The two sides and results of the battle of Yiling

Battle name: The Battle of Yiling, also known as the Battle of Yiling and the Battle of Xiaoting.

The Battle of Yiling is one of the three major battles in the history of the Three Kingdoms, namely, the Battle of Guandu, the Battle of Battle of Red Cliffs and the Battle of Yiling.

The warring parties: Sun Quan and Liu Bei.

Commanders: Lu Xun, Liu Bei.

It broke out in A.D. 222, which was a war between Wu (Sun Quan) and Liu Bei (Liu Bei) in the Three Kingdoms period for the eight counties in Jingzhou, a strategic place. It is also a famous successful example of active defense in China's ancient war history. Edit this paragraph | Back to the Top Battle Background After Cao Pi abolished the Han Emperor, Wei State was established, and then Liu Bei and Sun Quan also established two countries. In the battle of Jingzhou, Guan Yu and his adopted son Guan Ping were killed by Sun Quan, the prince of Wu. Liu Bei did not listen to the advice of Prime Ministers Zhuge Liang and Zhao Yun, and decided to devote all his strength to attack Wu and avenge Guan Yu. Sun Quan failed to make peace several times, so he had to send a young Lu Xun to stop him. "Lost Jingzhou" comes from this passage edited by this campaign | Back to the top of the campaign, Sun Quan of Soochow occupied Jingzhou, which destroyed Zhuge Liang's Longzhong strategy (Longzhong said, "There is cotton in the north, Bashu in the east, and Bashu in the west. This is a country with military power, but its owner can't keep it. This is almost a gift of generals. Does the general care? Yizhou is a dangerous place, fertile land is thousands of miles away, and the land of abundance makes Gaozu emperor. Liu Zhang is weak, Zhang Lu is in the north, the people are rich but don't know how to keep shirts, and the wise think of the wise. The general is the emperor's palace, loyal to the four seas, commanding heroes, thinking of the wise and thirsty. If there are advantages and benefits across it, rock resistance will be guaranteed, Sun Quan will be well established externally, and the world will be changed internally. Then the general was ordered to turn Jingzhou's army to ten thousand and Luo, and the general led Yizhou people out of Qinchuan, but the people did not dare. If this is the case, the hegemony can be reached and the Han family can flourish. " ), so that Liu Bei does not have unified conditions. If Liu Bei wants to destroy Cao Wei or Sun Wu, according to Longzhong's statement, Jingzhou must be retaken, otherwise it can only be separated by Shu Dao. Liu Bei had to retake Jingzhou, whether for his imperial career or to avenge the country, but because he was too eager to retake Jingzhou, Liu Bei sent his troops in a hurry before Shu was ready. Edit this paragraph | Return to the top of the activity. The two sides fought several times and both won and lost. Later, Lu Xun adopted a defensive strategy and could not persist. This strategy upset Liu Bei's plan to make a quick decision. Because Shu is located in the hills, it is very inconvenient to transport grain, and the weather at that time is very sultry, which makes the Shu army very depressed. So Liu Bei ordered the soldiers to station in the dense forest and even guard the camp. Lu Xun thought that the opportunity had come, so he launched an attack, burned the camp for 700 miles and defeated the Shu army.

After Battle of Red Cliffs in 208 A.D., Jingzhou, the strategic place governing the eight counties in the north and south of the Yangtze River, was divided up by Cao Cao, Liu Bei and Sun Quan. Cao Cao occupied Nanyang and northern Jiangxia, Sun Quan occupied Nanjun and southern Jiangxia, and Liu Bei captured Changsha, Wuling, Lingling and Guiyang. In 2 10 AD, at the request of Liu Bei and the persuasion of Lu Su, Sun Quan lent Liu Bei a strategic place on the north bank of the Yangtze River. In this way, Liu Bei actually basically controlled Jingzhou. Soon, Liu Bei captured Yizhou and Hanzhong successively, and the situation of Wei, Wu and Shu in history was thus formed. Hanzhong and Jingzhou are two strategic bases of Shu Han. From Hanzhong, you can go north to Tongguan and attack Chang 'an. From Jingzhou to the north, you can attack Xuchang through Xiangyang, and from the east, you can go straight to the hinterland of Wu, making it in a favorable position of both offensive and defensive.

