Why did the Kuomintang 74th Division fall?

The Battle of Meng Lianggu was a key battle to change the war situation in East China. China * * * East China Field Army, the People's Liberation Army, with 270,000 people against about 450,000 national troops. In three days, the People's Liberation Army defeated the 74th Division in an area heavily guarded by the national army, and won the head score of the enemy general Zhang Ling, declaring victory.

It is understood that the 74th Division of the Kuomintang was one of the five main forces of the Kuomintang at that time, equipped with American machinery and equipment. It was an A-class equipment division and model designated by Chiang Kai-shek, but it was completely annihilated in this battle. What is the amazing truth? China Historical Network (www.lishi.com) Bian Xiao announces it for everyone.

The truth was annihilated by the Kuomintang 74th Division in the Battle of Meng Lianggu.

1in March, 947, Chiang Kai-shek concentrated his forces in the liberated areas of northern Shaanxi and Shandong in an attempt to occupy northern Shaanxi and Shandong first, then North China and Northeast China, and then all China. On the battlefield in Shandong, more than 400,000 troops were concentrated in Xuzhou, under the command of Gu. Three mobile regiments, Tang,, and Ou Zhen, went north along the Lintai Line in an attempt to annihilate the main force of the East China Field Army in Yimeng Mountain area. In order to smash the key attack of the Kuomintang army on the Shandong Liberated Area, Chen Yi and Su Yu carefully arranged and began to fight against it. At that time, the Kuomintang troops attacking the liberated areas in Shandong were quite concentrated. In order to avoid being divided and annihilated in the attack, the policy of "close together intensively, strengthen maintenance, slow and steady, and gradually advance" was adopted.

In order to mobilize the Kuomintang troops and force them to split up in the mobile warfare, in the more than one month from the beginning of April to the beginning of May in 1947, Su Yu made five plans to mobilize the national army, directing the troops from south to north and from east to west, and inducing them to March back and forth for more than 1000 kilometers, which greatly consumed and confused the Kuomintang troops and eventually led to the Tang of the First Corps. Therefore, he ordered all the ministries under his jurisdiction to launch an all-round attack, with the 74th Division as the main assault force, from Huaiyin to Linyi in southern Shandong, serving as a pioneer and attacking Mengyin. In order to ensure the safety of the 74th Division, Tang also placed the 25th Division of Huang BGF and the 83rd Division of Huang BGF on its left and right sides respectively, guarding its defense line. The 74th Division quickly occupied Tancheng, Xintai and Mengyin, and occupied Huangluzhai, Sanjiaoshan, Yangjiazhai and Meng Lianggu from Duozhuang on May 1 1, with the vanguard pointing to Tanbu, where the headquarters of the East China Field Army is located. As the Kuomintang army plans to make a central breakthrough in the East China Field Army, the situation of the 74th Division, which is the main attack on the middle road, is bound to be slightly prominent, thus making the 25th Division and the 83rd Division, which were originally on the same line, fall behind slightly, creating favorable fighters for Hua Ye to encircle the 74th Division. But before the battle started, the two wings were less than 10 km away from the 74th Division.

Based on the comprehensive analysis of all kinds of information collected, according to the development of the war situation, Su Yu decided to use the central counter-breakthrough to deal with the central breakthrough of the national army, and adopted the tactics of frontal counter-attack, wedging into the wings, cutting off the retreat and blocking reinforcements from all walks of life, so that the 74th Division was separated from the national army heavy group and surrounded by it. Fighters are scarce and fleeting. Surrounding the 74th Division was a decision made by Chen and Su in a short time. On the evening of May 1 1, the movement of the 74th Division was found out, and at noon on May 12, the operational order to surround the 74th Division was officially issued.

