What is Kant's Copernican Revolution?

Chapter 15 Kant's so-called Copernican revolution

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When Kant writes at the end of 18, he will be familiar with the viewpoint expounded by Montacq Le, Beye and others: Copernicus triggered an astronomical revolution. Moreover, by that time, people had widely used the word "revolution" to refer to the radical changes in science, aesthetics and even the whole ideological field. At that time, the "revolution" was still very slim. Therefore, considering Kant's prominent position in the history of philosophy, his views on revolution and revolution in science are particularly important for us to study these concepts in the18th century. But it is generally believed that Kant attributed his philosophical innovation to a Copernican revolution, so these views are even more interesting.

The myth of Kant's Copernican revolution

In his authoritative book Mechanization of World Images (196 1 299), Dohuk Stacius asserted that "since Kant, the concept of' Copernican Revolution' has always been a clear expression of a fundamental change in some opinions or viewpoints. In the history of science, 1543 is regarded as the actual boundary between medieval and modern times. A large number of works on Kant's thought and the history of philosophy hold that Kant compared his philosophical achievements to a Copernican revolution. The Open University a few years ago (this is a bold attempt by British TV stations in mass education. It is equivalent to a bachelor's degree for those who can't study in colleges or universities through normal channels. ) It is planned to offer the course "Revolutionary Times" in the Second Horizon. Two of the main units are called "Kant's Copernican Revolution"; The subtitle of one unit is "speculative philosophy" and the subtitle of another unit is "moral philosophy". In the first unit, the author (Vichy, 1972, 10) mentioned "Kant's Copernican revolution in speculative philosophy", but he never explicitly regarded this concept as Kant's own creation. In the second unit (Hanfling 1972, 23-25), the author said unequivocally, "Kant himself did not clearly compare his efforts in moral philosophy with the Copernican revolution, just as he did not compare his achievements in speculative philosophy. However, I think we can still say fairly (and people often say so) that this comparison applies to both the former and the latter. "

Readers who are neither familiar with Kant's literature nor the history of philosophy cannot know how the belief in Kant's Copernican Revolution is almost universal (especially among British and American writers). Here are some examples we randomly selected:

Kant ... in the preface of Critique of Pure Reason ... talked about the Copernican Revolution planned in our way of thinking. (Bird 1973, 190- 19 1)

Kant compared his philosophical revolution with the revolution initiated by Copernicus. (Peyton 1936, 1: 75)

Now we can understand what Kant meant when he claimed to have triggered a philosophical revolution similar to Copernicus' astronomical revolution. (Yuanda 1978, 12)

Kant compared this new method of imagining the possibility of innate knowledge with Copernicus's revolution in astronomy. (Lindsay1934,50)

He insisted that his Copernican revolution did not damage the empirical reality of the empirical world, just as Heliocentrism did not change or deny the phenomenon of the empirical world. (Compton 1960, 6: 242)

In the preface to the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, he compared himself with Copernicus, saying that he caused a Copernican revolution in philosophy. (Russell 1945707)

Kant said that he himself caused a "Copernican Revolution". (Russell1948,9)

The whole significance of Kant's comparison is that we have found a revolution in two hypotheses, or completely revised a basic hypothesis that no one opposed long ago. In one case, the hypothetical observer is static, while in another case, the observer is passive. (Wilton1945,77)

What is particularly surprising is that Kant himself marked a revolution that he thought was caused by Copernicus. However, there is nothing Copernicus in it except that he thinks it is a revolution ... because his revolution, in itself, is an anti-Copernican revolution in a strict sense. (Alexander1909,49)

... Kant himself proudly called one of his ideas the Copernican Revolution. (Pop 1962, 180)

Kant believes that his criticism of reason caused the "Copernican Revolution" in philosophy. (Aiken1957,31)

As we all know, Kant specifically mentioned "Copernicus Revolution" in the preface of Critique of Pure Reason, thus making a concise statement on the problem. (Lukacs 1923, 1 1 1)

In the preface of the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason (1787), Kant will mention his Copernican Revolution ... (Knight 196 1, 3: 589).

