Application characteristics of Japanese ninja ~ Japanese imperial submarine water reconnaissance aircraft

After World War I, the signing of 1922 Washington Naval Treaty decided that the overall strength of the Japanese navy was weaker than that of Britain and the United States.

? In order to make up for the lack of strength, the Japanese empire first dug deep into the potential of the displacement of warships and tried to stuff stronger equipment on warships of the same tonnage. Secondly, it envisages nine stages of gradual reduction for the next possible decisive battle at sea in the Pacific Ocean.

However, how to find and track the enemy's main fleet in the vast Pacific Ocean? Unlike the British Empire, the Japanese Empire has no overseas colonies all over the world, and there is no naval base that controls the main access to the ocean.

In order to make up for the lack of marine reconnaissance capability, Japan attaches great importance to the aviation reconnaissance capability of the navy. Not only has it become a country with the world's first specially designed aircraft carrier (Fengxiang, designed in 2009, launched in 2009, 1923, earlier than the British competitive god), but it has also built and modified a large number of seaplanes, expanding the vision of the fleet.

In World War II, imperial japanese navy was the only country that equipped and used a large number of ship-borne submarines. The French and the British also tried this concept. The British modified the No.2 boat of the M-class submarine, dismantled the main gun and carried a Parnall Peto water reconnaissance plane, but their attempt was only a one-off experiment, which was not practiced in the war.

The above picture shows an E 14Y small water reconnaissance plane stored in the submarine NAGU in a disassembled way. It can be seen that the wing and the two water buoys are disassembled and stored separately. In order to store them in a narrow space, the vertical tail and horizontal tail of the tail can also be partially folded. The lack of vertical tail area has brought a problem, which is because the stability of zero small water reconnaissance aircraft is poor.

At the beginning of World War II, Japanese imperial submarines used the old 96-type small water reconnaissance plane (Watanabe E9W). With the mass production of a new type of small zero-type water reconnaissance aircraft, in the middle of 1942, Japanese submarines were gradually replaced with small zero-type water reconnaissance aircraft.

Due to the limitation of size and weight, the performance of these two reconnaissance planes is similar, and they are both equipped with nine-cylinder air-cooled engines with a power of 340 HP.

Wushi-1 four-type catapult

The Japanese navy initially adopted the mode of taking off from the sea by itself for water reconnaissance. Later, the submarine was equipped with Wu-I-III catapult for ejecting seaplanes. In the design of submarine B, the Japanese navy also developed the Wu-I-IV catapult.

The length of Wu-I-IV catapult is about 19 m, which is 0.4 m shorter than that of Wu-II-V catapult used on cruisers, and its ejection capacity is about 1.6 ton. It adopts compressed air ejection mode instead of powder ejection mode of Wu-II-V catapult, which is suitable for the actual situation of submarine surface ejection.

According to the test of Japanese navy, acceleration exceeding 3G is harmful to human body, so the average ejection acceleration of Wu-I-IV catapult is 2.5G (lower than the average value of Wu-II-V). In addition, due to the high freeboard of the cruiser, Wu-II-V is ejected parallel to the water surface, while Wu-I-IV is ejected upward at a certain angle with the water surface (similar to the jump deck takeoff used by aircraft carriers).

When the seaplane needs to perform a task, the submarine floats to the surface first, and then dispatches maintenance personnel to take the parts of the seaplane out of the hangar for assembly.

A well-trained two-person maintenance team can complete the assembly of seaplane in 6 minutes and 23 seconds at the shortest. Usually within 10 minutes, the small seaplane will be assembled and put on the Wu-I-IV catapult.

Pilots and investigators enter the cockpit of the aircraft for routine equipment inspection. After the inspection, they started the engine running at low speed and prepared to take off.

Under the command of maintenance personnel, Wu catapult ejected the small seaplane into the air by using the compressed air stored in the air storage tank.

During recovery, the seaplane first landed on the ocean near the submarine, and then the maintenance personnel put the sling close to the seaplane, connected the sling to the fuselage of the seaplane, and lifted the seaplane with a small crane at the front of the submarine and placed it at the tail of the catapult. After the crew left, the maintenance personnel disassembled the seaplane again and stored it in the bucket hangar. In this way, a complete launch-recovery process of submarine seaplane is completed.