Wu Dong's political power in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River is deeply disturbed by the rapid development of Liu Bei's power. Just because the common resistance of both sides to Cao Shang is the same strategic goal, this contradiction has not intensified for the time being. By AD 2 1 1, Sun Quan occupied Jiaozhou (now Guangdong and Guangxi), and his influence further expanded. At that time, Cao Cao was busy annexing the forces of Ma Chao and Han Sui in Guanzhong, stabilizing the rear, and had no time to look south. Sun Quan took this opportunity to ask Liu Bei to return Jingzhou, and Liu Bei refused to return it on the pretext that "Liangzhou is needed and Jingzhou is the phase". The contradiction between the two countries has become increasingly acute, and once they met each other. In the end, although an agreement was reached to divide Jingzhou equally: with Xiangshui as the boundary, Sun Quan occupied Jiangxia, Changsha and Guiyang, and Liu Bei occupied Nanjun, Wuling and Lingling, but the contradiction between the two countries was not really eliminated.

In AD 2 19, Sun Quan led the army to attack Xiangyang and Fancheng in the north with Guan Yu, commander-in-chief of Jingzhou in Shu. When he fought fiercely with Cao Wei's army, causing emptiness in the rear, he sent general Lv Meng to cross the Baidu River, which was the rear base that Guan Yu attacked and occupied. Guan Yu hurried to lead the army to rescue after hearing the news, and he was defeated and died. Sun Quan then occupied the whole Jingzhou. In this way, the contradiction between Sun and Liu intensified in an all-round way, which eventually led to the battle of Yiling.

In 22 1 year, Liu Bei proclaimed himself emperor in Chengdu, with the title of Han, known in history, and the title of Zhangwu. A month later, Liu Bei decided to attack Wu on a large scale in an attempt to avenge Guan Yu and recapture Jingzhou. Cao Pi and Cao Liu were happy to see the collapse of the alliance between Sun and Liu. They took the opportunity to fan the flames and sought opportunities in various ways, which aggravated the contradictions and conflicts between Wu and Shu and benefited the fishermen. During the Shu-Han period, Zhuge Liang, Zhao Yun and most other ministers and generals saw that a massive attack on Wu was not good for Shu, so they repeatedly warned Liu Bei not to send troops to attack Wu. However, the angry Liu Bei didn't listen to these opinions at all.

As for Sun Quan, after taking Jingzhou, in order to consolidate vested interests and not aggravate the conflict between Wu and Shu, he sent envoys to make peace with Liu Bei twice, but Liu Bei flatly refused. Zhu Gejin (Zhuge Liang's younger brother), the satrap of Nanjun County, also wrote to Liu Bei, telling him that he was very interested and hoped that Liu Bei would stop attacking Wu. Liu Bei also ignored it.

In July of 22 1 year, Liu Bei personally led more than 100,000 Shu and Han armies and waged a large-scale war against Wu. At that time, the border between the two countries had moved westward to Wushan, and the Three Gorges of the Yangtze River became the main channel between the two countries. Liu Bei sent generals Wu Ban and Feng to lead more than 40,000 people as vanguard troops, seized Xiakou, occupied the territory of Wu State, defeated Li Yi and Liu Abe in Wu County (now Badong, Hubei Province), and occupied Zigui. In order to prevent Cao Wei from taking the opportunity to attack, Liu Bei sent Huang Quan, the general of Zhenbei, to the north bank of the Yangtze River, and sent Ma Liang, the deputy commander, to Wuling, in order to win over the local tribal leader Shamok and the Shu-Han army.

Facing the strategic attack of the Shu army, Sun Quan stepped forward. General Zhenxi and right-back Lu Xun were appointed as viceroy, commanding Zhu Ran, Pan Zhang, Han Dang, Xu Sheng and other 50,000 people to go to the front to resist the Shu army. At the same time, send messengers to Cao Pi to make up for it and avoid fighting on two fronts.

After Lu Xun took office, through careful analysis of the strength, morale and terrain conditions of both sides, he pointed out that Liu Beibing was strong, well defended, full of momentum and eager to win. Wu Jun should temporarily avoid the edge of the Shu army, wait for the opportunity to break the enemy, and patiently persuade Wu Jun generals to give up the requirement of an immediate decisive battle. Decisively implement the strategic retreat, and always retreat to a front line (now Yidu, Hubei Province) and Xiaoting (now Gubei, Yidu, Hubei Province). Then stop retreating and turn to defense to curb the continued invasion of Shu army. And concentrate our forces and prepare for the camera war. In this way, Wu Jun completely withdrew from the mountainous area, leaving hundreds of miles of mountains that were difficult to deploy to the Shu army.