I think Kant's theory is a great personal philosophical achievement of the Copernican revolution. Kant himself mentioned this point many times. (Oizerman 1972， 12 1)

On Kant's Basic Thought of Copernicus Revolution. (Deleuze 197 1, 22-23)

Kant was very happy that he completed a real philosophical revolution ...-this revolution can be compared with Copernicus's revolution in cosmology and mathematical order. (Devo, 1955434)

Kant's revolutionary action in the history of thought, his "Copernican Revolution". (William Min1955,358)

This series of quotations we have made makes people more convinced of a quite common view among philosophers: (a) there has been a Copernican revolution, and (b) Kant thinks that his own fundamental innovation in philosophy is another Copernican revolution after that revolution, or like a Copernican revolution. If you spend half an hour browsing the shelves of the library casually, you can find at least dozens of such statements; These statements are all from famous scholars and published in the works published by first-class academic and university press in China. In addition, the encyclopaedia (that is, a part of the so-called 15 version of the Encyclopedia Britannica) is described as "detailed interpretation"; 1973, 10: 392) is authoritative:

Kant proudly declared that he had completed the Copernican revolution in philosophy. Just as Copernicus, the founder of modern astronomy, partly attributed the motion of stars to the motion of observers, thus explaining the apparent motion of stars, Kant proved how the innate principle of mind was applied to objects by revealing that objects are in conformity with the mind-in understanding, things should conform to the mind rather than the mind.

Many works about Kant or philosophy include the Copernican Revolution (Frasius1962,98 ff; Dewey,1929,287), The Copernican Revolution of Kant (Popper, 1962, 180). During the Gifford lecture hosted by Dewey in 1929, when talking about "seeking certainty", he boldly asserted: "Kant claimed to look at the world and our knowledge about the world from the perspective of knowledge subjects, thus causing a Copernican evolution in philosophy [sic, it should be a revolutionary revolution]". Dewey finally evaluated his contribution to philosophy as another Copernican revolution as important as Kant's revolution. A paper written by karl popper in 1954 (later republished in his conjecture and refutation (1962, 175 ff). )), part of which is devoted to Kant's "Copernican Revolution". Here, Popper quoted a sentence from Kant: "Our reason does not obtain its laws from nature, but imposes its laws on nature". In this regard, Popper commented: "This formula sums up an idea that Kant himself proudly calls his Copernican Revolution" (p. 180). A book (Willemin, 1954) devoted to Kant's legacy and Copernican revolution was also published. In the published literature compilation of the 3rd International Kant Congress held in 1970, at least three papers talked about "Kant's Copernican Revolution" (Baker, 1972,12,147,239), including

After all we have talked about, it would be surprising if Kant did not compare his contribution with Copernicus' revolution, both for readers and for myself. And I believe readers will fully understand why, after writing this chapter, I found it necessary to return to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason more than once (it was first published in German and three English versions of L.J.M.D. Meiklejohn,1855; Max Zuller， 188 1； Noah Kemp Smith (1929, and many reprints) convinced me that so many famous authorities in at least three languages might make such obvious mistakes persist. Is it possible that none of the audience in the Gifford lecture on 1929 knew Kant's original text, which may have attracted Dewey's attention to his mistakes? At the third Kant International Congress, no scholar of Kant School read Kant's works in German or English. Do you remember what he said? 1974, a paper (Steinek, 1975) read at the Copernican symposium, "Science and society: past, present and future", compares the Copernican revolution between Dewey and Kant (C. Cohen, 1975). This paper is discussed in an academic review (Cropp, 1975). This commentary raises the question: "Professor [Karl] Cohen ... described Dewey's philosophy as the product of a real Copernican revolution" (105), but the commentator did not correct the formulation of Kant's Copernican revolution; Moreover, it is obvious that no readers have done this.