19411February 8th, at the beginning of the Pacific War, imperial japanese navy was equipped with 62 submarines, of which nearly one fifth of the * * * 12 submarines had reconnaissance capability.

They are:

Patrol submarine type 2 (I-6);

Patrol submarine type 3 (I -7, I-8);

Run in A (I -9, I-10) by force;

Liu B (I-15, I-17, I-19, I -2 1, I -23, I -25, I-26);

However, flying a small seaplane on a submarine requires pilots with high ability and quality, and the Japanese navy lacks talents in this field. So in the attack on Pearl Harbor, only the following six submarines were equipped with seaplanes.

Yi -7 (Watanabe E9W), Yi -9, Yi-10 (Watanabe E9W), Yi-15, Yi -25 and Yi -30.

/KOOC-0/942/KOOC-0/2/KOOC-0/6, the submarine I -7 ejected its Type 96 small water reconnaissance plane (Watanabe E9W) and conducted reconnaissance on the attack effect at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The pilot reported that he saw the damaged battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 5 cruisers and 30 other ships.

However, when the Type 96 small water reconnaissance plane returned to the submarine for landing, in order to shorten the stay time of the submarine on the sea, the pilots and investigators decided to abandon the plane and swim back to the submarine.

Another case in 4 1 took place one week before the war.1941165438+10 on October 30th, the submarine I-10 launched a Type 96 small water reconnaissance plane in the South Pacific to conduct aerial reconnaissance on Suva, Fiji. Due to the bad local weather, the reconnaissance plane crashed, which led to the crash of the plane.

This incident confirms my above point of view. In the early days of World War II, the water reconnaissance plane was difficult to use, and the pilot's driving skills were highly required. The two experiences of 194 1 year influenced the Japanese army's use strategy of submarine aircraft throughout World War II.

Japan's submarine-borne water reconnaissance plane will not take off every day for air patrol to increase the alert range of Japanese submarines. I think when and where the seaplane takes off is directly controlled by the Japanese submarine command on the shore, not the submarine commander.

During the whole World War II, Japanese submarine carriers were often transported to enemy bases and home ports by submarines. The aircraft carrier that took off scouted fixed targets and never carried out patrol/alert tasks for targets in unknown locations. I think the Japanese side uses this method mainly to avoid the loss of aircraft carriers in daily patrol operations.

1942 65438+1On October 4th and February 23rd, I-19 and I -9 submarines respectively launched Type 96 micro reconnaissance planes to conduct aerial reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor, which provided a reference for Japanese troops to assess the damage of Pearl Harbor and master the military trends of the US Pacific Fleet.

1the most active submarine in the first half of 942 was undoubtedly the I -25 submarine, which carried a small zero-type water reconnaissance plane and conducted aerial reconnaissance on the following allied bases on the following dates.

February 17, Sydney Harbour, Australia;

February 26, Melbourne, Australia;

March 1, Hobart, Australia;

March 8, Wellington, New Zealand;

March 12, Auckland, New Zealand;

March 18, Suva, Fiji;

23 March, Pago Pago, Samoa (cancelled due to bad weather);

1942 In April, in order to cooperate with Nanyun Mobile Force to fight in depth in the Indian Ocean, the Japanese army sent three carrier submarines, I -7, I-10 and I -30, into the Indian Ocean.

On April 3rd, I -7 planned to conduct aerial reconnaissance on trincomalee and Colombo military ports in Ceylon Island.

On May 7th, 8th and19th, I -30 continuously scouted the ports along the Persian Gulf, including Aden, Somali, Tanzanian St. Bakeer and Dalai Serum.

I-10 scouted Durban, South Africa on May 20th. In order to cooperate with the use of pocket submarines to attack the Indian Ocean, no large ships were found.

Subsequently, on May 30th, the submarine I-10 sent a reconnaissance plane to inspect Diego Suarez Port on Madagascar Island, and found that there were 1 "Elizabeth" class battleships and cruisers in the port.