In the first month of AD 222, Wu Ban and Chen's water army entered Yiling area and stationed troops on both sides of the Yangtze River. In February, Liu Bei personally led the main force from Zigui to Xiaoting and established the base camp. At this time, the Shu army had penetrated 200-300 kilometers into the territory of Wu, and stopped the eastward movement because it began to be resisted by Wu Jun. Under the condition that Wu Jun held the important position, the Shu army had to set up dozens of camps in Wuxia, Jianping (now Wushan North, Sichuan) and Yiling for hundreds of miles. In order to mobilize Lu Xun, Zhang Nan, the former commander-in-chief of Liu Bei School, led his troops to besiege Sun Huan, who was stationed in the Post Road. Sun Huan is Sun Quan's nephew, so the generals in Wu Jun asked for troops to rescue him. However, Lu Xun knew that Sun Huan won the hearts of the people, and Yi Daocheng had plenty of food and grass. He resolutely refused to divide his troops to help Yi Dao, avoiding the behavior of dispersing troops and consuming troops prematurely.

Schematic diagram of Lu Xun's counterattack in the battle of Yiling From January to June, the two armies were still deadlocked. In order to fight Wu Jun quickly, Liu Bei frequently sent people to the front to insult the challenge, but Lu Xun ignored it. Later, Liu Bei sent Wu Ban to lead thousands of people to camp on the flat ground, and in addition, he ambushed 8,000 troops in the valley in an attempt to lure the enemy deeper and annihilate Wu Jun. But the plan still failed. Lu Xun's insistence on not fighting undermined Liu Bei's strategic intention of relying on superior forces to make a quick decision. The soldiers of the Shu army gradually lost their fighting spirit and their dominant position. Jiangnan in June is in the heat season, and the heat is pressing, and the soldiers of the Shu army are miserable. Liu Bei was helpless, so he had to transfer the navy ship to land, set up a military camp in the deep mountain forest, rely on the stream, station troops to rest, and prepare to wait until autumn to attack. Because the Shu army is located on the rugged mountain road of 200-300 kilometers in Wu, far from the rear, it is difficult to provide logistical support. In addition, Liu Bei's battalion is within a hundred miles and his troops are scattered, which provides an opportunity for Lu Xun to carry out strategic counterattack.

Seeing that the morale of the Shu army was low, Lu Xun gave up the operational policy of advancing by land and attacking Wu Jun, and thought that the time was ripe for a strategic counterattack. To this end, he wrote to Sun Quan, the king of Wu, saying: At the beginning of the war, he was worried that the Shu army would go hand in hand with the land and rivers. Now the Shu army has abandoned the ship and camped everywhere. Judging from its deployment, there will be no change. In this way, there is a chance to defeat the Shu army without difficulty. Sun Quan immediately approved Lu Xun's battle plan from defense to counterattack.

On the eve of a large-scale counterattack, Lu Xun sent a small group of troops to conduct a tentative attack. Although the attack failed, it enabled Lu Xun to find a way to defeat the enemy-the method of burning the Shu army company. Because Jiangnan was in midsummer and the climate was sultry at that time, the camps of the Shu army were all built with wooden fences, surrounded by Woods and thatch. In the event of a fire, it will burn to pieces.

After the decisive battle began, Lu Xun ordered Wu Jun foot soldiers to raid the Shu army camp at night and set fire to the wind. During the dinner, the fire was fierce and the Shu army was in chaos. Lu Xun took the opportunity to launch a counterattack and forced the Shu army to retreat to the west. Wu Zhuran led a large army of 5,000 men to break through the front of the Shu army, stabbed the rear of the Shu army, and surrounded the Shu army in Zhuoxiang (now west of Yichang, Hubei) with the Korean party, cutting off the retreat of the Shu army. Pan Zhang and his men stormed Feng's Shu army and broke it. In Xiaoting, Zhu Gejin, Luo Tong and Zhou Yin cooperated with Lu Xun's main force to attack the Shu army. Defending Yi Dao, Sun Huan also took the initiative to fight. Wu Jun went well, and soon broke through more than forty camps of the Shu army, cutting off the connection between the water army and both sides of the Yangtze River. General Shu, Feng and Sha were killed, and the commanders Lu and Liu Ning surrendered. Seeing the whole line collapse, Liu Bei fled to Ma 'anshan, northwest of Yiling, and ordered the Shu army to defend itself around the mountain. Lu Xun concentrated his forces and was besieged on all sides, annihilating tens of thousands of Shu soldiers. At this time, the Shu army was in flight, most of the casualties fled, and military supplies such as cars and boats were lost. Liu Bei fled overnight and arrived at Shimen Mountain (now northeast of Badong, Hubei). He was chased by general Wu, almost captured, and the defender Fu Tong was killed. Later, relying on the postmen to burn the equipment abandoned by the defeated soldiers and block the mountain road, they were able to get rid of the pursuers and escape into Yong 'an City (also known as Bai Di City, now Fengjie East, Sichuan).

At this time, Huang Quan, the general of the Northern Town of Shu Army, was leading his troops to defend Wei Jun in Jiangbei. After Liu Bei's defeat, Huang Quan's way home was cut off by Wu Jun, and he had to lead the people to surrender to Cao Wei in August.