Those who discuss Kant's Copernican revolution and actually provide the basis for Kant's so-called analogy refer readers to the preface of the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason (1787; The first edition is at 178 1). As we will see later, this new preface is very interesting because it discusses the revolution in science (mathematics and experimental physics) and the revolution in knowledge development. About Copernicus, Kant actually said this (from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 1926, page 20, that is, page Bxvi):

So what we are doing now is the same as Copernicus' according to its basic assumptions. The assumption that "all celestial bodies revolve around the observer" cannot explain the motion of celestial bodies, but Copernicus assumes that the observer rotates and the planet is stationary to test whether it is easy to succeed (Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Lan, Sanlian Bookstore, 1957, p. 12- 13).

Here, people don't need to be a German scholar, or even be very familiar with German, so we can see that in this passage we quoted, Kant said in terms of Copernicus' "basic intention" or "basic idea", not "in terms of a revolution". In today's translation, Norman Kemp Smith changed Kant's "original idea of Copernicus" into "basic assumption of Copernicus". This may provide a reasonable explanation for Kant's intention, but in fact it completely deviates from Kant's simple and clear expression. Therefore, Kemp Smith added a footnote to the original German phrase. His translation is:

Therefore, it should be carried out according to Copernicus' basic hypothesis [MIT Denersten Gedanken des Kopernikus]. Because the motion of celestial bodies cannot be satisfactorily explained based on the assumption that all celestial bodies revolve around the observer, he made an attempt: would it be more successful if the observer rotates and the planet is stationary?

However, in Kemp Smith's annotation (1923), the reader didn't get any hint. Kant wrote "MIT den ersten gedanken des kopernikus" instead of "MIT der ersten potash des kopernikus".

This passage of Kant clearly illustrates his intention. In astronomy before Copernicus, it was assumed that all the complexities of planetary surface motion were realistic. However, in astronomy after Copernicus, people see that the complexity mentioned here is partly due to the position of the observer on a moving earth. Earlier metaphysics also made a similar assumption: all external appearances (phenomena) of things have a reality beyond cognitive mind, just as the complexity of planetary motion was also true to astronomers before Copernicus. Kant's new view assumes that the object we know is not "the thing in it", but the result of the interaction between our mind and the object we feel. Therefore, Kant's views on "what things look like in them" and "what things look like in front of us"

It is obvious to us) makes an important distinction (Kemp Smith,1968,38).

Kant's approach may be similar to the traditional Copernican revolution, because in astronomy and mathematics, we can see "a revolution that has not been criticized for a long time, or a radical revision of a basic idea" (Wellington1945,77). In other words, "in one case, people assume that the observer is static, and in another case, people assume that the observer is passive." Many philosophers have pointed out that Kant's so-called revolution is not a real Copernican revolution. As Bertrand Russell (1948,9) said, "Kant said that he completed a Copernican revolution, but if he did, it would be more accurate, because he brought people back to the center where Copernicus overthrew people's authority."

No matter what Kant's actual intention is, he obviously and certainly doesn't mean that he has finished (or will finish) a metaphysical Copernican revolution. The whole paragraph (B xvi) we quoted above does not contain any such statement. It neither mentions the Copernican revolution nor any revolution in metaphysics (whether actual or imminent). However, although the Copernican revolution is not mentioned in any version of Critique of Pure Reason, there are signs of revolution in metaphysics. It is particularly noteworthy that Kant did not mention a Copernican revolution, because in the preface of the second edition, he fully developed the concepts of revolution in science and knowledge revolution. However, before stating Kant's revolutionary views, it is necessary to mention two other places that Kant mentioned Copernicus-both of which appeared in a note in the preface of the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason. In this note, Kant (1929,25 = bxxiiii) explained "the basic law of celestial motion"-probably Kepler's law-"how to provide Copernicus with the certainty that what was originally just a hypothesis was proved, and at the same time, it produced the proof of the invisible force (Newton's gravity) linking the universe." Kant added that Newton's gravity "will never be discovered" if "Copernicus did not dare to explore the observed motion in observers instead of celestial bodies". In these sentences, I can't find Kant expressing his view that the Copernican revolution has taken place; They may even suggest that the revolution only happened in the era of Kepler and Newton. These sentences do show Kant's role as "a change of view similar to Copernicus hypothesis". As far as [Copernicus's] hypothesis is concerned, Kant's "is only put forward as a hypothesis in this preface, aiming at drawing people's attention to these characteristics that originally tried to make such a change (this change is always assumed)". But-Kant asserted again-this hypothesis will be "proved to be inevitable, not hypothetical, from the nature of our representation of time and space and the basic concepts understood in the criticism itself".