The East China Field Army wedged 1 and 8 columns into the junction of the left and right sides of the 74th Division, took Lushan in a roundabout way, attacked Duozhuang joint venture with 6 columns, cut off its retreat, carried out frontal assault with 4 and 9 columns, and blocked and contained Laiwu 5 Army and Xintai 65 reorganization with 2, 7, 3 and 10 columns respectively. At this point, the 74th division commander Zhang soon understood Su Yu's plan to panic in the air.

However, although the People's Liberation Army was surrounded at that time, Zhang, with 32,000 troops from 74 divisions and rich combat experience, could meet the 83rd or 25th division of the Kuomintang Army as long as he turned left or right, because the division was less than 10 km away from these two divisions. Once we meet one of them, Zhang's danger will be relieved, and the PLA under Su Yu's command will not be so easy to panic in the 74th Division. What's more, more than 400,000 troops of the Kuomintang army are mostly in the surrounding lOO and will come at any time.

Therefore, after discovering that Su Yu's troops had a tendency to camp, Zhang did not leave quickly. In the face of danger, he made the decision of "playing along", withdrew his troops to the nearest Meng Lianggu, and actively surrounded himself by the People's Liberation Army. Zhang fantasized about making the 74th Division a "bait". While the People's Liberation Army surrounded him with 65,438+10,000 troops, 400,000 Kuomintang troops surrounded the People's Liberation Army from the outside.

Zhang believes that there are hundreds of thousands of Kuomintang troops around him, ranging from 10 km to more than 100 km. It only takes them a day or two to drive to Meng Lianggu at most. With the powerful military strength of the 74th Division and the steep mountains in Meng Lianggu, it is not a problem to stay here for a day or two. He believes that as long as the Kuomintang troops from all directions come around, his 74th Division can not only clear the gap, but also achieve the effect of "central flowering", enabling the Kuomintang troops to create a miracle of victory for the East China People's Liberation Army to panic in Chen Yi and Su Yu in Meng Lianggu.

It can be seen that Zhang Zhi took the initiative to be besieged, with the purpose of containing Su Yu's main force and making more than 400,000 troops from the peripheral yellow, yellow, yellow and other departments form a greater anti-encirclement of the PLA. Because from this distance, within two days, its reinforcements can completely reach Meng Lianggu.

With the entry of Zhang's army, the nature and significance of this battle have changed greatly. Chiang Kai-shek immediately understood the intention of Zhang's "central flowering" and saw that it was an excellent opportunity to fight a decisive battle with the East China People's Liberation Army under the command of Chen Yi and Su Yu. He said happily: "It is a rare opportunity to seize the main force of the Lu army, and we must make great contributions in the battle." Therefore, on the one hand, he ordered Zhang to hold his ground and attract the main force of the PLA. On the other hand, he ordered the 10 reorganization division around him, especially Huang's troops, to try their best to support the reorganization of the 74th division, with a view to gathering the East China People's Liberation Army.

As can be seen from the above, under the careful command of Chen and Su, the East China Field Army was highly mobile, and finally created a favorable fighter surrounded by the 74th Division.

Although the situation of the 74th Division, the main attack on the middle road, was slightly prominent, it created opportunities for the encirclement of the East China Field Army. However, after discovering Su Yu's intention, Zhang was able to get close to the 25th or 83rd Division of the Kuomintang Army and jumped out of the encirclement. However, he did not retreat, but took the initiative to be besieged, in order to fight a "central flowering" annihilation war and achieve the goal of encirclement and suppression of the East China Field Army.

Zhang, who has experienced the war, may be arrogant, but he will never make the big mistake of going into the war alone. Later, Su Yu clearly pointed out that "Zhang is a battle-hardened star. How could he make such a low-level mistake? Zhang's so-called going deep alone is actually a strategy to lure the enemy deep. " "Fighters did not appear naturally, but were created by our army through appropriate command and extensive maneuvers to induce the enemy to respond."