After Liu Bei fled to Baidi City, generals Pan Zhang, Xu Sheng and others all advocated the pursuit of 56-point victory to expand the results. Lu Xun was worried that Cao Wei would take the opportunity to fish in troubled waters and attack the rear, so he stopped chasing and took the initiative to retreat. In September, Cao Wei really attacked Wu, but because Lu Xun was ready, Wei Jun finally failed. In April of the following year, Liu Bei was ashamed of Yiling's fiasco. He became ill and died in Baidicheng. The battle of Yiling ended like this.

The battle of Yiling was Liu Bei's last battle, with nearly 65,438+10,000 troops, but was defeated by Lu Xun in Wu Dong. It should be said that this is the first time to truly establish the tripartite confrontation between the three countries: Wu occupied Jingzhou, defended Xichuan, and the weakening of the alliance between Shu and Wu also eased the military pressure of Wei, which was in a period of recuperation (Cao Pi died and Cao Pi proclaimed himself emperor), and basically determined the territory of the three countries in the coming decades. Shu Han completely lost its military fortress Jingzhou (Hanzhong and Jingzhou are two strategic bases of Shu Han, from which they can go north to Tongguan and attack Chang 'an; From Jingzhou to the north, Xuchang can be attacked by Xiangyang, and from Jingzhou to the east, the hinterland of Wu can be attacked, which makes it in a favorable position to attack and retreat Wei and Wu. Most of the participating troops died or surrendered, and many generals and counselors died and surrendered, which further weakened the Shu-Wu alliance and indirectly caused the situation that Zhuge Liang and Wei struggled for decades but never came back. "Before they could conquer, they were already dead." The great defeat in Yiling War has a lot to do with Liu Bei's tactical mistakes, which is the biggest strategic mistake in his life. How did the "invisible" Bay make such a huge strategic mistake? Moreover, regardless of the opposition of their most trusted old ministers such as Zhuge Liang and Zhao Yun, they launched the Yiling War.

In the battle of Yiling, Lu Xun was good at correctly analyzing the enemy's situation, boldly withdrawing troops to lure the enemy, concentrating his forces, attacking from the rear, and skillfully attacking it with fire. In the end, Wu Jun, who was at a disadvantage of 50,000, defeated the Shu army in one fell swoop with superior forces, creating a successful example of changing from defending to attacking, which reflected superb command art and military talent, indicating that he was worthy of being an outstanding military commander. As for Liu Bei's failure, it was no accident. He "urges teachers with anger", relies on strong aggression, and commits the taboo of military strategists. In the specific operational guidance, he did not observe the geographical position, and took the troops into the rugged mountain road of 200 to 300 kilometers, which was difficult to expand. At the same time, in the face of Wu Jun's stubborn resistance, he didn't know how to change the operational deployment in time, but adopted a wrong camping method that didn't focus on everything, and finally fell into a passive position, leading to a fiasco and suffering the consequences of "destroying the army and killing the generals", which made people deeply touched.

The battle of Yiling also had a great influence on the tripartite confrontation of the three countries. For Shu Han, it greatly damaged the national strength and basically destroyed the grand strategic blueprint formulated by Zhuge Liang when he took countermeasures in the middle of the year. For Wu Dong, although he won the war, it further undermined the relationship between Wu and Shu. Strategically, it also broke the possibility of Sun and Liu Lianhe resisting Cao, laying the groundwork for the subsequent downfall of Wu and Shu. Edit this paragraph | Analysis of the case of returning to the top The Shu army has nearly 65,438+10,000 troops (700,000 in the romance), while Sun gave Lu Xun only 50,000 troops. Logistically, the Shu army sent Zhao Yun to supervise the grain and grass, so it did not fail because of the grain and grass. Liu Bei failed because he didn't have the right time, right place and three taboos: the right time, right place and harmonious people. He chose the hot summer to attack Wu, which was nothing to defend the country, while Shu, as an attacking country, marched in the scorching sun every day, making the soldiers' periods and bodies slowly weak. If it's just the weather, the Shu army can still rely on the number of troops to win. However, the loss of geographical location created a good opportunity for Lu Xun to sneak attack. The Shu army was stationed in the dense forest, although it was close to the river, but there was no way to fight against Wu Jun's attack. The most fatal thing is that Liu Bei didn't listen to Zhuge Liang's advice before going out to war, and then arranged for Zhao Yun, who was both wise and brave, to repeat the same mistakes. Finally, Ma Liang advised him not to station troops in the jungle and not listen, which created a good opportunity for Lu Xun's attack. So Liu Bei's failure is inevitable.