In Kant's exposition, Copernicus's name only appeared when Kant mentioned "original thought" and the paragraph we just discussed. Copernicus is also mentioned in Kant's other works, but this has nothing to do with the concept of revolution. In short, a self-proclaimed "Copernican Revolution" of Kant, like the so-called Copernican Revolution in astronomy at the end of the century, does not seem to have much reality. Although at least three academic articles in famous magazines tried to tell philosophers that Kant did not compare his contribution with a Copernican revolution (Cross,1937; Hansen,1959; Engel, 1963), however, famous philosophers still give "Kant's Copernican Revolution" a prominent position in their works and articles.

Kant's view of scientific revolution

The discussion about scientific revolution in the preface of the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason is worthy of attention. /kloc-many scholars in the 0/8th century believe that revolution and sudden and remarkable leap have produced something completely new in science or something that did not exist before, and promoted the development of science. Kant is such a scholar. The first revolution he talked about was an exciting change in children's knowledge. The new meaning of the word "revolution" contained in this revolution is gradually being widely used by people. As far as the word "revolution" he used is concerned, strictly speaking, Kant is a new thinker (modern man) rather than a traditional advocate; The "revolution" he said does not refer to a certain period of change or a certain ups and downs, nor does it refer to a return to a more ideal state in the past, but a fundamental and progressive step, a complete and complete break with the past.

In Kant's view, the first revolution took place in the field of mathematics, which transformed the empirical knowledge of land investigation into a deductive system. The "real method" is the "new light" found in the mind of the first person (whether Thales or others) who demonstrated the nature of equilateral triangle. On this matter, Kant said (1929, P. 19 = bxi-xii):

The real method he created is not to test what he saw in the graph or the naked concept of the graph, to understand the essence of the graph, but to discover what is necessarily contained in the "concept of one's innate composition" and present this innate thing to one's own composition method, so as to show it in the graph. If he has an innate certainty about everything, he will never attach anything except what he must add to the graph by himself according to his concept.

Kant compares the "swinging road of science" to the "blind rope" here. This contrast or difference is not always easy to understand and grasp. However, fundamentally speaking, Kant seems to say that in logic, reason only deals with itself, but in scientific geometry, reason is used for things other than itself, such as geometric figures, especially equilateral triangles. The ideological revolution is to realize that "neither empirical observation nor conceptual analysis can help us prove any mathematical truth" (Peyton,1937,366). It is not enough to determine the nature of an equilateral triangle only by naked eye observation or inspection, nor is it enough to study the concept of such a triangle. On the contrary, "we must use the' construction' of the concept that Kant said; In other words, we must naturally show intuition consistent with our concepts. " Therefore, "Kant thinks that the earliest mathematician's discovery seems to be" (ditto):

We must construct graphics according to our own thinking and the concept of things that are inherently displayed; Moreover, in order to master certain innate knowledge, nothing is attached except what must be added to the graph according to his concept.

Kant believes that this fundamental change in geometry (1929, 19=B xi) "must be a revolution caused by one's brilliant thoughts". So this man pointed out that "this science must be enlightened, and only by following the Tao can we get real progress and unlimited expansion in all ages."

Kant insists that "this ideological revolution" is far more important than finding a route around the famous Cape of Good Hope. Then he mentioned "the commemoration of this revolution". Therefore, in a few lines on a page, there are three different revolutionary formulations ("revolution" twice and "veranderung" once) (P.19 = bxi).