As the commander-in-chief who commanded the annihilation of the 74th Division at that time, this statement was the most obvious. In later articles, the East China Field Army captured Meng Lianggu soldiers, saying that they were reorganized by the 74th Division and delivered to the door alone. This statement does not conform to the reality of the battlefield. It does not reflect the foresight and campaign decisions of the generals of the East China Field Army, nor does it reflect the movement of the Kuomintang army and the operational intention of "central flowering". The above statement may be due to ignorance of the manufacturing and capture process of fighters. It imagines the battlefield situation according to the traditional tactics usually adopted by the PLA. That's not enough. Zhang is so stupid.

Fighting hard and blocking wars, Yimeng battlefields abound. The People's Liberation Army, Wang Paijun and Meng Lianggu did not have Chiang's reinforcements.

Chen Yi and Su Zhenyuan wanted to annihilate the 74th Division in the movement, but Zhang took the initiative to be besieged. They also went to Meng Lianggu, ready to ask for help. The danger coincides with the fighter plane. In front of the East China Field Army, there are only two outcomes at once: either quickly destroy the 74th Division, or get stuck by the 74th Division, and the more than 400,000 troops surrounded by it will be hit hard. Under the present situation, it is obvious that the 65,438+10,000 people in Hua Ye, Su Yu surrounded Zhang's 74th Division with more than 30,000 people, but strategically it was surrounded by more than 400,000 Kuomintang troops. If we can't strike hard, the Kuomintang army's "central flowering" plot will succeed, and the consequences will be unimaginable! This grim situation shows that it is not easy to annihilate the 74th Division. To win the battle, it depends not only on whether the encirclement and suppression of the 74th Division can quickly solve the battle, but also on whether the resistance forces can stop the reinforcements. This requires the PLA to annihilate the 74th Division as soon as possible at all costs before the arrival of Kuomintang reinforcements.

The fighting began in May 13. After two days of life-and-death fighting on May 14 and June 15, although the People's Liberation Army captured some hills next to the main peak, Zhang Zhuli still resisted in the main peak, and the fighting was extremely tragic. Thousands of bloody bodies lie on the Meng Lianggu. The casualties of the PLA column attacking the mountainous area are also considerable, and it is difficult to replenish ammunition. In addition, the situation of the surrounding Kuomintang troops heading for Meng Lianggu also made our army's morale very tense. Therefore, some commanders of the headquarters and subordinate columns of the East China Field Army have raised the question: Under such circumstances, if a long-term attack is impossible, whether to withdraw from Meng Lianggu reluctantly to ensure that the army will not fall into encirclement. Su Yu, who came to the front command post for command, naturally understood the seriousness of the current war situation: both the possibility of victory and the possibility of failure were close to the critical line of the probability of winning or losing. At this time, the only factor that can make the battle situation biased towards victory or defeat is the morale of both sides, and the most important thing is the confidence and command efficiency of the commander in the decisive battle.

At this critical moment, Su Yu decisively ordered that no one should retreat! Chen Yi also announced three battlefield disciplines of "dismissal, investigation and beheading", and investigated the responsibility of dereliction of duty. And it is strictly ordered that all columns must make all sacrifices, capture Meng Lianggu within 24 hours, annihilate the number of casualties in each column of the 74 th Division, and ensure the organizational system after the battle; At the same time, it broke the tradition that the PLA only fought big battles at night to hide Kuomintang planes and tanks, and continued to attack on 16 during the day.

Admittedly, the 74th Division is not in the right place to climb the mountain, and Meng Lianggu is full of granite, so it is impossible to build fortifications. All the soldiers guarding the mountain were exposed to the shooting range of the People's Liberation Army. Needless to say, this strange rock full of mountains has also become an excellent bunker for mountain attackers, leaving the mountain defenders with no open shooting range. This is a taboo in defending the war. In Zhang 74 Division, the dominant US artillery is mostly water-cooled, but stony and waterless, so the firepower advantage cannot be exerted. As for those cars, heavy artillery and tanks, they can't be taken up the mountain, but they are just a bunch of exhibits.

