Salhu weather

If the killing of Li Yong marked the end of the Ming and Qing wars, then the battle of Salhu undoubtedly opened the prelude to this half-century war. This war was not the node of the Ming Dynasty from prosperity to decline, but sounded the death knell from decline to extinction. In fact, before the battle really broke out, whether it was strategic layout or tactical preparation, the Ming army was almost certain to die. Tactically, look at the strength first. The Ming court claimed that it had more than 470 thousand troops in pre-war propaganda, which was the consistent practice of the war at that time. In the face of ordinary rebels, with the authority of the imperial dynasty, it is possible to win by shouting slogans (for example, Wang Shouren even deceived and scared away the garrison troops of Nanchang rebels). But Nurhachi is an old acquaintance of the Ming Dynasty or the army, and this method is completely useless to them. What is the actual strength of the Ming army? The official notification is reinforcements100,000 plus Liaodong 90,000, totaling nearly 200,000 people. ? Above _ Nurhachi's half-length robe, but even this figure is quite moist. In the middle and late Ming Dynasty, it was common for general schools to lie about the vacancy of soldiers. The reinforcements of the Ming army were drawn from all over the country, and the proportion of vacancies was different according to the priorities of the war. Take the elite as an example. At the end of the Ming Dynasty, the rated strength of the elite was120,000. Emperor Chongzhen sent an imperial inspection and found that less than half of them actually served, and most of them were old, weak and sick. Juniper, the newly appointed company commander of Shanhaiguan, led as many as 60,000 reinforcements, but according to the prison army, there were only more than 25,000. Liaodong originally garrison situation is even more tragic. Before the war broke out, Liaodong's army had been in arrears for three years, and their horses were not ready. The so-called strong GuanNingJun in the world, second only to Yuan Chonghuan Governor Sun Chengzong. Before the imperial court decided to "aggressively suppress", Ding Xiang, the company commander and deputy company commander of Liaodong, and Liang, the guerrilla general, had died in battle and suffered heavy losses. In order to supplement the shortage of Liaodong troops, the Ming court recruited 30 thousand strong men from Zhending and Baoding to Liaodong. However, these 30,000 people are just "planned recruitment" because the time is relatively hasty (less than one year), and the number may not meet the standards, let alone training. ? Above _ Yuan Chonghuan (1584- 1630) If the reinforcements are calculated according to the ratio of half to two thirds (assuming that recruits are recruited), plus the already broken Liaodong troops, the total strength of this war can only be around100000. In terms of strength, there is no disadvantage in founding the country. Their leader is a soldier, leading the Eight Banners Army, which integrates production and combat. According to the method of "Lu Niu-Jala-Gushan (Banner)", one Lu Niu has 300 people, one Jala commands five Lu Niu, and one Gushan commands five Jala, so the Eight Banners have 60,000 troops-but in fact, there are more than that. Under the national mobilization of Nurhachi, Mongolian tribes and other jurchen who surrendered to statehood participated in it. Li Yongfang, who surrendered when he conquered Fushun, also actively persuaded the Ming defenders in Liaodong to surrender, and used the Chinese character "Guangbuqinghe, threatening Beiguan". ? The second tactical factor in the situation map of Liaodong in the late Ming Dynasty is the combat effectiveness of the troops. What affects the combat level of soldiers is training and the relationship between men and women. Most of the generals of the Ming army raised a number of their own servants. These so-called servants are actually their own cronies. Their status is lower than that of ordinary soldiers, but their pay and wages are much higher than that of ordinary soldiers. With the expansion of the war, there were more and more servants of the Ming army, which led to the warlordization of the army and the loss of food. However, the Ming court still did not choose to solve this problem. The main reason is that the fighting capacity of servants is very strong-at least much stronger than that of ordinary foot soldiers, which is the core fighting capacity of an army, while most other troops are nominal. The reason for this is that there is a big problem in the conscription system in the Ming Dynasty: after the collapse of the medical system, the Ming army began to recruit in parallel, but the conscription was often hasty, and the soldiers recruited were weak. General generals could only choose their favorite soldiers as the core of centralized training. ? Above _ Yan Jiajun? Above _ Qi Jiguang So in Amin Army (except Qi Jiguang and other famous soldiers), almost only these dinking groups can have some fighting capacity. Such a military structure not only creates psychological barriers among soldiers, but also makes it difficult to cooperate and assist each other. Jianzhou tribe is different. They changed from the early social form of fishing and hunting. Huang taiji said they were "soldiers" and "farmers". They are not only familiar with the battle, but also make the soldiers under the same organization closer for a long time. Nurhachi was born in Liaodong border guards. After commanding the troops in Jianzhou, he began to "make the troops bright", emphasizing discipline and standardizing military orders in the management of military camps. Xiong Tingbi, an important official in the Ming Dynasty, recorded "slave stealing tactics". Dead soldiers were in front, sharp soldiers were