In the next few short paragraphs (192, 19-20 = bxii), Kant turned from mathematics to "natural science-the natural science mentioned here is based on the principle of experience". It takes much longer for natural science to enter the "road of science" than for mathematics. Kant said, "Only a century and a half ago", Bacon "partially started" this transformation, and "to a certain extent" inspired new life and vitality among people who have embarked on the road of creating an empirical science, which can be said to be "the unexpected result of an ideological revolution".

In the next paragraph, Kant unabashedly "deduces the correct way of the history of experimental methods". Here he only mentioned the experiments of Galileo, Torricelli and Shtal as examples. He asserted that physics experienced a "benevolent revolution in viewpoint" and a favorable revolution in thought. For Kant, "the' benevolent revolution' in physics is based on' lucky thoughts', that is, when reason must explore in nature rather than make up facts, whatever reason itself is unknown but can only be learned from nature, reason must put itself in nature as its guide in this exploration". It is in this respect that "natural research has entered the solid road of science after centuries of blind pursuit" (PP.20-2 1 = b XIV).

The origin of this myth

After discussing mathematics and experimental or empirical physics, Kant turned to metaphysics, "a completely isolated speculative rational science" (P.2 1 = BXIV). He compared this subject with mathematics and natural science. He pointed out that mathematics and natural science "became so prosperous because of a sudden revolution" (PP.2 1-23 = bxv-XVI). On the third page of this discussion, the phrase "Mitden Erstengedankendes kopernikus" appeared. As we have seen, this statement can be literally translated as "having the original thoughts of Copernicus". Here, Kant's point of view is obviously that Copernicus has completed the transformation from the point of view of a static observer to that of a rotating observer. He showed that when people separate the observer's motion from the observed or surface motion of the sun, planets and stars, changes will occur. Therefore, Kant's understanding of Copernicus's "initial thought" seems to be in the sense of logical precedence rather than historical continuity. Moreover, if Kant wanted to say that Copernicus initiated or founded a revolution in astronomy, science or thought, why didn't he say so? Because, just a few pages ago, he was still discussing the revolution in science, and at the beginning of this page, he talked about the revolution in science. Obviously, this concept of revolution occupies a prominent position in his thoughts. Kant thought whether there was a Copernican revolution, but he certainly didn't say so in the preface to the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason. This fact seems to be more important when discussing the scientific revolution and ideological revolution in which Kant's comments on Copernicus are located. Of course, the reference to revolution at the beginning of the paragraph referring to Copernicus should not make critics think that Kant mentioned a Copernican revolution.

Kant said that he thought his book gave certainty to the metaphysical scientific method. He insisted that philosophers should try to simulate the process of mathematics and natural science, at least "as far as its analogy with metaphysical simulation is concerned, the same rational knowledge is possible" (1929,22 = bxvi). Since then, Kant described his legacy to future generations as a systematic metaphysics. He said, "This is a gift whose value cannot be underestimated", because "rationality will advance along the solid road of science, instead of the blind road of Diming without censorship and self-criticism as before" (P.30 = Bxxx).

Can we say that this change in metaphysics is a revolution? Kant gave a positive answer to this. He said that the purpose of his exposition is "to change the prevailing metaphysical methods and follow the practices of geometricians and natural philosophers, so as to launch an all-round revolution in metaphysics [einegan zliche revolution] (bxxii). Therefore, Kant joined the ranks of scientists in the18th century-Wei, lavoisier and Mara. These scientists all say that their job is to trigger and create revolution. But Kant did not say that the revolution belonged to Copernicus, nor did he cite Copernicus or astronomy as evidence. Because in any known letters, published works or manuscripts, Kant never mentioned the Copernican revolution. Therefore, it is impossible for him to say that his great contribution to philosophy was (or will be) to trigger a Copernican revolution.