Therefore, the so-called Meng Lianggu risk, for the 74th Division, is not "easy to defend but difficult to attack" as some people say, but "easy to defend but difficult to attack". However, if Zhang wants to achieve "central flowering", he must go up the mountain and take the initiative to let his 32,000 troops be besieged by the People's Liberation Army, because the whole core requirement of his tactics is to hope that more than 400,000 Kuomintang troops around him can be besieged within two days. In this way, not only his 74th Division can be easily wiped out, but the Kuomintang army can also achieve a great victory in destroying the East China Field Army. Because, according to common sense, all the Kuomintang troops less than 10 km can arrive in a day or two. Therefore, the success or failure of Zhang's campaign lies not in the 74th division going up the mountain, but mainly in whether the 400,000-odd Kuomintang troops can come in two days. Once the reinforcements used by the Kuomintang to counter the encirclement and suppression are not in place, I and his tactics will only die.

However, it was not until the afternoon of 16 that the 74th Division was destroyed. Except for Li Tianxia, the commander of the 83rd Division of the Kuomintang, who was forced by Chiang Kai-shek to symbolically "rescue" the 57th Regiment with the weakest fighting capacity, there were no other Kuomintang troops in Meng Lianggu. Zhang inferred from common sense that as long as he persisted for a day or two, the Kuomintang troops around him might come in anyway, and he did persist for nearly three days. However, even on the third day, the Kuomintang reorganized the fifth army and was contained in Laiwu; 1 1 Division reorganization was blocked in the northwest of Mengyin; The BGF 65th Division and the BGF 25th Division were blocked in Cao Zhuang, themoon and jiepai. The Seventh Army and the reorganized 48th Division were refused to stay in Tian and Bizishan. That is, the 83rd Division and 25th Division, which were less than 10 km, did not arrive, so that the PLA not only did not have time to attack Meng Lianggu and destroy the main force of the 74th Division, but also did not have time to withdraw from the battlefield, because the number of annihilated enemies was not enough to count 32,000 (the number of soldiers in the 74th Division), and then returned to the battlefield and captured more than 7,000 scattered soldiers in hiding. Then, the PLA was mighty and calmly evacuated.

To sum up, it can be seen that although the 74th Division did not occupy the land, it persisted for nearly three days in the face of the siege of 65,438+10,000 troops. Because according to Zhang's original idea, as long as the 74th Division can persist for two days, reinforcements can arrive and the goal of "central flowering" can be realized. The 74th Division's goal of sticking to the top of the mountain for two days has been fully realized. It can be seen that whether Zhang went up the mountain or not has nothing to do with the success or failure of the battle between the two sides. It was precisely because the Kuomintang reinforcements did not come for more than two days that the 74th Division collapsed and Zhang and his tactics failed. Therefore, in a sense, it can be said that the downfall of the 74th Division was not due to the fact that the 74th Division went up the mountain, nor was it unable to fight.

Putting the blame for the failure of the 74th Division on the dead Zhang is what Gu, Tang and others did at the Kuomintang military review meeting after the collapse of the 74th Division.

The reinforcements are full of contradictions, their actions are uncoordinated and their rescue is weak. Before the people entered the war, the army and the people fought tenaciously, and Song won.

As long as the Kuomintang reinforcements can drive to Meng Lianggu in two days, the 74th Division will not die. Few people raise objections. Then why are the reinforcements so weak? What caused the reinforcements not to reach the designated position?

On this issue, Guo Rugui, then director of the Third Hall of the Kuomintang Ministry of National Defense, wrote in his diary: "I think this defeat is very strange from a purely military point of view. The friendly forces on the left and right wings of Gai 74 Division are five or six kilometers away. Why can't it be reinforced in three days? " "The troops are so uncoordinated and the combat effectiveness is so poor that there is no other way but to fail." Here, Guo Rugui only saw the reasons why the Kuomintang reinforced himself.

