8? Sina.com "Wang Xing: Entrepreneurship is to predict the future"

< p> | How did Wang Xing maintain his own rhythm when the outside world was so crazy?

Zhang Tao of Dianping said

Quoted from 2016.11.9 36kr "Dianping Zhang Tao: Past successful experiences may become the source of your failure in the next step"

After checking, Dianping raised US$100 million for the first time in April 2011. This was indeed the time when group buying was heavily advertised.

As mentioned earlier, Wang Xing had also wavered and once released news that the advertising budget was more than 100 million. But he did not get lost in the end, and he must have withstood the pressure from both internal and external sources.

While everyone is spending money on advertising, thinking this is a game to quickly seize the market, he can see clearly where the key points of this business are and continue to open cities and provide services at his own pace.

No matter how crazy the outside world deviates from the essence, maintain the judgment of the essence of things and take a lonely road that will not see results in the short term. Sometimes, especially with a marathon business, it really matters.

Let’s sort out the time when Meituan and Lashou received financing and what they did. You can take a look at what they did when they got the money, and how they played when they had money and when they had no money. .

2011.10-2015.10

In February 2012, Meituan launched Maoyan Movies (called Meituan Movies at the time). In March, monthly sales exceeded 300 million for the first time. In August, monthly sales exceeded 580 million, ranking first in the industry. In September, the top five companies at that time included Dianping and Nuomi.com in addition to the three mentioned above.

In 2013, hotel group purchasing was launched. In May, we will expand into third- and fourth-tier cities. In 2013, Meituan’s movie tickets accounted for 50% of the group-buying movie ticket market, and hotel group-buying accounted for 70% of the market.

In 2014, layout takeaway. In May, it received a Series C investment of US$300 million. Spend heavily on advertising in June. At that time, it probably accounted for 55% of the group buying market.

In January 2015, it received a D-round financing of US$700 million. In October, it merged with Dianping, the second largest company in the industry. Since then, he has truly established himself as the leader in group buying.

What I am interested in at this stage is:

What did Meituan do to break out of the siege when there were only 3 players left?

What are the criteria for selecting vertical industries?

The market share in 2014 was 55%. Aren’t you already winning? Why are you advertising again?

Why is 2013 the time to do vertical business? Why is the focus not on Kaicheng?

| What did Meituan do to break out when there were only 3 players left?

As can be seen from the figure, there were still three "200 million clubs" in 2011. Starting from March 2012, Meituan's sales maintained rapid growth for several months, and eventually became the third "200 million club". one.

There are not many business strategies or product strategies in the articles at this stage, but we saw that at the end of 2011, the former Alibaba B2B Vice President Gan Jiawei was appointed as COO. He helped Meituan establish a Support the ground and push the iron army. Maybe the main reason is this.

| What are the criteria for selecting vertical industries?

An article in 2014 said that at that time, the scale of the catering industry was about one trillion, the scale of weddings was 800 billion, the scale of hotels and KTV was almost 300 billion, and the scale of movies was tens of billions.

Then why did Meituan first choose smaller movies instead of weddings and KTV when choosing vertical industries?

In this regard, Wang Huiwen, the second-in-command of Meituan, said this:

Quoted from Sohu.com’s “Meituan-Dianping’s new ***Xiang Auto Capital Market Interpretation Super” on November 18, 2017 "Platform Value"

This answer is indeed a bit too broad.... So I guess they think weddings and KTV will not change much in the short term...

| 2014 The annual market share is 55%. Aren’t you already winning? Why do you advertise again?

When and how to advertise is very particular. During the Thousand Regiments War, Wang Xing did not spend large-scale money on offline advertising, but focused on precise online advertising. (Of course, it was mainly because there was no money at the time...) In the early days, there was no rush to establish a brand, but focused on word-of-mouth marketing. In fact, group buying was still a new thing at that time, and advertising heavily at that time was equivalent to helping competitors educate users.

By 2014, although the market share was 55%, it had just become the leader and had to widen the gap with the second tier! (Of course it’s also because of the money...)

Quoted from 2014.5.21 donews? "Meituan has shown its kingly power: It’s time to spend money on advertising!" 》

| Why is 2013 the time to do vertical business? Why is the focus not on Kaicheng?

I don’t know this question, please ask the master to answer it...

2015.10 - Present

In January 2016, Meituan Takeout accounted for 32.3% of the takeout market share . In February, the home decoration division was established. In April, Maoyan Films became an independent company.

In February 2017, Meituan Taxi Hailing was launched in Nanjing. In April, Meituan Travel was launched.

In December 2017, the organizational structure was adjusted. The business groups are divided into:

New in-store business group: in-store catering, catering ecology, in-store comprehensive payment, etc.

Large retail business group: takeout, fresh food, etc.

Travel Division

Original Hotel and Tourism Business Group

In March 2018, Meituan Taxi Hailing was launched in Shanghai.

It’s so tough. I have only one question:

| Why does Meituan do everything and do it well? < /p>

After sorting out Meituan Chuan, we mainly looked at its business strategy, and then let’s talk about product strategy.

| Only one product is launched every day. Why was it possible when group buying first emerged, but not now?

The question that arises from this is actually: when do we need to give users appropriate restrictions, and when do we give him freedom of choice? Just like around November 2010, some people tried this model: users put forward demands and let merchants customize goods into groups. Why not?

I don’t have a good answer yet, so I think I can write a separate article~

| When will we talk about user stickiness?

When Lashou.com was first launched, it adopted the model of groupon + foursquare. I don’t know how many people still remember the latter, which was a very popular sign-in app at the time. Wu Bo is quite proud of his invention. It is believed that group buying users are not sticky, but check-in can stick to users very well.

Let’s not talk about whether check-in can really enhance stickiness. Generally speaking, we always think that a function is good if it can make users more sticky. But in some cases, the priority of user stickiness is not that high.

First, look at what value the product provides. Group buying offers low prices and convenience. Users are not easy to be sticky. As long as there are cheaper and more convenient (or simply cheaper) products, users may leave. Secondly, look at the stage of the business. In the early days of group buying, the most important thing is the user scale, and user stickiness is not that important.

Then there is the issue of short-term stickiness and long-term stickiness. In the short term, it still depends on price. Interesting behavioral incentives such as check-ins are not as effective as price. Looking at long-term stickiness, it still depends on basic services, ease of use, etc.

Finally, here are a few more crossfires. When looking at the history of the Internet, one is always caught off guard with a sense of age:

"I forgot where I quoted it from, it doesn't matter."

Mentioned

Reference materials:

2011.11 Chuangye.com? "Why is Lashou.com so "popular""? /a/20110111/182093.html

2018.3.23 36kr "The ups and downs of China's O2O life in fifteen years, where is the way back?" 》/i/2010-04-08/16384034544.shtml

2016.11.9 36kr "Dianping Zhang Tao: Past successful experiences may become the source of your failure in the next step"/p/5056147. html

2017.11.18 Sohu.com "Meituan-Dianping adds ***Xiang Auto Capital Market to interpret the value of super platform"/a/205188953_579461

2014.5.21 donews? "Meituan Already showing his royal aura: It’s time to advertise! 》/idonews/article/3024.shtm