Therefore, the Japanese later selected the special attack target of the pocket submarine as the port of Diego Suarez, Madagascar, and hit the British battleship Ramirez (R) and sank the oil tanker Loyalty (6,993 tons) in the attack on May 3 1 day.

At the same time, in the South Pacific, I -2 1 conducted aerial reconnaissance in Suva and Auckland successively. On May 23rd and 29th, I -29 and I -2 1 conducted aerial reconnaissance on Sydney Harbour twice, and found that there were 1 battleships moored in the harbour (Japanese investigators misreported the American heavy cruiser Chicago as. According to the information provided by this reconnaissance, the commander of the Japanese submarine force decided to attack Sydney Harbour on 3 1.

The Japanese attack submarine sneaked into Sydney Harbour to launch an attack. The target was a torpedo fired by Chicago and sank the camping boat Coutable (447 tons).

From the above investigation actions, it can be seen that the reconnaissance target of Japanese ship-borne submarines during this period was often the base of the Allied rear area, far from the strategic reconnaissance scope of the Japanese navy.

At the same time, in order to cooperate with the special attack of mobile forces and pocket submarines, Japanese ship-borne submarines also provided necessary reconnaissance information to support them before the war. 1942 in the first half of the year, * * * conducted six such support operations, four in the Indian Ocean and two in the South Pacific.

In the battle of midway from the end of May to the beginning of June, the Japanese army mistakenly used ship-borne submarines. In May, the carrier submarine was used to investigate the Aleutian Islands in the North Pacific many times, but none of them were deployed on the key midway island. With the failure of K's second operation, the operation of using a large airship to detect Pearl Harbor through midway refueling failed, and the Japanese side lost control of the movement of the American aircraft carrier.

With the failure of the battle of midway, the Japanese submarine force also withdrew from the front line and returned to the mainland to rest.

1from June to July, 1942, only two submarine reconnaissance operations were carried out in two whole months (10 in June, I -29 scouted Noumé a, New Caledonia in the South Pacific, and 15 in June, I -9 scouted Kodiak Port in Alaska).

1In August, 942, the United States launched a counterattack, Guadalcanal Island in Solomon Islands became the center of war, and Japanese submarine forces regrouped in the South Pacific. 1942 in the second half of the year, many ship-borne submarines were dispatched to cooperate with the operation, and repeated aerial reconnaissance was carried out on the main bases and ports of the US military to capture the main trends of the US military.

From August 1942 to February 1943, before Guadao retreated, the carrier submarine I * * * conducted several aerial reconnaissance operations at the following bases:

New Hebrides base group: 9 times.

New Caledonia: 4 times

Australia: 2 times

Other bases: 3 times

Therefore, 1942 has become the year with the largest number of submarine reconnaissance operations in Japan, with 4 1 time dispatched every year.

In addition, in order to distract the attention of the United States, in September 1942, the Japanese army also sent an I -25 submarine to the west coast of the United States, and twice used incendiary bombs to attack the forests of Oregon, USA.

1943 * * dispatched 9 times. The main reason why the Japanese submarine carrier troops dispatched less and less was that the garrison on the isolated island at the front line was in a state of supply cut-off, and it was difficult for surface ships and transport ships to supply the front line troops under the attack of allied aviation and surface ships.

In desperation, the Japanese army can only invest in the submarine force to undertake the transportation work, and the hangar of the submarine aircraft carrier is vacated and used as a warehouse.

Only 1944 dispatched five times, including two times to attack Majuro Atoll in Marshall Islands with a special type 4 internal fire boat (torpedo tank) to cooperate with "Operation Tornado".

April 22 1944, I -36 boat scouted Majuro Atoll.

June 1944, 12, I-10 Reconnaissance Majuro Atoll.

The other three times were reconnaissance operations by I -37 boats against allied bases in the Indian Ocean:

March 3, Chagos Archipelago

Diego Suarez, March 65438, 2005.

April 7, Mombasa and Pemba Island, Kenya

These reconnaissance operations of the I -37 boat should be initiated to grasp the movements of the British Pacific fleet.

