Why is there no Samsung car in China?

1 Before that, a Chrysler car produced by Samsung Automobile in Zhanjiang, Guangdong Province, was not quite the same as the current Dajielong. This enterprise has gone out of business. At that time, the cars produced were basically smuggled and then assembled to play Samsung.

I know that it produced Mazda's MPV, Mitsubishi's space car and American Dodge's 7-seat car. This Samsung car is a Korean car company, which belongs to Renault-Nissan Group. Its cars are sold under the brand name of Renault-Nissan Group. For example, SM7 is a natural sound in China, and SM5 is the influence that Renault has just launched.

At the same time, Samsung also participated in the styling design and automobile research and development of Renault-Nissan Group. Samsung Automobile is the automobile company we know that Samsung was founded in 1993, but it was later acquired by Renault-Nissan Group. 3 lessons learned from behind closed doors 1. Introduction In the field of marketing, it is as important to study typical failure cases as classic success cases. Generally speaking, business leaders are most likely to make major mistakes when they create new business, innovate and change, make mergers and acquisitions, and face competitive pressure. You can know what not to do and what to do by studying the destructive symptoms behind failure-high-level illusion, wrong attitude, information system failure and unfavorable leadership style. By explaining why smart executives fail, we should finally understand how smart executives succeed. The story of Samsung's failure provides us with experience and lessons in this respect. Second, what is Samsung? Samsung is a noodle manufacturing company, which was founded in 1938 by its former president Li Bingzhe, with assets of only 30,000 won (US$ 30). The company's initial business development plan is the same as that of other chaebol in Korea, that is, to rapidly expand into the production and sales fields with minimum investment. Under the guidance of the traditional family consortium model, the company boldly went deep into every industry with opportunities, and made rapid development in the 1950s and 1960s. In the next decade, it entered new markets continuously, became the enterprise leader of South Korea, and finally became the number one manufacturer of semiconductor and electronic products in the world. 1987 After Li Bingzhe died, his son Lee Kun-hee took over as president of Samsung. 1988, at the 50th anniversary celebration of Samsung, the new president announced that he would rebuild the group, claiming to build Samsung into a world-class company in the 20th century. In fact, by 1999, Samsung had grown into the second largest enterprise in Korea, involving five different fields (electronics, machinery and heavy industry, chemistry, finance and others such as hotels, shopping malls and a theme park), with 16 1000 employees and an annual income of $93.5 billion. Li Jianxi, president of Samsung Group, announced that Samsung will soon join the automobile industry, which caused a wave of fluctuations in both state-owned and private automobile industries. South Korea's automobile industry has no new face for decades, and automobile manufacturing has been monopolized by Hyundai, Daewoo and Kia. 1993, when this decision was announced, Samsung group was thriving because of its best-selling integrated circuit chip in electronic products. Although they entered the business late, they have become the best in all industries they have set foot in. However, many people still doubt Li Jianxi's decision to join the automobile industry. Because he is a well-known car enthusiast, he has dreamed of making cars all his life, so business leaders, the press and even Samsung's own managers believe that joining the automobile industry is not so much a wise business decision as the result of Li Jianxi's personal fanaticism. As a Samsung manager said, "Lee Kun-hee, president of Samsung Group, is famous for his passion for cars. Many people think that there are more and better investment opportunities and it is unwise to join the automobile industry. " However, Li Jianxi firmly believes: "For the benefit of the country, we are about to launch Samsung. Since we promoted the country's development with electronic products and semiconductors in the 1970s and 1980s respectively, we should certainly lead the national economy with the automobile industry in the 1990s. " Despite opposition, Samsung's car-making plan has been carried out step by step. Amid doubts, the company launched the first batch of cars at 1998. However, the great influence of this group's automobile business will shock the world. No one-no matter its staunchest supporters or sharpest opponents-can predict the impact of this undertaking on Samsung's profit and loss and future development direction. Fourth, people can't compete with Lee Kun-hee, the president of the market. He may dominate Samsung, but the god who dominates the business destiny is not so accommodating. Let's see what he faced when he launched a fierce attack on the automobile industry. At that time, South Korea was on the verge of a great economic recession-1at the end of 997, an unprecedented economic crisis swept across South Korea, which led to a sharp depreciation of the won and a sharp rise in the prices of imported raw materials. To make matters worse, the domestic demand for automobiles has greatly decreased, from the annual growth of13% (1990-1995) to 4%. The annual output of Korean cars is 2.4 million, while the domestic market demand is only 6.5438+0.6 million. Oversupply has become a major problem in South Korea's automobile industry. At that