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1, Albania failed, and the most fundamental thing was that it failed in strategic decision-making mistakes again and again.

Strategic decision-making is a decision, strategy and method made on major issues related to the overall situation of the war, such as the combat object, strategic policy, strategic direction, strategic task and strategic deployment, and it is the fundamental task to guide the war. However, on this fundamental issue, Albanian leaders made a series of mistakes. This series of mistakes is reflected in the wishful thinking of the pre-war strategic situation and the serious underestimation of the response of Britain and the international community. The dispute over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands has a long history. Although the previous negotiations between the two sides made little progress, they also achieved some results. Albania is eager to solve the Falklands issue by force, not only because Falklands discovered oil in the 1970s, but also its economic value greatly increased. More importantly, it wants to solve the Falklands problem, pass on the domestic crisis and ease domestic contradictions. This strategic attempt itself is very reckless and risky. Albania estimates that Britain is far from the ocean, beyond its reach, and will not fight for Falklands; The United States cannot support the British side and can only remain neutral at most; NATO countries have their own affairs and will not mind their own business. It is based on this unrealistic strategic judgment that Albania is blindly optimistic, overconfident, lucky, and lacks adequate combat preparation. It naturally backfires when it rashly decides to send troops to Falklands. When the war broke out, not only Britain responded quickly, but also the United States actively provided military assistance to Britain. NATO also imposed a military embargo and economic sanctions on Afghanistan. Because Argentina has not established its own defense industrial system, its weapons and equipment mainly depend on imports. The western arms embargo has caused Argentina's weapons and equipment to be unable to be replenished and repaired in time, and its subsequent strike capability has been greatly weakened. This also shows from one side that a country's military equipment is completely supplied by other countries, and it is absolutely unreliable to pin the hope of safeguarding national security on others.

2. Secondly, Albania overestimates its weak military strength and is seriously inadequate for war preparation. Although the Afghan army is strong, it hasn't fought for more than 100 years, and half of the island-guarding troops participating in the war are recruits who have been trained for less than three or four months. They have not received adaptive training in cold island operations, and their physique is weak, so it is difficult to adapt to the battlefield environment. The command ability of officers is low, and some officers don't even have the minimum military knowledge, don't know how to organize anti-landing operations, and even send messages in plain code. This is in sharp contrast with the British army, which is mainly professional soldiers and has rich combat experience. In the case of underestimating the enemy and overestimating itself, the combat readiness of the Afghan army is seriously inadequate both mentally and materially, especially the material reserves of the officers and men guarding the island. Coupled with operational consumption and British blockade, the logistics supply of the Afghan army has become a difficult problem to solve.

3. The mistakes in Albania's strategic decision-making are also manifested in improper strategic deployment after the outbreak of war. When Britain made a strong response to send troops, Albania made mistakes in judging Britain's attempt, strategic direction, surrounding environment and battlefield situation, so the deployment of troops ran counter to it. Albania thought the British would attack Albania, fearing that neighboring Chile would take advantage of the fire to rob it. Therefore, Albania used a large number of troops for mainland defense, which greatly weakened its combat strength in the Falklands region. The deployment of troops in the Falklands Theater is also seriously unbalanced, too scattered, and lacks organic connection with each other, failing to form an annular, three-dimensional, contradictory and flexible overall defense system. Coupled with the disunity of the Afghan armed forces' operational thinking, fragmentation, passive strategy and tactics, and mechanical rigidity, Afghanistan's wrong strategic deployment is even worse.

A series of mistakes made by Albania in strategic decision-making made the balance of war victory tilt to the British army again and again. The mistake of strategic decision-making is the biggest mistake. The lesson of Albania reminds us that only by putting the actual situation of the enemy and ourselves in politics, economy, military affairs, diplomacy, science and technology, history and geography in a specific domestic and international environment and making a comprehensive, dialectical and scientific analysis and comparison can we make a correct judgment and choice. This is not only the starting point and key of war strategic guidance, but also the most fundamental problem that determines the outcome of the war, which must be highly valued.

reference/mil/20 12-04/29/c _ 123048646 . htm