The Kuomintang army itself does have some problems. There are many contradictions among generals and uncoordinated operations. Most officers regard their troops as the capital for promotion and wealth, and it is difficult for all troops to help each other in the same boat. The 83rd division commander was secretly pleased to see Zhang surrounded. Instead of saving, he led the 83rd Division to retreat. Under the strict orders of Jiang and Tang, a company was sent to the west bank of Yishui to pretend to support. Later, under Chiang Kai-shek's strict orders, the 57th regiment nearest to the 74th division was sent for reinforcements, but he personally telephoned the colonel and immediately retreated in case of emergency. Huang is not very enthusiastic about starting to rescue the 74th Division. After repeated urging by Chiang Kai-shek and Tang, he sent troops to support him. Although the 25th Division spared no effort to carry out Chiang's orders and tried its best to support the 74th Division, at that time, the People's Liberation Army had completely controlled the strategic location of tianmashan, and the reinforcements of the 25th Division were blocked and could not move. Because most Kuomintang officers put the preservation of political power first, and each had his own ulterior motives, Jiang Tang made repeated requests, and reinforcements from all walks of life could not get to the rescue in time.

The failure of the Kuomintang reinforcements to reinforce the 74th Division in time is by no means solely the responsibility of the Kuomintang itself. Another important reason why the Kuomintang reinforcements could not come should be found from the full support of the PLA and the people in the liberated areas for this campaign.

In stark contrast to the Kuomintang army, the PLA is United from top to bottom and United as one. All participating troops cooperate closely and unite sincerely. At that time, four columns called for help, and the support forces struggled to stop the reinforcements of the Kuomintang army at all costs. With the existing field fortifications, the Kuomintang troops were defeated and charged again and again. Before the 74th Division was annihilated, reinforcements were not allowed to approach Meng Lianggu, which made a great contribution to the victory of the campaign. The victory of the Battle of Meng Lianggu was the result of close cooperation between the offensive forces and the resistance forces. As Chen Yi said at the summary meeting of the Battle of Menglianggu, "A great war of annihilation cannot be separated from the main attack and interception, which are often an inseparable part of the war of annihilation."

In this regard, the selfless support of the people in the 101 billion liberated areas has also played a great role.

First of all, the people's strong support in manpower and material resources in the liberated areas enabled the PLA to put most of its troops into the front line, which not only ensured the completion of the task of blocking reinforcements from all walks of life, but also enabled the PLA to concentrate on destroying the 74th Division in less than three days.

At that time, the nine columns of the PLA, including the resistance forces, relied mainly on the support of the people in the liberated areas for ammunition and supplies. Under the slogan of all for the front line and all for victory, the people in the liberated areas launched an unprecedented movement to support the front line. With amazing perseverance, they ensured the material supply of hundreds of thousands of troops. Tens of thousands of carts, cars, burdens and stretcher teams rushed to the front line to deliver materials and rescue the wounded. Zhucheng, Binhai, Mengshan, Zhong Yi, Jiaonan, Wuqiao and other places organized thousands of grain transport teams and stretcher teams. The grain delivery team's unicycle carries more than 200 kilograms of grain each. People bring their own dry food, no matter how hungry they are, they don't move rations, and they bring their own hemp fiber and mats in case it rains. Rain or shine, not afraid of enemy aircraft shooting, there are almost no grain delivery teams that can't finish the task all over the country. The stretcher team and the nursing team went in and out of the battlefield and braved the bullets to rescue the wounded. In this campaign, there were 76,000 migrant workers, second-line migrant workers154,000, and 690,000 temporary migrant workers. The support of the people consolidated and strengthened the superior position of the PLA in the campaign, and made great contributions to stopping the reinforcements of the Kuomintang and winning the victory of the whole campaign. As Chen Yi said, "The victory of the war was pushed out by the Shandong people in a small car." Facts have proved that such a large-scale and large-scale battle cannot be completely won without the selfless assistance of the people.