time, it was predicted that this market saturation would reduce the factory utilization rate of all Korean automakers to below 60% after 2000. For Samsung, to be competitive, the annual output must reach at least 240,000 vehicles. However, the company does not have enough funds to achieve it without affecting its finances. Even those successful car manufacturers, such as Nissan and Mazda, have fallen into a serious financial crisis because of the decline in sales and the depreciation of stocks. For Samsung, getting government support is crucial. In order to finance new business, the company has to borrow a lot from banks, which must be approved by the government. However, the government has issued policies to restrict large-scale diversified enterprises from continuing to expand into new fields, so as to prevent excessive competition and maintain the balance of securities investment in the whole economy. Samsung is also facing enormous political pressure, especially to improve efficiency by giving up inappropriate business and downsizing. Now, their decision to add new business projects directly conflicts with the government's bill, which leads to tension between them and government officials. Samsung's first attempt to get government approval was unsuccessful and their request was rejected. Cul-Soo Kim, Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy of South Korea, resolutely opposes Samsung's entry into the automobile industry. He pointed out many warning signs, such as excessive competition and slow market growth. However, Li Jianxi made up his mind to play the "Busan brand" in the consultation with the government. Busan was the power base of South Korean President Kim Young-soo at that time, and building a factory there was an excellent career for Busan residents. After two months of negotiations, under the strong demand of local residents, President Kim finally softened and Samsung was born. Samsung's political strategy is costly. The high land price makes Busan not an ideal place to build a factory. As a result, this move cost a lot of money, resulting in a production cost of 26.2 million won (2 1.825 USD) per vehicle, which is simply not feasible compared with the production cost of 2.4 million won and 3.3 million won per vehicle per day. In addition, Samsung also signed a license agreement with Nissan, which is quite unfavorable to it, thus further increasing the burden on the company. Samsung agreed to import some core parts of Nissan in exchange for 1.6%- 1.9% of its sales, but the average sales profit of Korean automakers at that time was only 1%. Faced with so many unfavorable conditions, it is impossible for Samsung to successfully launch the automobile business. In fact, its car itself is still very good, but the execution efficiency and product quality are only necessary but not sufficient conditions for commercial success. Despite many favorable comments, Samsung only sold less than 50,000 cars (mostly to employees), and the Busan Automobile Factory with an annual output of more than 240,000 cars built at a cost of $3 billion could not show its magic. In the first half of 1998 alone, Samsung lost156 billion won, and its debt rose from 2.6 trillion won at the end of 1997 to 3.6 trillion won. Many observers believe that Li Jianxi has no choice but to give up his passion for automobile manufacturing. 1999 At the beginning of this year, Samsung filed bankruptcy management with the bank to recover its losses through various means. 5. What's wrong? Samsung, like Iridium, is also a business with a very low probability of success. From the beginning, the cage has been made. The so-called "cold current" of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) emergency fund assistance program has frozen the domestic market in South Korea, and its automobile demand has plummeted to 35% in the previous year, and many production lines are idle. After competitors merged into two other weaker companies in the Korean auto industry, Samsung had to stand on its own feet, but it didn't help. Despite their efforts to recover, in May 2000, their creditors decided to sell 70. 1% of Samsung's shares to French car manufacturer Renault for $56 million. Many analysts believe that the deal is really a good deal for Renault, given that Samsung has invested $5 billion, of which $3 billion is for the factory in Busan. Although the company's managers are opposed to this transaction, the creditor's attitude is very firm, and further delay will only lead to the closure of more parts suppliers (because Hyundai and Bluebird do not allow their main parts suppliers to sell auto parts to Samsung, Samsung has to establish its own supply network. Unless Samsung can rally, these suppliers will only go bankrupt. Obviously, Samsung should not enter the automobile industry in the mid-1990s when the domestic and international markets were oversupplied. The economic crisis and the fiasco of the automobile industry have forced Samsung Group to carry out painful restructuring within the whole company in order to survive. In order to make the financial structure more sound, they were forced to sell 10 subsidiary and fired 50,000 employees. Finally, Samsung is lucky as a whole. For an enterprise with a long history, this public failure is only a warning of what will happen when a large and resource-rich enterprise is completely dominated by its private boss. But did you really learn your lesson this time? Although in the 200 1 reorganization, Lee Jae-yong, the 34-year-old son of Li Jianxi, was appointed as the deputy general manager of Samsung Electronics, which was the biggest promotion in the company's history. The final result is still unknown.