Ninja in the Warring States period in Japan was such a profession. They sneaked into enemy-occupied areas in disguise and obtained important information by means of money purchase and assassination. Warring States generals rely on them to control the political situation and wage war.

The use of Japanese aircraft carrier submarines is very similar to the actions of ninjas. They often go deep into the base areas behind enemy lines, take off carrier-based aircraft to detect enemy movements, and report information to the Japanese command organization to provide reference for their subsequent decision-making.

Submarine-borne aircraft is not permanently configured, but temporarily configured. As mentioned earlier, the submarine-borne water reconnaissance plane needs the high skills of aircrew, and since the war, the Japanese army has been short of pilots and investigators for submarine-borne water reconnaissance planes.

This can be seen from the fact that I -25 carrier-based reconnaissance plane (pilot Nobuo Fujita and investigator Kenzo Okuda) attacked 12 times during World War II, accounting for 2 1% of all Japanese submarine aircraft in World War II.

Due to the performance and structure problems of small-scale water reconnaissance aircraft, this weapon is easy to be destroyed, so the Japanese army's use strategy is actually very conservative, and the submarine command will only specify the use time and target when it is extremely necessary. The submarine captain has no authority to call the water reconnaissance plane.

This can be confirmed by the memoir "Eleven Wan Li under the Sea" by the captain of I -36.

I -36 submarine was commanded by Yoshino Ino, who returned to Japan from Chiska on August 1943. Shibuya, the staff officer of the first diving team, came to the boat to convey the order of the commander of the joint fleet, ordering the I -36 to attack in early September, and on September 20, using the meteorological conditions of the full moon to conduct aerial reconnaissance operations on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

In order to carry out this mission, I -36 boat accepted a small zero-type water reconnaissance plane for reconnaissance, two flight attendants (pilot Fu Yongfu left the grassland and investigator Da Zhuosen second grassland) and two maintenance personnel.

Therefore, the water reconnaissance planes and pilots of Japanese ship-borne submarines performing aerial reconnaissance missions are not the standing armed forces of each boat, but are assigned by the submarine force command according to the needs of the mission. This rule makes the submarine carrier a strategic long-range reconnaissance weapon, not a tactical use.

Judging from the actual use, in order to avoid unnecessary losses, Japanese submarine carriers usually do not take off to perform patrol tasks, and cannot expand the horizons of Japanese submarines. Therefore, when carrying out the campaign of breaking off diplomatic relations, the carrier submarine has no special advantage compared with other submarines in Japan.

In the Japanese attack stage, submarine-borne aircraft played a certain auxiliary role in the Japanese mobile forces' sneak attack on Pearl Harbor and the Indian Ocean. In addition, in special attack operations, it is of great value to locate key targets and formulate attack plans for pocket submarines.

After entering the allied counterattack stage, if the Japanese submarine is not dragged down by the transportation task, there is still a chance to provide the Japanese with intelligence information of important enemy bases in the form of long-range reconnaissance.

As can be seen from the above figure, the number of reconnaissance operations against the enemy's main base is 42;

Among them, the South Pacific accounted for more than half, reaching 29 times. Followed by 8 times in the Indian Ocean, 5 times in the North Pacific (during the Battle of Midway Island) and 2 times in the Central Pacific (1Pearl Harbor in autumn of 943).

Secondly, among the 13 reconnaissance attacks in other operations, special attacks such as pocket submarines account for more than half. Secondly, it cooperated with Nanyun Mobile Force to attack 4 times and attacked the United States 2 times.

In the late World War II, the Japanese navy also tried to build a long-range special attack submarine force with the water attack aircraft as the main force by expanding the submarine scale and carrying a new type of water attack aircraft. By attacking the Panama Canal lock, the United States slowed down the speed of mobilizing these two foreign forces.

They include:

I-13 and I-14 boats, carrying two water reconnaissance planes.

I -400, I -40 1 and I -402 boats carry three "blue" water attack aircraft, which can carry 800 kilograms of bombs.

However, these dreams failed to come true with the defeat and surrender of the Japanese Empire and finally sank to the bottom of the sea.

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