Secondly, the people not only give great support in manpower and material resources, but also fight guerrilla warfare and actively cooperate with the main force. Local armed forces laid guns and mines everywhere where the Kuomintang reinforcements went, leaving the Kuomintang army with nowhere to stay. When the Kuomintang reinforcements attacked, the people cleared the scene, evacuated their assets, buried food, and tightly blocked the news, so that the Kuomintang army could not get food and information. After the start of the campaign, local armed forces and guerrillas in central Shandong, southern Shandong and Binhai actively cooperated with the main forces to stop reinforcements. The local armed forces in central Shandong trained more than 0/000 blasting experts and organized more than 60 blasting teams to cooperate with the main forces in laying mines in Mengyin, Yishui, Dawenkou, Xintai and Qingzhou. Local armed forces in southern Shandong attacked Linzi Highway and cut off Lin Yong Highway, which not only cut off the two main supply lines of the Kuomintang army in the front line in central Shandong, but also contained the 25th Division of the Kuomintang.

It can be seen that without the strong support of the people, it is unthinkable to stop the attack of reinforcements from all walks of life of the Kuomintang and achieve complete victory in the battle.

Zhang Zai's "central flowering" tactics are not groundless. So it can't be realized because he only sees the good side of the war. Zhang, who has fought many battles, has always been overconfident. He believes that the 74th Division is an invincible "elite force", which is located in the favorable terrain of Mishima, and all kinds of reinforcements are close at hand. However, he ignored some problems existing in the Kuomintang army itself, forgot the common problems of internal contradictions and inability to cooperate in operations, and failed to see the strategizing of the generals of the production party, the tenacious struggle of the PLA soldiers and the selfless support of the broad masses of the people in the liberated areas.

From this point of view, the downfall of the 74th Division should be investigated from two aspects: the besieged division and the annihilated division. The 74th Division was besieged first and then annihilated. The generals of the East China Field Army, Chen and Su, planned the siege with one hand, carefully commanded and created and captured the fighters in time. But after discovering Su Yu's intention to panic in his own hands, Zhang was able to get close to the surrounding Kuomintang troops and jump out of the encirclement. But he didn't break through in time, but was besieged on his own initiative. It is simply impossible to fight a "central flowering" annihilation war and realize the goal of the Kuomintang army encircling the East China Field Army. The seventy-four division was wiped out, not because Zhang pulled the army up the mountain. The 74th Division did stick to the head of the Three Tianshan Mountains and achieved the goal of sticking to it for two days, only because the reinforcements were not in place within three days. The main reasons why the Kuomintang army is not in place are not only its own factors, but also the tenacious struggle of the People's Liberation Army and the strong support of the people in the liberated areas in manpower, material resources and military affairs.

From this point of view, the total annihilation of the 74th Division of the Kuomintang can be examined from two aspects.

First: the 74th Division was besieged.

The siege was carefully directed by Chen Yi and Su Yu, generals of the East China Field Army, creating an excellent captive reality. However, after Zhang found himself besieged, he did not break through in time. Instead, he was actively besieged and fantasized about a big annihilation war with a central flowering. The result can be imagined.

Second: The 74th Division was completely annihilated.

Three days after the Battle of Menglianggu, the national army reinforcements did not arrive on time, which was also the main reason for the encirclement and suppression of the 74th Division, and also because the PLA soldiers received strong support from the people in the liberated areas.

However, there is also a saying among the people that prisoners of war are rebellious.

Zhang once incorporated Lianshui's captured troops into the 74th Division. This matter was also known by Chiang Kai-shek. He personally prevented Zhang from doing so, but Zhang immediately refused and simply incorporated them into the 74th Division.

Many years later, Mao Sen, the spy chief who was in charge of the political security and security intelligence work of the Tang Corps at that time, recalled that the defection of the captured soldiers at the critical moment was the reason for the failure of the 74th Division.

According to the internet, it is these * * * army prisoners who stay in the trenches of Duozhuang. How many of these captured troops are there? According to Mao Sen, it's two thousand, but some people say it's six hundred.