behind, dead soldiers wore heavy armor, rode double Ma Chong before ... Dare not retreat, and killed them from behind when they retired sharp soldiers. "With such strict military discipline and organization, the Ming army at that time had been lost, and Nurhachi was used in his own army, which made the army full of fighting capacity. ? Above _ Schematic diagram of the Battle of Salhu? Above _ Schematic diagram of the Battle of Salhu Finally, weapons and equipment. In this war, the North Korean army participating in the war recorded that Liu Ge's Ming Lu Army "fought against each other, without guns or firearms, and relied entirely on our division". The Ming army, which has always relied on firearms, did not have guns and firearms in this crucial decisive battle, but relied on North Korea. When the Ming army asked North Korea to send troops, it was clearly stated that there must be 5,000 gunners among 10,000 North Korean soldiers. Not to mention armored protection. Later, Xu Guangqi, a famous minister, asked, "The juniper is the first arrow, and Pan Zongyan is the second. He is the chief town supervisor and has no excellent armor. What is the situation? " "Juniper and its Ministry Pan Zongyan died for their country, and both of them died tragically. Xu Guangqi pointed out that the Ming army did not have well-equipped armor from foot soldiers to generals. Juniper is the main force, even he and his men are still like this, and other Ming troops can imagine. In terms of founding the country, according to the information of Koreans and Liaodong people, Nurhachi has already assembled skilled craftsmen to cast weapons and armor for it, and the scale of the arsenal stretches for several miles. Their troops are well protected by armor, so they dare to take the lead and are not afraid of the firearms and bows and arrows of the Ming army. In fact, from these perspectives, the defeat of the Ming army has been decided, and the two sides will face each other head-on, and the United States will certainly gain an advantage. However, the Ming army made a big mistake in strategy and pushed a hundred thousand troops into the abyss. ? Above _ Xu Guangqi (1562.4.24-1633.11.8), the word first, the first mistake Levin, commander-in-chief of the Ming army in Hu Xuan, made was to divide his troops and attack. Later, Xu Guangqi explained that the army "soldiers" were outnumbered and divided into four ways. He often attacks one with four, and I often attack one with four. Isn't it true? " This is obviously a reproach for Levin's strategic failure. Levin's idea is to create an atmosphere of heavenly soldiers and generals to deter the enemy by dividing troops to suppress the Communist Party and combining soldiers. However, Nurhachi, a veteran who has served in the border guards of the Ming army for many years and has dealt with the Ming army for many years, will not be intimidated by this kind of fighting. As the head of the army who has occupied Liaodong for many years, he not only knows that the Ming army is poorly equipped, but also knows that there are many vacancies in the Ming army. Coupled with my own understanding of the terrain, I made full use of my mobility and adopted the strategy of "let you take several roads, I will only take one road" against the Ming army. Levin didn't think enough about the weather and terrain, which also created conditions for Nurhachi's attack. From the 16th day of the first month, it began to snow heavily in the northeast, so it was extremely difficult for the troops to March, and even the advance date of the troops had to be postponed. The slow progress made it impossible for the four armies to attack together and cooperate with each other. The first juniper crossing the river was defeated by Nurhachi and was isolated. When Liu Ge was trapped in the last road, he didn't know that the other three roads had been defeated. It can be said that Nurhachi's strategy has achieved absolute success. ? Above _ Battle of Salhu The second strategic mistake of the Ming army was to attack rashly. The Ming army was unable to cope with the Liaodong war situation under the circumstances of lack of food and clothing, poor equipment and insufficient training. It is the most correct way to move forward step by step. However, the Ming court, which was on the verge of financial collapse, repeatedly urged troops to attack, fearing "long-term defeat" and hoping to end the battle as soon as possible-juniper was driven out under such circumstances. His troops, even artillery and chariots, didn't carry big killers to deal with the enemy, so they marched across the river and died in defeat. After the defeat of the main force, the other three roads were just artificial knives to kill me. It is in this tactical gap that the Ming army adopted the most failed strategy, and its failure could be predicted before the war. Just a few days ago, Liu Ge was alone. He told North Korean generals that he had a problem with head coach Yang Hao and that he would rather be defeated than commit suicide. It seems that Liu Ge has always been pessimistic about the prospect of this war. The battle of Salhu was a complete failure. Three of the four generals of the Ming army died in battle, fled back and committed suicide, were jailed and finally executed. Nearly 50,000 soldiers were killed (if calculated by100,000 people, it would be nearly half of them), and almost all towns in Liaodong fell. Such a fiasco was definitely not caused by the dereliction of duty of several generals and commanders, but by the continuous decline of a regime, which concentrated many factors of a war. Text: Zuo Guangdou Reference:

The characters in "Lack of Country", "A Record of Ming Shenzong" and "Liao Shuo with Troops" were created by the team of the History University Hall, and the pictures came from the internet and were owned by the original authors.