Then, how can the literature we have read be so wrong? One possible explanation is that the metaphysical revolution is discussed at the beginning of a paragraph, and there is a long footnote in the previous paragraph, which talks about Copernicus and Newton. The annotator's mistake may be due to combining the sentence about revolution in metaphysics with the preceding footnote. However, because Kant used "examples of geometricians and natural philosophers" instead of astronomers, it seems to us that any possible (though not inevitable) connection is with the Newton-style revolution rather than the Copernican revolution. No matter what the source of the initial error is, it is obvious that the authors spread the facts to each other without carefully checking their sources. Although there are three warnings that Kant never described a Copernican revolution, and not many people in this area say that Kant triggered a Copernican revolution in metaphysics, this error still exists year after year in philosophical literature.

Just when I finished the final revision of this chapter, I saw that four books continued to have this age-old mistake. One of them was written by Roger Scrutton and published by Oxford University Press as one of the series of "Celebrities of the Past". In the book, the author emphasizes "Copernicus Revolution in Kant's Philosophy" (1982,28). The other is the great masterpiece of the late Ernst Cassirer (first published in 19 18). This work has been translated into English. A new Introduction to English Edition (198 1, vii) begins with a discussion of "Copernican Revolution in Kant's Philosophy". We also read: "The Copernican Revolution was based on a brand-new philosophy and philosophical method, which Kant described as critical and transcendental" (p.viii).

In a first-class book about Goethe, Kant and Hegel, walter kaufmann wrote (1980, 87-88): "Kant claimed to have completed a Copernican revolution". However, Kaufman believes that in Critique of Pure Reason, Kant "completed an anti-Copernican revolution. He reversed and overturned Copernicus' deafening attack on human self-esteem because he "brought people back to the center of the world". There is a very insightful entry about the Copernican revolution in the Dictionary of the History of Science (198 1), which emphasizes that this expression can have two meanings: one is that Copernicus "introduced a Heliocentrism system into astronomy" and the other is that "such a system was firmly established in the17th century with the revised elliptical orbit proposed by Kepler". Finally, the article commented: "Like Kant, people generally use the concept of' Copernican Revolution' to describe the fundamental change of any thought that can promote ideological progress." However, there is nothing about the so-called Copernican revolution in the entries about Kant behind the same dictionary.

It is not a recent invention to attribute a self-proclaimed Copernican revolution in philosophy or metaphysics to Kant. During the period from 1799 to 1825, at least four authors who studied Kant's philosophy publicly stated-in publications or lectures-that Kant himself expected or had begun a philosophical Copernican revolution. Charles de Villar, a Frenchman who has lived in Germany for many years, has written a large number of publications to explain Kant's thoughts to his compatriots. 1799, villar said in an article about the critique of pure reason in the northern witness that Kant's meditation on human knowledge and reasoning "made him think that a revolution similar to Copernicus's in astronomy was needed in metaphysics" (page 7). Then, in the preface to the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason (B.xvi), Villar explained the essence of Kant's revolution with similar terms and wording as when Kant himself described "Copernicus's original thought". In another book, Kant's Philosophy (180 1, page VIII-X), Villar hinted that Descartes, lavoisier, Copernicus and Kant had caused an ideological revolution.

16 years later, Victor Cushing once again brought up the topic of Kant's Copernican revolution. Cushing was one of the most widely read philosophers of his time, and his books were reprinted in many versions. In his speech at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Paris, he linked Kant with the Copernican Revolution. His speech was not published until 184 1. According to the "notes" written by the editor, these lectures were the first to introduce Kant's system in French universities (184 1, IV-V). In the second edition (1846,1:105-13), people clearly know that Cushing also taught Kant's thoughts in 18 16. 18 17, when he was able to read Kant's works from the original German (1: 255, N.2), Cushing explained that "the revolution caused by Kant in metaphysics is the same as that caused by Copernicus in astronomy". He is in 1820 (1842, 1846, 1857 edition; 1854 English version), Cushing said, "Kant realized that he